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Preface 
 
A brief remark regarding the choice of language: apart from personal preferences, we are inclined 
to write this thesis in English, primarily because the various applications of Habermas’ theory to 
public relations—the main subject of this thesis—are published almost exclusively in English. 
When directly referring to Habermas, though, we will mainly do this with regard to the original 
German text. To, nevertheless, allow for a monolingual reading, longer German citations are 
accompanied by translations that can be found via endnotes tagged to the reference of the origi-
nal text in small Roman numerals, for example as in: (Habermas, 1983: 99)vii. Furthermore, refer-
ences to particularly relevant passages in Habermas’ texts will lead to both, the original text as 
well as the respective translation. 
 
Siegen, October 2010  A. B. 
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1 Introduction 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory is said to have the potential to serve as a “profound theoretical basis 
from which to reflect on [...] different functions of public relations in society, or different com-
municative styles of public relations” (Bentele, Wehmeier, 2009: 247), and it is stressed that his 
concepts provide arguments that are “extremely important for a theory of public relations” 
(Pearson, 1989c: 73). However when examining the academic discourse we realize that, in spite 
of this alleged significance, Habermas’ concepts, in their entirety, have hardly been utilized for 
public relations research (cf. Zerfaß, 2010: 62). Moreover, it is quite telling that in a recent and 
broad edition by Carl Botan and Vincent Hazleton (2006), which is labeled an extensive docu-
mentation of current public relations discourse (cf. Szyszka et al., 2009: 37), not a single reference 
or footnote is reserved for Habermas. Although Karl Nessmann (1995: 153) claims, for instance, 
that “Habermas’ thoughts on the topics of symmetrical communication, discourse, mutual under-
standing, dialog and consensus” can be seen as “particularly influential in the development of PR 
theory”, the author fails to substantiate the ‘particularity’ of this ‘influence’.1 What Nessmann 
refers to as theory development influenced by Habermas, on the most part, refers to “implicit 
assumptions behind theory” (Taylor, 2001: 636). It appears that it is not so much Habermas’ 
concepts in particular, but rather the more general status of the topics of communication symme-
try, dialog, discourse, etc. as “keywords in modern definitions” of public relations that leads the 
author to claim an ‘influence’ (Nessmann, 1995: 153). Ultimately, what Nessmann sees as a par-
ticular influence may be more correctly depicted as imprecise terminological borrowings that are, 
in fact, largely void of Habermas’ original concepts: a vague utilization of Habermas’ terms that is 
not uncommon within the field of communication studies (cf. Lang, 1993: 214).  
On the whole, a relatively select number of scholars in public relations research draws di-
rectly on Habermas’ concepts. To different extents, some of these applications have already been 
further addressed in the literature. Especially the popular efforts by Roland Burkart (cf. chap. 
3.2.2) and Ron Pearson (cf. chap. 3.3.1) are still subject to public relations discourse and are re-
viewed in a number of standard works of the field (cf. e.g. Grunig, 1992; Zerfaß, 2010; Bentele et 
al., 2008; Kunczik, 2010; Röttger, 2009a). Nevertheless, as Rodney Benson (2008) points out, the 
applications of Habermas’ theory to public relations have received scant critical attention,2 and a 
comprehensive analysis, also including other, less popular or more recent applications of 
Habermas’ theory, has not been conducted so far. In a 2007 special issue on social theory by Pub-
                                                
1 Nessmann’s only reference in this regard is to an article in a newsletter of the European Association of Public Relations 
Research and Education (CERP), which reviews a restricted number of papers submitted to this very association.  
2 A noticeable exception is the German-speaking discourse on the aforementioned efforts of Burkart. See especially 
the editions by Günter Bentele and Tobias Liebert (1995) as well as Walter Hömberg et al. (2010).  
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lic Relations Review, the article “On Jürgen Habermas and public relations” (Burkart, 2007) merely 
consists of a presentation of the author’s own model, even if the generality of the title may sug-
gest otherwise. In addition, the recently published volume on Public Relations and Social Theory by 
Øyvind Ihlen et al. (2009), which collects a number of different approaches to public relations 
that draw on prominent social theorists, contains a chapter dedicated to Habermas’ theory (cf. 
141–165). Here, once more, Burkart’s application is rearticulated by the author, who only deals 
with a restricted number of other applications of Habermas’ theory in a cursory manner, and 
completely neglects to mention the efforts of authors like Shirley Leitch and David Neilson 
(2001; see chap. 3.4.2), Craig Maier (2005; see chap. 3.2.1), or Mark Eisenegger and Kurt Imhof 
(2008; see chap. 3.2.3). Concluding the volume at hand, Günter Bentele and Stefan Wehmeier 
(2009) state in their article that the potential of the social theories discussed in the volume seems 
“to be even broader than shown so far, and other aspects of these theories, which are not men-
tioned in the chapters, could further inspire public relations theory building” (358).  
As we see it, the concluding remark by Bentele and Wehmeier also calls for a more com-
prehensive demonstration and discussion of possible applications of Habermas’ theory to public 
relations. Moreover, it is absolutely vital to the ‘discipline’ of public relations research in general 
to conduct critical ‘as-is-analyses’ of existing theoretical efforts, elaborate the central lines of dis-
cussion and analyze the specific potentials and challenges of different theoretical applications; to 
Ulrike Röttger, these are the essential preconditions for breaking new ground in public relations 
theory at present (cf. Röttger, 2009b: 9). In this sense, the thesis presented here makes an effort 
to respond to these ‘invitations’ found in the current discourse. According to these, the broad 
question, which stands at the center of our effort is: how can Habermas’ theory be applied to 
public relations and what are possible challenges that emerge? Attending to this central question 
we aspire to demonstrate various possible applications, detect and discuss existing challenges, and 
raise pivotal questions that may widen the spectrum of consideration and stimulate further dis-
cussion. It is on this foundation that we then aim to explore some selected aspects in more de-
tail.3  
We want to approach this effort first by offering an introduction into the terminological 
and conceptual ‘groundwork’ of public relations research as well as Habermas’ theory (chap. 2). 
On this basis we then take a comprehensive look at potential applications of Habermas’ theory to 
public relations (chap. 3). We do this by establishing four different ‘perspectives’ from which the 
                                                
3 In the following we will only treat applications that directly draw on Habermas’ theory. That excludes those efforts 
that, though sometimes claimed to be “logically derived from [the] work of Habermas” (Vercic, 2008: 272) are for 
the most part ‘inspired’ by Habermas’ concepts on a fairly general level and not explicit applications of his theory 
(cf. e.g. Cheney, Christensen, 2001; Heath, 1994; Bains, 2007; Kent, Taylor, 2002; Metzler, 1996, 2001). 
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various applications can be approached, namely the evaluative perspective of analyzing particular 
aspects of public relations, the practical perspective of modeling public relations practice, the moral 
perspective of grounding and enacting public relations ethics, and the societal perspective of conceptu-
alizing public relations in its social context. Subsequent to the demonstration of possible applica-
tions, each of these four ‘perspectives’ is further advanced by a discussion in which we seek to 
assess salient aspects, elucidate particular challenges and raise further questions regarding the 
different applications. We then proceed by engaging in some general reflections regarding the 
totality of applications, i.e. assembling recapitulatory remarks on the performed demonstrations 
and discussions, reflecting on paradigmatic aspects, and assessing major differences in how the 
various application relate to Habermas’ theory (chap. 4). Finally we attempt to develop some 
further considerations regarding selected aspects of the previous debate (chap. 5), before summa-
rizing and concluding our findings and formulating further prospects (chap. 6).  
Preliminary Overview: Research Field and Theory 
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2 Preliminary Overview: Research Field and Theory 
2.1 Public Relations Research 
In the following we conduct some introductory remarks on the status quo of the ‘disciplinary 
terrain’ that encompasses this thesis; that is the terminology, outlines and desiderata of public 
relations research. To allow for surveying insights into the interdisciplinary endeavor of public 
relations research, we will begin by conducting some clarifying remarks on the enigmatic term 
‘public relations’ as such (chap. 2.1.1). We then provide a short evaluation of the current discipli-
nary status of public relations research from the perspective of the German-speaking discourse 
(chap. 2.1.2). Furthermore, we assess some basic aspects of theory development in the field 
(chap. 2.1.3). Therefore we draw a brief outline of the spectrum of public relations theory along 
the lines of different theoretical foci (micro, meso, macro), the opposing fields of theory and 
practice, as well as the contrast between the positions of symmetrical and asymmetrical public 
relations. Following, we will give an assessment of the deficiencies, challenges and perspectives of 
current public relations research (chap. 2.1.4). 
2.1.1 Introductory Remarks on the Terminology of Public Relations 
The definition of the term public relations is marked by thorough plurality and ambiguity (cf. 
Fröhlich, 2008: 95); a circumstance that, in part, reflects the heterogeneous and multidisciplinary 
discourse on the issue (cf. Röttger, 2009b: 10; see also chap. 2.1.2 below). Adding to this prob-
lematic, the term is often used without any definition, presuming that its meaning is universally 
familiar (cf. Kunczik, 2010: 26).4 Such enigmatic terminological usage leads to an equivocation 
that stimulates efforts to systemize existing definitions (cf. Bentele, 1998; Fröhlich, 2008). It also 
provokes the generation of general and comprehensive definitions. Following a comparison of 
472 different definitions of the term, Rex Harlow (1976) sets up a comprehensive definition of 
public relations that reads as follows: 
Public relations is a distinctive management function which helps establish and maintain mutual lines 
of communications, understanding, acceptance and cooperation between an organization and its pub-
lics; involves the management of problems or issues; helps management to keep informed on and re-
sponsive to public opinion; defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the 
public interest; helps management to keep abreast of and effectively utilize chance, serving as an early 
warning system to help anticipate trends; and uses research and sound and ethical communication 
techniques as its principal tools (36). 
This and similarly comprehensive definitions allow an initial insight into the field, but, neverthe-
less, still have to be criticized as exclusive as well as nontransparent regarding their emphases of 
several elements (cf. Ronneberger, Rühl, 1992: 28f). Harlow’s ‘convolute’, for instance, disregards 
                                                
4 For further factors of the terminological plurality and ambiguity of the field see Romy Fröhlich (2008). 
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epistemological aspects, marginalizes sociological questions, and fails to mention further func-
tions of public relations like that of reputation management or the building of trust. The posi-
tioning of a single comprehensive and adequate definition might in any case be improbable in a 
multidisciplinary field such as public relations (e.i.). Consequently, Gabriel Vasquez and Maureen 
Taylor (2000) turn to a more inclusive definition in terms of a ‘least common denominator’: 
“Many different definitions of public relations have been offered, but it is generally accepted that 
public relations is strategic communication between an organization and its publics” (324)—this 
definition constituting the most common one on an international scale (cf. Bentele, 2003: 54). 
To some extent, the openness of this definition already illuminates the common problem-
atic of differentiating public relations from important neighboring and overlapping terms like 
lobbying, advertising, marketing, journalism or propaganda (cf. e.g. Leif, Speth, 2006; Fröhlich, 
2008; Kunczik, 2010: 20–64). Furthermore, when approaching current advisory and academic 
literature on public relations, one often comes across the terms of ‘organizational communica-
tion’ and ‘communication management’. In current professional and academic discourse these 
three terms “coexist, differ, and overlap” (Wehmeier, 2008: 220), and there are also calls to use 
these terms synonymously (cf. Grunig, 1992: 4; Bentele, 2003: 56).5 Some slight differences be-
tween the terms are e.g. that, unlike the term public relations, the term ‘communication manage-
ment’ narrows meaning entirely down to the perspective of an organization and is resistant to 
broader societal questions. As Wehmeier (2008: 226) puts it, the term “might lack something that 
is crucial: the environment”. The somewhat more holistic term of ‘organizational communica-
tion’, assimilates the other two terms in its broad definition as the “communication of the organi-
zation, inside the organization, and about the organization” (227; italics in original).6 
Since the better half of the applications discussed in this thesis uses the term public rela-
tions and since furthermore, the applications discussed will range from the individual to the so-
cietal level, it seems suitable for us to adhere to this term instead of using e.g. ‘organizational 
communication’. If not depicting a specific other connotation of the term, as part of the discus-
sions below, we will adhere to the standard inclusive definition of the term as the strategic com-
munication between an organization and its publics. 
                                                
5 In addition, the German-speaking discourse on the issue has produced the term Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, as a synonym 
for public relations (cf. Kunczik, 2010: 14). 
6 For further differentiation and discussion of these terms see e.g. Kunczik (2010). Here the author also assesses 
other popular terms of the more recent German debates, like e.g. Unternehmenskommunikation or integrierte Kommuni-
kation. 
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2.1.2 The Disciplinary Status of Public Relations Research 
As Ihlen and Betteke van Ruler (2009) put it, the core questions of public relations research are: 
“how does public relations work and what does it do in, to, and for organizations, publics or [...] 
society as a whole” (2). The current status of researching these core questions is assessed in di-
vergent fashions. Some label the current academic field of public relations as “immature” 
(Wehmeier, 2008: 219), characterize the according theory development as insufficient (cf. 
Kunczik, 2010: 69–71), and find fault in misleading definitions (cf. Schulz, 2004). Others, like 
Peter Szyszka et al. (2009: 37), refuse to join in with this common lamento and, referring to e.g. 
Bentele et al. (2008: 91–280) or Röttger (2009a), praise quality and quantity of current discourse, 
or like Ihlen et al. (2009: 4) speak of the “maturity” of the discipline. Moreover, Botan and Taylor 
(2004) even claim public relations to be the best researched field in communication studies—a 
rather disproportionate assumption that may be seen as ‘promotion’ for public relations research 
(cf. Kunczik, 2010: 19).  
Regardless of these conflicting positions, we can safely attest: (a) that we have seen an evi-
dent “rise of public relations in the last two centuries” (Heath, 2005: 680), and (b) that the ‘disci-
pline’ is, on the whole, still in its early stages (cf. Kunczik, 2010: 19). Strictly speaking, public rela-
tions research can hardly be referred to as a discipline in the strong sense of the word. A subject 
of research from different perspectives, with different methodologies, and different scientific 
interests, it “appears like a multidisciplinary field where approaches of different disciplines are 
used in an unrelated manner” (Wehmeier, 2008: 223). Consequently, public relations research 
may be more correctly referred to as a specific ‘interdisciplinary endeavor’ than as a discipline in 
its own right (cf. Bentele, 2003: 56). The disciplines most relevant to the research in public rela-
tions are communication studies, sociology, business and psychology (cf. Wehmeier, 2008; 
Bentele et al., 2008: 17–90). Based on the theories common within these disciplines, we have seen 
a noticeable diversification of academic public relations literature in the 1990s, equally elaborating 
on societal, organizational, and action-oriented approaches (cf. Szyszka et al., 2009: 38). Whilst 
especially early German-speaking research focused more on the functions and impacts of public 
relations in the context of democratic societies, the more recent efforts are predominantly con-
cerned with public relations in the context of organizations (cf. Röttger, 2009b: 17). Furthermore, 
it must be stated that even though the German-speaking discourse has increased and intensified 
debate on public relations theory in recent years (cf. Kunczik, 2010: 70), the discourse was and 
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still is strongly influenced by U.S.-American approaches (cf. Nessmann, 1995: 152; Bentele, 2004: 
487; Jarren, Röttger, 2008: 20).7 
Linked to some general remarks on the interdisciplinary endeavor of public relations re-
search, Bentele (2003) roughly distinguishes between three fields: research on the terminological 
and theoretical level, research regarding public relations history, and research that is concerned 
with the professional field. Within this coarsely mashed ‘grid’, our following efforts are merely 
concentrated on the terminological and theoretical level. 
2.1.3 Outlining the Debate on Public Relations Theory  
2.1.3.1 A Matter of Perspective: Micro-, Meso-, and Macro-Theoretical Ap-
proaches 
When generating a systematic outline of current public relations theory, scholars often use the 
established distinction between micro-, meso-, and macro-theories to differentiate and classify 
the various approaches (cf. e.g. Röttger, 2000; Merten, 2009; Kunczik, 2010; Szyszka, 2008). 
Whilst micro-theories are conceptualized on the (inter-)subjective level of individual  
(inter-)actions, meso-theories refer to the level of organizations and associations, and macro-
theories are conceptualized on the abstract level of societal structures. 
From the micro-perspective, public relations can be seen as a practical instrument for ac-
tion. This perspective focuses on practicable and effective realization of public relations activities 
(cf. Szyszka, 2008: 161f). Public relations concepts on the micro-level approach concrete com-
municative forms and assess questions like: what are effective practices in light of a certain con-
text of action? As such, efforts on the micro-perspective may serve as guidelines for the work of 
practitioners. An example for a micro-level approach to public relations is the model of consen-
sus-oriented public relations, which is grounded in Habermas’ theory and thus also discussed in 
this thesis (cf. chap. 3.2, 4 and 5.3). 
From the meso-perspective public relations can be seen as a function of organizational 
management or as an organizational subsystem (cf. Wehmeier, 2008: 224). This perspective fo-
cuses on an organization’s need for action fulfilled by means of public relations practices (cf. 
Szyszka, 2008: 161). Hence, the meso-perspective allows for questions like: what functions does 
public relations realize for an organization, how do public relations practices of an organization 
work, how are certain issues dealt with, and how can public relations be improved in light of the 
goals of an organization? As mentioned above, more recent efforts in German-speaking research 
are predominantly concerned with public relations in the context of organizations. This tendency 
                                                
7 Though Nessmann (1995) also succeeds in demonstrating some influences on the discourse in the United States by 
particular theoretical schools and traditions from the German-speaking debates. 
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toward meso-theoretical approaches of the organizational perspective may be seen as a general 
trend in the field: indeed also Ihlen and van Ruler (2009: 6) point out that most of current public 
relations research is “concerned with the relationship between an organization and its publics and 
not so much with the problem of how an organization relates itself to the public arena and to 
society in large”. Meso-thoretical efforts in the field of public relations are conducted by James 
Grunig and Todd Hunt (1984), Anna Theis (1992), or Scott Cutlip et al. (2006) for instance. 
From the macro-perspective public relations can be assessed as a functional system of soci-
ety (cf. Wehmeier, 2008: 225). Though this perspective does acknowledge that public relations 
activities are based on an organization’s need for action, its primary focus consists of the func-
tions and consequences of public relations in and for society (cf. Szyszka, 2008: 161). This allows 
for questions like: how can public relations be described in its societal context, and what func-
tions does public relations hold in society? Considerations regarding the societal level are domi-
nated by non-normative approaches based on systems theory (cf. Wehmeier, 2008: 225). Theore-
ticians on the macro-level include Franz Ronneberger (1977), Ulrich Saxer (1991), Vincent 
Hazleton (1992), Ronneberger and Manfred Rühl (1992), or Klaus Merten and Joachim 
Westerbarkey (1994). 
2.1.3.2 Between Fields of Knowledge: Theory vs. Practice 
When facing the question of the relation of the aforementioned theoretical efforts with the prac-
tice of public relations—a question which has just recently been addressed in much diversity (see 
e.g. Kocks, 2009; Kunczik, 2009; Rühl, 2009; Femers, 2009)—we can, analogous to the multidis-
ciplinarity of the research, identify thoroughly differing standpoints: whilst some conduct their 
theoretical efforts substantially removed from empirical reality (e.g. Mickey, 2003; Rühl, 2009), 
some primarily adhere to the field of experience (e.g. Rolke, 2009)8 or even denounce pure theo-
retical research that resists empirical verification as mere wordplay (e.g. Kunczik, 2010). Yet oth-
ers emphasize the need to further mediate the interdependency of theory and practice in public 
relations research (e.g. Röttger, 2009b). When addressing the relationship between theory and 
practice, Röttger makes the following recapitulatory remarks (cf. 20f): (a) there is no direct or 
linear relationship between contemporary public relations research and professional public rela-
tions practice; (b) public relations theory cannot directly solve practical problems; and (c) not 
every single phenomenon of public relations practice allows for translation into theory. Hence, 
allowance for and acceptance of the different rules and logics of theoretical research on the one 
                                                
8 In contrast to these assumptions, Lothar Rolke’s (1999) efforts on the basis of systems theory, just like those of 
Ronneberger and Rühl (1992), resist a verifiable, empirical connection to practical public relations (cf. Kunczik, 
2010: 75). 
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hand, and practice on the other are labeled preconditions for ‘productive animations’ between 
both fields of knowledge (cf. 20).  
2.1.3.3 Contrasting Positions: Symmetry vs. Asymmetry 
We can generally identify and distinguish two contrasting positions on how the function of public 
relations is conceived. On the one hand, public relations is conceived as persuasion and manipu-
lation of public opinion (cf. e.g. Kunczik, 2010; Faulstich, 2000). Advocates of this position view 
public relations asymmetrically and strategically, as “spinning the truth to selfish interests of some 
organization, issue advocate, person, or viewpoint” (Heath, 2005: 679). The contrasting position 
on the other hand, views public relations as being “dedicated to fostering effective two-way 
communication between some organization or entity, such as an industry and persons whose 
opinions can make or break future success of the sponsor” (ibid.). Accordingly, advocates of this 
position view public relations as mediating the interests between a sponsor (employer/client) on 
the one hand and its publics on the other (cf. e.g. Grunig, Hunt, 1984; Cutlip et al., 2006; Kent, 
Taylor, 2002). Following, public relations’ core function is seen in the management of conflicts 
on the basis of symmetrical communication (or dialog) and consent, whilst forms of persuasion 
are denounced as unethical (cf. Botan, 1997).  
Most German-speaking academic literature appears to reflect the position of public rela-
tions as primarily asymmetrical or strategic communication and labels the opposing dialogical 
models as utopian distortions and mere ideology (cf. e.g. Kunczik, 2010; Merten, Westerbarkey, 
1994; Faulstich, 2000; Bentele et al., 2008; Ronneberger, Rühl, 1992; Saxer, 1994).9 Nevertheless, 
recent U.S.-American literature reveals that symmetry-based theories have accumulated the lead-
ing body of knowledge in the field and have “probably done more to develop public relations 
theory and scholarship than any other single school of thought” (Botan, Hazleton, 2006: 6). 
Looking at the practical implementation of the contrasting positions, i.e. at factual public rela-
tions campaigns, we can identify a clear preference for the uni-derectional and asymmetrical con-
ceptions over the enacting of symmetrical public relations (cf. Baerns, 2005). Empirical evidence 
suggests that “few employers are willing to pay practitioners to perform as negotiators for equally 
empowered conflicting publics” (Curtin, Boynton, 2001: 418f). Correspondingly, leading public 
relations agencies self-evidently claim that they “effectively influence attitudes, behaviors, and 
outcomes in the public sphere” (Troup, 2009: 441). Faced with this rather unambiguous tendency 
of real public relations, advocates of the two-way symmetrical model explain that the symmetrical 
                                                
9 Some of the few exceptions are e.g. Wolfgang Langenbucher (1991) and Burkart (1993); for the latter see also chap-
ter 3.2 below. 
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model is incompatible with the general worldview of most organizations and presupposes an 
amount of personnel that organizations generally lack (cf. Grunig, Grunig, 1989). 
2.1.4 Deficiencies, Challenges and Perspectives of Public Relations Re-
search 
Above we have depicted some general outlines of current theory and research in public relations. 
Taking a comprehensive look at these general aspects of the debate, one might ask: what are the 
core deficiencies, challenges, and perspectives in public relations research presently? 
In providing an up-dated summary of the major deficiencies of the field, Röttger (2009b: 
12f) alludes to four core aspects: (a) lack of basic research, (b) lack of general efforts on the level 
of organizational and societal public relations theory, (c) lack of interconnection between public 
relations theory and general theories of society and the public sphere, and (d) lack of theoretical 
considerations regarding the level of actions as well as the duality of structures and actions. 
Michael Kunczik (2010: 506), moreover, alludes to the general deficiency that public relations 
research too often builds on positivist and naïve epistemological assumptions, and Bentele (2003: 
71) sees research deficiencies specifically in the areas of public relations ethics and public rela-
tions history. We can also attest a common neglectfulness of questions regarding the reception of 
public relations practices, like the frequently presumed yet seldom empirically examined demand 
for dialog (cf. Röttger, 2009b: 14). Furthermore, due to the strong influence of research on jour-
nalism in the field, public relations is widely researched in terms of a ‘dangerous influence’ on 
publicist organs. This in turn also leads to public relations’ reduction to ‘mere press work’—a 
perspective that cannot do justice to the complexity of real public relations practices (cf. ibid.). 
In turning to the challenges in the field, we may begin by alluding to the ‘cultural lag’ as a 
general and underlying challenge of public relations research and theory-building (cf. Kunczik, 
2010: 510f). ‘Cultural lag’ refers to the lag of delayed social theories trying to explain rapidly 
evolving technological and economical circumstances. Though much to the point, the remark 
regarding this ‘cultural lag’, which originally stems from William Ogburn (1969), is actually di-
rected at an underlying challenge of social theory in general, rather than at a challenge of public 
relations theory in particular. Another challenging aspect, more specific to the field, is the afore-
mentioned multidisciplinary character of research. The fact that the previously mentioned disci-
plines relevant for public relations are necessarily bound to their specific perspective leads to 
characteristic shortcomings in the according applications (cf. Röttger, 2000: 25–62). The majority 
of business-based approaches, for instance, disregard pivotal questions and findings relevant in 
communication studies (leading e.g. to an often narrow focus on marketing functions) (cf. ibid.), 
whilst approaches based on communication studies and sociology often lack sufficient attention 
to questions assessed in organizational theory and business (leading e.g. to a disregard of correla-
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tions between public relations and company value). Ultimately, just like the term public relations 
itself (e.s.), the field of public relations theory and research is marked by thorough plurality and 
ambiguity. This circumstance can be interpreted as both a challenge and an opportunity. On the 
one hand, the lack of terminological and theoretical coherency is problematic for the field, be-
cause it prevents the cumulation of a public relations body of knowledge (cf. Raupp, 2006: 33)—
one possible reason as to why John Ledingham (2003), for example, may feel the need to call for 
a general theory of public relations. On the other hand, plurality and ambiguity of course are not 
necessarily disadvantageous, since they generally allow for diverse inquiry into and description of 
reality (cf. Kunczik, 2010: 512). In embarking on this position, Ihlen and Piet Verhoeven (2009: 
337) reject the endeavor for a general theory of public relations and argue for a “diversity of 
methodologies in the widest sense”.  
To Bentele and Wehmeier (2009), the aforementioned diversity of the field constitutes one 
of its major potentials, and efforts to “compare the different approaches and to analyze where 
they do in fact have commonalities and incommensurabilities” are stated to be both “necessary 
and fruitful” (341). A similar postulate for such extension of comparative interchange is also 
aimed at the possible interrelations between public relations theory and public relations practice 
(cf. Röttger, 2009b: 18). As mentioned above, further connecting these fundamentally different 
logics is said to produce a promising ‘animation’ between both fields of knowledge. Furthermore, 
social theory is increasingly claimed to be “necessary to understand the practice of public rela-
tions and to raise important empirical questions about it” (Ihlen, Verhoeven, 2009: 323). Cur-
rently, it is especially the link between organizational-level research on the one hand and societal 
considerations on the other that promises illuminating perspectives in the field (cf. Bentele, 
Wehmeier, 2009; Röttger, 2009b; Ihlen, Verhoeven, 2009). Ihlen and van Ruler (2009) argue that 
“the instrumental and administrative approaches that currently prevail must be supplemented 
with societal approaches that expose what public relations is in society today, rather than only 
what it should be at the organizational level” (5). In this respect, research should develop more 
independently from the broadly discussed subject of the economic organization and start taking 
into account other forms of organizations (cf. Röttger, 2009b: 21). In addition the introduction 
of different contexts of public relations, like the rarely addressed form of strategic and external 
consulting, could close existing gaps in present research (cf. ibid.).  
2.2 Habermas’ Program 
Having determined the general grounds and facets of current public relations research (e.s.), we 
here turn to the particular theoretical ‘groundwork’ underlying the concepts focused on in this 
thesis. The aspired demonstration and discussion of applications of Habermas’ theory to public 
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relations eo ipso demands a comprehensive introduction to Habermas’ program. In the following 
we commence with the terminological centerpiece of Habermas’ theory, namely the concept of 
communicative action (chap. 2.2.1), to then introduce the theoretical program on the basis of 
which this concept is substantiated (chap. 2.2.2). Subsequently we present Habermas’ draft of 
society as both system and lifeworld (chap. 2.2.3). Furthermore we embark on Habermas’ moral-
philosophical endeavor to introduce the concept of discourse, the universalization principle and 
the ideal speech situation (chap. 2.2.4). Finally we illustrate Habermas’ socio-historical concept of 
the public sphere and its structural transformations as well as the author’s later conceptual revi-
sions regarding this concept (chap. 2.2.5). 
2.2.1 The Central Concept: Communicative Action 
To depict Habermas’ core concept of communicative action one can start by pointing out its 
major difference to other social concepts of action.10 Looking at the concepts of teleological ac-
tion (which applies to realization of goals), normative action (which applies to adherence to 
shared values within groups), and dramaturgical action (which applies to self-expression vis-à-vis 
a public), one realizes that each of these three refers to either the objective, the social or the sub-
jective world (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 126–141; 1984: 84–94). Compared to these, communicative 
action can be referred to as the underlying and comprehensive concept of action that generally 
applies to understanding and only indirectly (or more precise: reflexively) refers to the objective, 
the social, and the subjective world. 
Für das kommunikative Handlungsmodell ist Sprache allein unter dem pragmatischen Gesichtspunkt 
relevant, daß Sprecher, indem sie Sätze verständigungsorientiert verwenden, Weltbezüge aufnehmen, 
und dies nicht nur wie im teleologischen, normengeleiteten oder dramaturgischen Handeln direkt, 
sondern auf reflexive Weise. [...] Sie nehmen nicht mehr geradehin auf etwas in der objektiven, sozialen 
oder subjektiven Welt Bezug, sondern relativieren ihre Äußerung an der Möglichkeit, daß deren Gel-
tung von anderen Aktoren bestritten wird (Habermas, 1981a: 148, italics in original).i 
The reflexive world relation and the readiness to relativize utterances refers to other’s abilities to 
either accept or object to what has been said. This means that any actor who is oriented toward 
understanding inevitably raises at least three validity claims (Geltungsansprüche) with an utterance: 
he or she must claim that what has been said is (a) objectively true (with respect to the objective 
world as the totality of entities about which true statements are possible), (b) normatively right 
(with respect to the social world as the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations), 
and (c) expressively truthful (with respect to the subjective world as the totality of personal or in-
                                                
10 Herein we follow an introduction into Habermas’ seminal work, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981a, 1981b) 
as presented by Walter Reese-Schäfer (2001). 
Preliminary Overview: Research Field and Theory 
 
17 
dividual inner experiences).11 Of course an actor may not be oriented toward understanding but 
follow egocentric calculations of individual success; in this case Habermas speaks of strategic 
action (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 381–397; 1984a: 282–295). Here the validity claims are obviously 
undermined, but the strategic actor would, nevertheless, raise them in need to pretend that the 
presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 445f; 1984a: 332f).12 
Because we inevitably raise these validity claims in action, oriented toward reaching understand-
ing, we are lead to acknowledge that others raise them as well, and by acknowledging this, we 
subsequently ‘attribute’ rationality.13 This is why Habermas claims that communicative action has 
a ‘rational internal structure’ (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 198; 1984: 138).14 
Ein Sprecher kann einen Hörer zur Annahme eines Sprechaktangebotes [...] rational motivieren, weil er 
aufgrund eines internen Zusammenhangs zwischen Gültigkeit, Geltungsanspruch und Einlösung des 
Geltungsanspruches die Gewähr dafür übernehmen kann, erforderlichenfalls überzeugende Gründe 
anzugeben, die einer Kritik des Hörers am Geltungsanspruch standhalten (Habermas, 1981a: 406, 
italics in original).ii 
The fact that one has to attribute rationality to a speaker first, before being able to coherently 
discuss the truth, rightness, and truthfulness of his or her utterances, leads Habermas to his claim 
of the universality of communicative rationality which is central to his concept of society (cf. 
Habermas, 1981a, 1984a). The substantiation of this far-reaching claim constitutes the essential 
challenge to Habermas’ theoretical efforts (cf. Habermas, 1984b: 605). The according program of 
justification builds on the philosophy of language and speech act theory15 so as to demonstrate 
                                                
11 These validity claims are sometimes incoherently, sometimes incorrectly used in the terminology of the applica-
tions of Habermas’ theory to public relations (cf. e.g. chap. 3.1). Whereas we will literally depict the individual ter-
minology when explaining possible applications demonstrated by different authors, we will preferably use 
Habermas’ original terminology in the discussions. To prevent the misconception of subsequent passages, how-
ever, we will briefly allude to these terminological difficulties here and revisit and emphasize them, where neces-
sary, in the subsequent discussion. Often rightness is referred to as ‘legitimacy’ or ‘morality’ and truthfulness as 
‘sincerity’; the use of these synonyms is not uncommon and, for the most part, unproblematic. It happens, though, 
that truth is referred to as ‘truthfulness’, which is incorrect because both terms—truth and truthfulness—are re-
lated to distinctly different world relations within Habermas’ concept (e.s.). Furthermore, in some of the possible 
applications of Habermas theory to public relations we note the depiction of a fourth validity claim: comprehensi-
bility (Verständlichkeit). Comprehensibility (by some also refered to as ‘intelligibility’ or ‘understandability’), however, 
does not constitute one of the validity claims—inevitably raised in communications—but is a precondition of com-
munication in general (cf. Habermas, 1981a, 1984a). 
12 An obvious exception is openly strategic action. But in this case the actor needs to substitute the rational binding 
force of the validity claims with claims to power in order to be successful (cf. Habermas, 1988: 74). 
13 It is this, in general terms, ‘attribution’ of rationality that is subject to Habermas’ formal-pragmatic program of 
justification (cf. chap. 2.2.2 below).  
14 And this is also the notion through which validity claims can clearly be distinguished from power claims: on the 
one hand, the former is always connected with reasons and thus has a rationally motivating force, the latter, on the 
other hand, has to be covered by a potential for sanction in order to be successful (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 408; 1984: 
302). 
15 In this regard Karl Bühler (1934), Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967), John Austin (1962), and John Searle (1969), are to 
be mentioned as important ‘theoretical resources’ for Habermas’ concepts (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 369–452; 1984: 
273–337). 
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how human communication necessarily presupposes rationality (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 369–452; 
1984a: 273–337), and is referred to as formal pragmatics (see chap. 2.2.2 below).16 
[...] kommunikative Vernunft [findet] nicht einfach den Bestand eines Subjekts oder eines Systems 
vor, sondern hat Teil an der Strukturierung dessen, was erhalten werden soll. Die utopische Perspekti-
ve von Versöhnung und Freiheit ist [...] in den sprachlichen Reproduktionsmechanismus der Gattung 
schon eingebaut (Habermas, 1981a: 533).iii 
As long as this central concept of reaching understanding as the inherent telos of human speech 
and the rationality of communicative action can be successfully justified, Habermas possesses a 
punctum archimedis for a broad critique of society. 
2.2.2 The Program of Justification: Formal Pragmatics 
It is the aim of formal pragmatics to trace the structural properties of processes of reaching un-
derstanding from which general pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action can be de-
rived (cf. Habermas, 1976, 1979, 1981a: 385–410). Other forms of social action (for instance, 
competition, conflict, or strategic action in general) are seen as derivates of action, oriented to-
ward reaching understanding. And since language can furthermore be viewed as the specific me-
dium of reaching understanding, it is by means of rational reconstruction of intuitive linguistic 
know-how, that the justification of rationality is approached. The essential aspect in this regard is 
the double structure of speech, i.e. its inherent reflexivity. This inherent reflexivity is rooted in 
the fact that the propositional and the illocutionary elements of an utterance can vary independ-
ently of each other: in a conversation, people combine communication of a particular content 
with communication about the role in which the content is used (cf. Habermas, 1984b: 407). This 
structure illuminates the process by which Habermas devises the idea of an internal connection 
between speech and rationality: altering the perspective (propositional/illocutionary) allows for 
reactions in situations of dissent without the necessity of constraint. An essential aspect of the 
illocutionary element of this double structure is the inevitable raising of validity claims (e.s.). 
What we have rather rudimentarily labeled an ‘attribution’ of rationality above (cf. chap. 2.2.1), 
Habermas sees as constitutive to the raising of validity claims; to him there exists a rational foun-
dation to the ‘illocutionary binding force’ of an utterance (cf. Habermas, 1979: 59–65; 1984b: 
428–436).  
[Actors] cannot but mutually raise validity claims for their utterances and claim that what they say 
should be assumed—and, if necessary, could be proved—to be true or right or sincere, and at any rate 
                                                
16 Habermas referred to his central program of justification first as universal pragmatics (Universalpragmatik) (cf. e.g. 
Habermas, 1976, 1979) and later as formal pragmatics (Formalpragmatik) (cf. e.g. Habermas, 1981a, 1983, 1984a, 
1991). This shift in terminology also signals the shift in his philosophy from an early consensus theory of truth (cf. 
Habermas, 1973) with a transcendental idea of rationality to pragmatism (cf. Habermas, 1999, 2003) and a ‘detran-
scendentalized’ idea of rationality (cf. Habermas, 2001). 
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rational. An implicit reference to rational discourse—or the competition for better reasons—is built 
into communicative actions as an omnipresent alternative to routine behavior (Habermas, 2006: 413). 
To Habermas rationality, which is proper to the communicative practice of everyday life, seems 
to point “to the practice of argumentation as a court of appeal” (Habermas, 1984a: 17). This is 
the case because, corresponding to each of the validity claims, an utterance entails certain obliga-
tions on the side of the speaker: constative speech acts (referring to truth, i.e. the objective world) 
entail the obligation to provide reasons; regulative speech acts (referring to rightness, i.e. the so-
cial world) entail the obligation to provide justification; and expressive speech acts (referring to 
truthfulness, i.e. the subjective world) entail the obligation to prove trustworthy (cf. Habermas, 
1979: 63f; 1984b: 433f). It is these speech-act-typical obligations of a speaker that constitute an 
illocutionary force within an acceptable speech act. In principle the decision, whether or not to 
accept the validity claims raised by a speaker, remains a rational one. This formal-pragmatic re-
construction of speech acts helps to clearly differentiate between the different forms of action (or 
speech acts), attributing to them certain types of rationality, and also distinguishing communica-
tive action as the comprehensive concept of action. 
2.2.3 The Two-Tiered Concept of Society: Lifeworld and System 
When Habermas shifts the focus from the formal-pragmatic level of analysis to empirical prag-
matics and therefore to the context-dependent meanings of speech, the need to complete the 
concept of communicative action through a concept of a common stock of cultural knowledge 
becomes apparent (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 440–452; 1984a: 328–337). The latter adverts to a his-
torically structured and implicit type of knowledge that does not stand at our disposition, thus 
having to be characterized as fundamental background knowledge, referred to as the lifeworld (cf. 
Habermas, 1981b: 182–223; 1987: 119–148).17 But a description of society as wholly absorbed 
into the lifeworld would lead to the problem that subsequent investigations of society will be 
carried out in terms of self-interpretation: an internal perspective that is entirely indifferent to 
external sociocultural effects on the lifeworld (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 223f; 1984a: 148f). If society 
is identified with the lifeworld alone, it appears as a network of communicatively mediated coop-
eration, and the integration of society is seen as taking place only on the premises of communica-
tive action. 
Tatsächlich werden aber [...] zielgerichtete Handlungen nicht nur über Prozesse der Verständigung 
koordiniert, sondern auch über funktionale Zusammenhänge, die [...] nicht intendiert sind und inner-
                                                
17 To affiliate the concept as a complement to the concept of communicative action, Habermas turns to Alfred 
Schütz and Thomas Luckmann (1979) who stress three central moments of the lifeworld: (a) the naïve familiarity 
with which one accepts it, (b) its intersubjective validity, and (c) its delimiting character (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 198–
205; 1987: 130–135). 
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halb des Horizonts der Alltagspraxis meist auch nicht wahrgenommen werden (Habermas, 1981b: 
225f).iv 
To also open his investigations to the “counterintuitive aspects of the nexus of social reproduc-
tion” (Habermas, 1987: 151), the concept of the lifeworld is complemented by the concept of the 
system (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 171–293; 1987: 113–197):18 the system serves the material reproduc-
tion of the lifeworld through the mechanisms of state and economy that mediate action by means 
of power and money (symbolic media). Habermas suggests to conceive of societies as both sys-
tem and lifeworld: in this perspective society is seen as an entity that is differentiated simultane-
ously, as a lifeworld and as a system, during the cause of social evolution; systematic evolution on 
the one hand “is measured by the increase in a society’s steering capacity”, whereas lifeworld 
evolution on the other hand “is indicated by the separation of culture, society, and personality” 
(Habermas, 1987: 152). This clear distinction between the concepts of lifeworld and system is the 
basis on which Habermas then grasps the pathologies of modernity (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 445–
593; 1987: 301–403).19 
2.2.4 Communicative Action and Moral Consciousness: Discourse Eth-
ics 
To depict Habermas’ account of discourse ethics one might begin with the fundamental principle 
that Habermas aims to justify in his program, namely the universalization principle. This principle 
formulates the necessary conditions under which it is possible to define a practical question as 
true: 
[...] die Folgen und Nebenwirkungen, die sich aus einer allgemeinen Befolgung der strittigen Norm für 
die Befriedigung der Interessen eines jeden Einzelnen voraussichtlich ergeben, [müssen] von allen zwang-
los akzeptiert werden können (Habermas, 1983: 103, italics in original).v 
This principle entails a cognitivist moral philosophy on the basis of which Habermas aims to 
maintain that practical questions admit of truth.20 In his program of moral justification (cf. 
                                                
18 This concept enters Habermas’ theoretical framework primarily as a result of debate and critique regarding the 
works of Parsons and Luhmann (cf. Habermas, 1981b, 1987). Other than these authors, Habermas is of the opini-
on that the integration of highly complex societies cannot, as systems theory suggests, be carried out by bypassing 
the communicative power of the public of citizens. To him the paradigm of systems theory can coherently only 
refer to the economy and the state, but misses aspects of communicative integration apparent beyond the horizon 
of large organizations or networks. In Habermas’ concept, different components of a differentiated lifeworld inter-
pret one another by means of ordinary language, which is the medium of communicative action. (cf. e.g. Habermas, 
1992a: 415–435; 1996: 341–359). 
19 It is Habermas’ central point of critique regarding Parsons, that the latter’s terminology forbids a clear distinction 
between lifeworld and system to the effect that the rationalization of the lifeworld is conceptually ‘harmonized’ 
with the increasing complexity of the social system (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 352–444; 1987: 235–299). 
20 This strong claim of moral truth has meanwhile clearly been abrogated by Habermas (cf. 1985a: 207) and he has 
explicitly distanced himself from authors like Karl-Otto Apel, who in Habermas’ opinion overextend the normative 
approach of discourse ethics (cf. Habermas, 1992a: 10). For a summary of this ‘withdrawal’ and its implications for 
Habermas’ theory see e.g. Andreas Koller (2004: 81–90). An updated account of Habermas’ (pragmatic) stance on 
the issue of truth can be found in e.g. Habermas (1998, 1999, 2003). 
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Habermas, 1983, 1991, 1990a, 1993) he starts defending this cognitivist position by demonstrat-
ing how moral attitudes and feelings are inevitably bound to the horizon of everyday practices in 
which one engages performatively (cf. Habermas, 1983: 53–67). Especially in reviewing Peter 
Strawson (1974) and Stephen Toulmin (1970), Habermas stresses: “Die Wahrheit von Sätzen be-
deutet auf ähnliche Weise die Existenz von Sachverhalten wie die Richtigkeit von Handlungen die 
Erfüllung von Normen“ (Habermas, 1983: 69, italics in original).vi The pivotal question of how 
practical questions can be answered in an equivalent fashion to questions regarding the existence 
of states of affairs is addressed by pointing to the mode in which normative propositions are justi-
fied (cf. Habermas, 1983: 67–86).21 At this point Habermas faces the challenge that the universal-
ization principle itself requires a sufficiently justified framework. For such substantiation he re-
sorts to the program of formal pragmatics (cf. chap. 2.2.2): to further employ this program of 
justification for questions of moral truth, Habermas focuses on the process that allows for the 
reestablishment of consensus after validity claims have been challenged (cf. Habermas, 1973). To 
debate validity claims that have been challenged, the interaction needs to shift from the instru-
mental mode of everyday communication (that e.g. also involves gestures, mimic, etc.) to the 
reflexive mode of discourse, where only the persuasive force of the better argument is allowed 
(cf. Habermas, 1984b: 159–174). Only this mode of discourse that dispenses of anything but the 
force of the better argument enables what Habermas refers to as ‘pure communicative action’ 
(reines kommunikatives Handeln) (cf. 178), and can therefore produce ‘true’ consensus.22 The ques-
tion whether discursive argumentation leads to ‘true’ or ‘false’ consensus can be answered by 
reviewing whether the foregone discourse situation allowed for all participants to argue without 
any external or internal coercion, i.e. whether it meets the conditions of the ideal speech situation 
(cf. Habermas, 1984b: 176; 1990a: 86–94). These conditions are summarized by Habermas as 
follows:23 
(3.1) Jedes sprach- und handlungsfähige Subjekt darf an Diskursen teilnehmen. (3.2) Jeder darf jede 
Behauptung problematisieren [...], jede Behauptung in den Diskurs einführen [... und] seine Einstel-
lungen, Wünsche und Bedürfnisse äußern. (3.3) Kein Sprecher darf durch innerhalb oder außerhalb 
des Diskurses herrschenden Zwang daran gehindert werden, seine in (3.1) und (3.2) festgelegten Rech-
te wahrzunehmen (Habermas, 1983: 99).vii 
The practical realization of these ideal conditions is, of course, highly unlikely; most obviously 
due to physical limitations of discourse participants and obvious spatiotemporal constraints. 
                                                
21 This focus on the mode of argumentation is explicitly reflected in the aforementioned universalization principle as 
an ethical rule for argument. 
22 To be precise, only the validity claims to truth and rightness can be subject to discourse since one cannot argue for 
truthfulness but has to prove it through consistent behavior (cf. Habermas, 1984: 139).  
23 Here Habermas draws on a summary of ‘rules for discourse’ by Robert Alexy (1978). For a more detailed account 
of the ideal conditions for discourse see Habermas (1984b: 177f). 
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Habermas, however, shows in his formal-pragmatic analysis that every competent speaker who 
engages in argumentation must necessarily presuppose these general symmetry conditions (cf. 
Habermas, 1983: 93–119; 1990a: 83–109). The ideal conditions thus claim the status of counter-
factual presuppositions that can develop “factual force” (Habermas, 1990a: 203). They are 
‘merged’ into the aforementioned universalization principle that is ultimately only concerned with 
the process of justifying claims, wholly unrelated to the generation of substantive norms (cf. 
Habermas, 1991: 30; 1990a: 221). This principle can then be defended by merely pointing toward 
its necessary presupposition and the subsequent performative contradictions of anyone who tries 
to reject it by means of argumentation (cf. Habermas, 1983: 104–108; 1990a: 94–98). Since 
Habermas’ project merely aims to reveal this moral point of view, discourse ethics have to be 
understood as a principle for justification rather than a maxim of action (cf. Habermas, 1983: 
130–133). This moral point of view, however, also reveals Habermas’ high demands of human 
rationality, because it requires that maxims and contested interests are generalized by discourse 
participants. And this generalization compels the competent speakers to transcend their own 
socio-historical context, their own particular community and form of life, and adopt the multiple 
perspectives of all those possibly affected. 
2.2.5 The Public Sphere and its (Conceptual) Transformation 
In his postdoctoral thesis Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit – Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der Bürger-
lichen Gesellschaft (1962), Habermas describes the history of bourgeois society in terms of a ‘decay’ 
of classical liberalism and its idea of inclusive, rational and critical debate. He sees civil society as 
the realm of social labor and commodity exchange, an area opposed to the public authority of the 
state (cf. Habermas, 1962: 40–44; 1989: 27–31). When private people of the civil society come 
together to form a public, Habermas speaks of the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit): 
Bürgerliche Gesellschaft läßt sich vorerst als die Sphäre der zum Publikum versammelten Privatleute 
begreifen; diese beanspruchen die obrigkeitlich reglementierte Öffentlichkeit alsbald gegen die öffent-
liche Gewalt selbst, um sich mit dieser über die allgemeinen Regeln des Verkehrs in der grundsätzlich 
privatisierten, aber öffentlich relevanten Sphäre des Warenverkehrs und der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit 
auseinanderzusetzen (Habermas, 1962: 40).viii 
Thus the public sphere is a sphere of ‘mediation’ between the realms of civil society and the state, 
or as one introduction tersely puts it: The public sphere is private in its constitution but political 
in its function (cf. Reese-Schäfer, 2001: 38). Furthermore, Habermas distinguishes the political 
public sphere from the literary one “when public discussion deals with objects connected to the 
activity of the state” (Habermas, 1974: 49).24 To briefly summarize the meaning of the term one 
                                                
24 Habermas (1962, 1989) distinguishes between two important processes that constitute the public sphere: (a) in the 
literary public sphere processes, a variety of texts (literature, drama, art, etc.) is intersubjectively made available by 
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might define the public sphere as the realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion (öffentliche Meinung) can be formed (cf. Habermas, 1964: 220). This corresponding 
term of public opinion then refers to the central task of a public body: the practicing of criticism 
and control vis-à-vis the ruling structure, i.e. the state (cf. ibid.).  
This kind of public sphere that allows for critical and institutionally guaranteed discussions 
has “not always existed” but “grew out of a specific phase of bourgeois society” (Habermas, 
1974: 50). It developed historically under the subversive circumstances of early capitalism: the 
development of traffic in commodities and news as well as a free press due and parallel to early 
capitalist long-distance trade catalyzed the transformation from a representative publicity (reprä-
sentative Öffentlichkeit) of feudal power to a liberal bourgeois publicity (cf. Habermas, 1962: 26–39; 
1989: 14–26).25 However different the actual venues in which private people come together as a 
public,26 they can be characterized by the common formal criteria of: (a) the authority of the best 
argument, (b) no restraints on topics, and (c) an open end to discussion (cf. Habermas, 1962: 49–
51; 1989: 36f). Under these formal conditions, what Habermas refers to as Räsonnement, becomes 
possible: a form of inclusive, rational and critical discussion or reasoning.27 The normative pre-
condition to the liberal public sphere is a great number of equally small and privately owned en-
terprises that limits the concentration of power and thus serves a central role in the bourgeois 
constitutional state: “Die ‚Herrschaft’ der Öffentlichkeit ist ihrer eigenen Idee zufolge eine Ord-
nung, in der sich Herrschaft überhaupt auflöst” (Habermas, 1962: 97).ix This kind of public does 
not itself strive for domination; it serves as an ‘emancipatory force’ that is constitutionally pro-
tected28 and prepositions the logic for organizing the constitutional state (cf. Habermas, 1962: 
94–103; 1989: 79–88).  
Such an account of a public, of course, remains an ambiguous concept between ideal and 
ideology since its formal criteria and socio-economic preconditions have never been fully real-
                                                                                                                                                   
different agents and serves as a source for ‘vicarious living’ that becomes part of the reflexive development of a 
person’s own identity and its concepts of others; (b) In the political public sphere processes, societal problems are 
identified, exposed and discussed in light of common interest, so as to produce legitimacy to governmental deci-
sions. 
25 These circumstances where subversive because they stabilized the existing power structure of a society organized 
in estates on the one hand, and produced the very elements which served for a dissolving of this structure on the 
other. 
26 Habermas discusses the venues of the German Tischgesellschaft, the British coffee house, and the French salon (cf. 
Habermas, 1962: 44–57; 1989: 31–43).  
27 Unfortunately this term is often translated into English as mere ‘discussion’. Such a translation, however, misses 
the important connotation of the rationality of liberal argumentation, which is implied in the word Räsonnement. It 
could and should thus more accurately be referred to as ‘liberal and critical reasoning’. To coherently adhere to the 
original connotation of the word, we will henceforth use the suggested alternative or use to the German term 
Räsonnement. 
28 Efforts to protect the public sphere are manifested and institutionalized in fundamental rights such as: freedom of 
speech, opinion, press, and assembly, the right of petition and equal voting rights, as well as the protection of per-
sonal freedom, privacy, and property, or equality before the law (cf. Habermas, 1962: 96–103; 1989: 82–88). 
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ized. Habermas, however, postulates that this ideal liberal concept has at least been partially real-
ized during the second half of the 19th century, so that he traces its ‘decay’ thenceforth (cf. 
Habermas, 1962: 158–199; 1989: 141–180): Liberal mercantilist trade is gradually replaced by 
protectionism, big cartels and unions are formed and the structural dissociation of the private and 
the public realm is undermined. The practice of Räsonnement is ousted by consumption, public 
debates consist of propaganda, advertising and public relations campaigns conducted by large 
organizations and Habermas speaks of a refeudalization (Refeudalisierung) of the public sphere (cf. 
Habermas, 1962: 200–255; 1989: 181–136). Figuratively speaking, the public sphere is trans-
formed back into an atrium of feudal estate where a spectacle for prestige is demonstrated in 
front of an obedient audience (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 299). Correspondingly Habermas talks of 
nonpublic and quasi-public opinion (as distinguished from ‘real’ or ‘rational’ public opinion) and 
of an accordingly ‘manipulative publicity’ (cf. Habermas, 1962: 264–270; 1989: 244–250). 
Öffentliche Meinung bleibt Gegenstand der Herrschaft auch da, wo sie diese zu Konzessionen oder 
Reorientierungen zwingt; sie ist weder an Regeln öffentlicher Diskussion oder überhaupt an Formen 
der Verbalisierung gebunden, noch muß sie mit politischen Problemen befaßt oder gar an politische 
Instanzen adressiert sein (Habermas, 1962: 264).x 
Today Habermas’ Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962) must be seen in a new context because 
the author has meanwhile acknowledged a number of reductions and misconceptions on his ac-
count (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 11–50; 1992).29 These deficiencies have ultimately led Habermas to a 
disproportionately drastic contrast between an early, idealistically glorified political public sphere 
and a present public sphere of mass-democratic social-welfare states (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 21). 
[...] meine Diagnose einer gradlinigen Entwicklung vom politisch aktiven zum privatistischen, ‚vom 
kulturräsonierenden zum kulturkonsumierenden Publikum’ greift zu kurz. Die Resistenzfähigkeit und 
vor allem das kritische Potential eines in seinen kulturellen Gewohnheiten aus Klassenschranken her-
vortretenden, pluralistischen, nach innen weit differenzierten Massenpublikums habe ich seinerzeit zu 
pessimistisch beurteilt (30).xi 
Moreover, Habermas’ general theoretical efforts have developed significantly; albeit not so much 
in its fundamentals as in its complexity.30 This has led Habermas to make some efforts to embed 
                                                
29 The author now acknowledges that his post-doctoral thesis contains an overly stylized depiction of the bourgeois 
public sphere (leading e.g. to an overdrawn emphasis on the rational aspects of public communication) and a too 
simplistic understanding that oversees the coexistence of competing public spheres (leading e.g. to a disregard of 
the inner dynamics of plebeian culture) (cf. Habermas, 1990a: 15). 
30 In the differentiation between a rational and critical ‘real’ public opinion (that corresponds with the concept of 
liberal bourgeoisie and Räsonnement) on the one hand and a non-public or quasi-public and manipulative opinion on 
the other (e.s.), one can already identify the distinction between lifeworld and system, between communicative ac-
tion and strategic action (cf. chap. 2.2.1–2.2.4). But as demonstrated above, Habermas, in his current theoretical 
framework, finds the normative foundations for his theory in the rational potential, intrinsic in everyday communi-
cative practices, which he brings into the open via the program of formal pragmatics (cf. chap. 2.2.2); consequently 
he now distances himself from his early ideology-critical approach (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 33f). Furthermore 
Habermas no longer conceives of society holistically as an association writ large, but as a two-tiered construct of 
lifeworld and system (cf. chap. 2.2.3). As demonstrated in the above chapters, the concept of communicative ac-
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his early considerations into his current theoretical framework (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 33–50, 
1992b: 441–457, 1992a). The revisions and the alignment in a new framework produced a re-
viewed, much differentiated understanding of the public sphere. 
In komplexen Gesellschaften bildet die Öffentlichkeit eine intermediäre Struktur, die zwischen dem 
politischen System einerseits, den privaten Sektoren der Lebenswelt und funktional spezifizierten 
Handlungssystemen andererseits vermittelt. Sie stellt ein hochkomplexes Netzwerk dar, das sich räum-
lich in eine Vielzahl von überlappenden internationalen, nationalen, regionalen, kommunalen, subkul-
turellen Arenen verzweigt; das sich sachlich nach funktionalen Gesichtspunkten, Themenschwerpunk-
ten, Politikbereichen usw. in mehr oder weniger spezialisierte, aber für ein Laienpublikum noch zu-
gängliche Öffentlichkeiten (z. B. in populärwissenschaftliche und literarische, kirchlich und künstleri-
sche, feministische und ‚alternative’, gesundheits-, sozial-, oder wissenschaftspolitische Öffentlichkei-
ten) gliedert; und das sich nach Kommunikationsdichte, Organisationskomplexität und Reichweite 
nach Ebenen differenziert – von der episodischen Kneipen-, Kaffeehaus-, oder Straßenöffentlichkeit 
über die veranstaltete Präsenzöffentlichkeit von Theateraufführungen, Elternabenden, Rockkonzerten, 
Parteiversammlungen oder Kirchentagen bis zu der abstrakten, über Massenmedien hergestellten Öf-
fentlichkeit von vereinzelten und global verstreuten Lesern, Zuhörern und Zuschauern (Habermas, 
1992a: 451f; italics in original).xii 
Ultimately, this ‘new’ public sphere constitutes a much differentiated network for communicating 
information and opinions that is reproduced by means of communicative action (cf. Habermas, 
1992a: 436). 
                                                                                                                                                   
tion, which is complementary to the concept of the lifeworld, is assessed as the social integrative power that—via 
processes structured according to its inherent and ideal procedural conditions—serves as a rational source for le-
gitimacy in political and moral questions (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 36–41). 
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3 Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
On the basis of the established introductions into the field of public relations research as well as 
into the terminology of Habermas’ program (e.s.), we can now take a comprehensive look at po-
tential applications of Habermas’ theory to public relations, discuss important challenges that 
these entail, and raise further questions on the basis of these considerations. In structuring this 
investigation, we choose to prescribe four different ‘perspectives’ from which the various applica-
tions can be approached according to their distinct characteristics, namely the evaluative, the 
practical, the moral, and the societal ‘perspective’.31 We commence with a focus on applying 
Habermas’ theory to analyses of aspects of practical public relations (chap. 3.1). The applications 
demonstrated here draw directly on Habermas’ concepts without engaging in an effort of theo-
retical or terminological modeling. We then demonstrate how Habermas’ theory can be applied 
to model public relations practice (chap. 3.2). Third, we embark on the ‘moral perspective’ to 
demonstrate potentials of Habermas’ framework for the grounding and enacting of public rela-
tions ethics (chap. 3.3). Here, as well as in the previous ‘perspective’, we also selectively show 
how the different applications may be drawn upon to analyze or plan public relations practice. 
Finally, we demonstrate how Habermas’ theory can be applied to reflect on public relations in a 
macro-societal context (chap. 3.4). Subsequent to the demonstration of potential applications of 
Habermas’ theory, each of these four ‘perspectives’ leads to a discussion in which we want to 
critically elucidate and evaluate important aspects and particular challenges of the different appli-
cations. In finishing each of these discussions, moreover, we raise pivotal further questions that 
emerge from the individual efforts to apply Habermas’ theory to public relations. 
3.1 Evaluative Perspective: Analyzing Aspects of Public Rela-
tions32 
3.1.1 Analyzing the Transparency of Annual Reports 
Annual reports play an important role in public relations because they are a significant source of 
information for stakeholders and thus affect the overall evaluation of corporations (cf. e.g. 
                                                
31 Of course the four ‘perspectives’ that we have chosen to structure our efforts are everything but mutually exclu-
sive categories—an approach demonstrated in one ‘perspective’ may thus partially extend into others. We are, nev-
ertheless, convinced that the benefit from the structured insights that can be facilitated through the established 
‘perspectives’ positively overcompensates some inescapable ‘blind spots’ resulting from the inevitable rigidity of 
such a classification. 
32 Different to the following three ‘perspectives’, which encompass a relatively select number of applications, this 
‘perspective’ opens up to a broad spectrum of case studies regarding different aspects of practical public relations, 
in certain campaigns, certain industries, etc. conducted on the basis of Habermas’ critical theory; see for instance 
the recent efforts of Rachel McLean and David Wainwright (2009), as well as Meisenbach and Sarah Feldner 
(2007), or the critical analyses of public relations messages collected in Elwood (1995). The analyses that we chose 
to demonstrate seem appropriate in our context, because they are fairly current and furthermore quite comparable, 
so that they are passable for our aspired further considerations in a joined discussion. 
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Esrock, Leichty, 1998).33 Providing information for investors, competitors, employees and other 
stakeholders of a corporate organization, these reports may serve as a means for both ‘distorted’ 
and ‘legitimate’ communication (cf. e.g. D'Aveni, MacMillan, 1990). Kristi Yuthas et al. (2002) 
argue that annual reports are (a) the only element of corporate communications that is thor-
oughly monitored by independent agencies, are (b) addressed to all stakeholders, and should thus 
be valued more highly than other elements of corporate communication (cf. 142). Against this 
backdrop the authors criticize that annual reports are mostly analyzed only in their relevance to 
investors (cf. ibid.). What has accordingly been omitted from debate so far is the question of how 
these reports fulfill their purpose with regard to the greater spectrum of stakeholders. This is 
where Yuthas et al. see the potential for applying Habermas’ theory: to further explore these as-
pects, the authors use Habermas’ theory as a framework for analyzing corporate annual reports34 
in respect to their general transparency.35 In so doing, the researchers “develop a method to op-
erationalize [Habermas’] communicative action norms and apply them in a rhetorical analysis” 
(142). Subject to this effort are the annual reports of a sample of firms “that were expecting first 
quarter earnings to be significantly lower than analysts’ forecast” (154). In their analysis of these 
reports, Yuthas et al. use a software that searches texts for certain semantic variables by passing 
them through a variety of digital dictionaries, and then cluster them into five composite dimen-
sions and altogether 36 individual dimensions. These dimensions are then individually related to 
one or more of the validity claims differentiated by Habermas (cf. chap. 2.2.1), namely compre-
hensibility, truthfulness, legitimacy, and sincerity (cf. Yuthas et al., 2002: 146–154):36 Comprehen-
sibility, for instance, is measured by the quotient of the use of general and picturable verbs, nega-
tions, or reference to tangible, everyday matters, because it is assumed that this indicates rhetoric 
that is tangible and familiar to the reader. Truthfulness is tested by comparing the narrative 
statements to the financial report (regarding completeness, correctness, and verifiability), and 
analyzing the quotient of present tense verbs, because it is assumed that a high degree of present 
tense verbs implies a disregard of the facts of last year’s performance. To identify the legitimacy 
of the texts, Yuthas et al. (2002) inquire about whether the rhetoric of the reports is appropriate 
                                                
33 Generally corporate organizations that trade their stock publicly are required to produce audited annual reports so 
as to allow an evaluation of the company’s performance. Key elements of these reports are detailed financial in-
formation as well as narrative texts that are supplied by the company’s management, which provide a discussion 
and interpretation of the financial statements.  
34 In their analysis, Yuthas et al. (2002) mainly focus on the aforementioned, narrative portions of annual reports. 
35 What exactly is meant by ‘transparency’ is not clearly defined by the authors. Their subsequent case study indi-
cates, however, that they are referring to the general degree to which these annual reports promote understanding 
in Habermas’ sense (cf. chap. 2.2.1). 
36 As we have signaled before (cf. chap. 2.2.1), one notes here that the terminology of the validity claims differs 
somewhat from Habermas’ original concept. To some extent this also holds true for the following application (cf. 
chap. 3.1.2). We will revisit this in the discussion below (cf. chap. 3.1.3). 
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for the context by looking at the scores on embellishment, variety and blame. Finally, sincerity is 
associated to the degree of accurateness to which perceptions, interests, and objectives are repre-
sented. It is thus related to the manner in which the text is presented (rather than its content). In 
other words: sincerity is measured by the degree to which the rhetoric differs from the factual 
performance. A firm that has had negative performances in the past and uses optimistic termi-
nology in a subsequent report would accordingly be labeled as being less sincere. 
Yuthas et al. see their applications as an attempt “to integrate an abstract ethical frame-
work, discourse ethics, with the practical world of the public dissemination and communication 
of business information” (154). Although the researchers initially expected that firms with nega-
tive performances would show strategic efforts to obscure or hide information (cf. 141), they 
found that generally “both the positive and the negative companies generally were seen as more 
communicative than strategic in their communications” (154f). 
3.1.2 Analyzing Standards for Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
In a recent study Mary-Ann Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) examine voluntary corporate responsi-
bility reporting “as a form of moral discourse” (47). Their analysis consists of two pivotal parts 
that each rely on different ‘portions’ of Habermas’ theory: the first part draws on the differentia-
tion of validity claims (cf. chap. 2.2.1) and examines how conditions for basic communicative 
understanding are addressed in various frameworks of corporate social responsibility (CSR) re-
porting (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 48–56).37 The second part draws on discourse ethics (cf. 
chap. 2.2.4) and provides a normative critique of these frameworks, examining the extent to 
which corporate communication can reflect moral discourse (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 56–62).  
By considering the validity claims of comprehensibility, truth, legitimacy, and sincerity in 
association with corporate social responsibility reporting, Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) find that 
“the reporting frameworks address all of Habermas’ validity claims” (54).38 The issue of compre-
hensibility to stakeholders is explicitly addressed by “providing means for standardization of met-
rics and reports”, and the legitimacy of the reports is enhanced by setting up guidelines to “en-
sure that information relevant to stakeholders is included” (55). To promote the aspect of truth 
in these reports, the different frameworks recommend or incorporate methods for auditing and 
validating, designed to “guarantee the credibility of reported information” (ibid.). Furthermore 
                                                
37 These frameworks represent different standards that have been developed to provide guidance to corporations 
concerning the content and format of corporate social responsibility reports. The standards aim at ensuring a cer-
tain degree of transparency and understandability of the reports for the stakeholders they are addressed at. The par-
ticular frameworks dealt with by Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) are: EMAS, ISO 14001, SA 8000, AA1000, Copenha-
gen Charter, and GRI 2000. For a detailed depiction of the former see Reynolds and Yuthas (2008: 50–53). 
38 Here, we once more notice some terminological incoherencies regarding Habermas’ concept of validity claims (cf. 
chap. 2.2.1 and 3.1.1). See the discussion below for further treatment of this aspect (cf. chap. 3.1.3). 
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the frameworks entail feedback components to check whether the “goal of improved environ-
mental performance is embedded into [...] strategy, structures, and process” to ensure that firms 
are “sincere about improving social performance” (56). 
Moving to the normative critique, Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) draw on Michael Kettner’s 
(1993) account of Habermas’ concept of ideal speech. The latter reduces this concept to five la-
conic propositions: generality, autonomous evaluation, role-taking, transparency, and power neu-
trality (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 57). These are then applied within the context of the afore-
mentioned frameworks to “explore the discursive processes” inherent in the standards for corpo-
rate social responsibility reporting and “examine the degree to which [...] the models satisfy the 
principles of discourse ethics” (58). The proposition of generality suggests that stakeholders (or 
according to Kettner (1993: 137): “all parties interested”) must be included in the dialog. 
Reynolds and Yuthas also “include ‘the natural environment’ as a stakeholder, and do not elimi-
nate from consideration non-human species and future generations” (Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 
58). Regarding this proposition the researchers found that “[each] of the frameworks requires 
organizations to identify relevant stakeholders, and recognizes that understanding and addressing 
the interests of these stakeholder groups is a necessary condition for effective social reporting” 
(ibid.). In addition the proposition of role-taking, which suggests that all parties involved in dis-
course must make an attempt to understand each others’ points of view, is addressed by all the 
frameworks, as they “require companies to identify those issues that concern stakeholders” (59). 
Autonomous evaluation, in contrast, which requires for all stakeholders participating in dis-
course, to be allowed to express opinions, raise and question claims, make proposals, and be al-
lowed all means necessary to move toward consensus, is largely ignored by the frameworks: they 
indeed require corporations to accommodate stakeholder interests in decision-making, but they 
“[fall] short of prescribing stakeholder engagement processes” (60). Furthermore the transpar-
ency condition, which requires making interests publicly known to others, is only rudimentarily 
included in the frameworks by more or less strict requirements for public reporting (cf. ibid.). 
This, however, “cannot guarantee that the full range of corporate interests is exposed” (ibid.). 
Finally, the principle of power neutrality, which implies that all parties have equal access to deci-
sions, and equal participation in these decisions, is the “most critical”, and in the context of cor-
porate social responsibility reporting the “most problematic” or “illusive” of the ideal proposi-
tions (61). Reynolds and Yuthas even go on to state that due “to the legal corporate form, the 
Western world privileges management’s fiduciary responsibility to shareholders above responsi-
bilities to other stakeholders, it may even be legally impossible to engage in processes that allow 
stakeholders equal power in corporate decision-making” (ibid.). 
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The researchers conclude that even though “there is a trend to move [...] toward an effort 
to communicate with stakeholders in a more interactive way”, and the reporting frameworks “in-
corporate some [discursive] aspects”, it is evident that all the standards for corporate social re-
sponsibility reporting ultimately “fall short when it comes to fully engaging stakeholders by 
adopting all key principles of moral discourse” (62). 
3.1.3 Discussion 
3.1.3.1 Terminological Misconceptions 
In both applications of Habermas’ theory depicted above we see that the researchers, unlike 
Habermas, speak of four validity claims: along with truth, rightness, and truthfulness both analyses 
refer to comprehensibility as a validity claim. This however, as we indicate in chapter 2.2.1, is a 
misconception, since Habermas only refers to three validity claims (cf. Habermas, 1981: 410–427; 
1984: 305–319). What clearly differentiates comprehensibility from truth, rightness, or truthful-
ness, and furthermore disqualifies it as a validity claim as such, is the fact that it is not associated 
with what Habermas depicts as an illocutionary binding force (cf. chap. 2.2.2). 
Verständlichkeit stellt [...], solange eine Kommunikation überhaupt ungestört verläuft, einen faktisch 
schon eingelösten Anspruch dar; sie ist nicht bloß ein Versprechen. Daher möchte ich ‚Verständlich-
keit’ zu den Bedingungen der Kommunikation rechnen und nicht zu den in der Kommunikation erho-
benen, sei es diskursiven oder nichtdiskursiven Geltungsansprüchen (Habermas, 1984b: 139, italics in 
original).xiii 
Comprehensibility is something that precedes communication; it is not a validity claim we raise in 
communication. Comprehensibility thus relates to the validity claims in a hierarchical order in 
which the former preconditions the latter. Other than constative, regulative, or expressive speech 
acts—i.e. speech acts that each reflexively relate to either the objective, the social, or the subjec-
tive world—communicative speech acts simultaneously relate to all three worlds.  
More momentous than this misconception of the difference between communicative pre-
conditions and validity claims is the misleading use of the term ‘truthfulness’ when speaking of 
the “four Habermasian principles” of “comprehensibility, truthfulness, legitimacy, and sincerity” 
(Yuthas et al., 2002: 148). In this ‘tetralogy’ the term truthfulness obviously refers to the objective 
world, since legitimacy is associated with the social world, sincerity with the subjective world, and 
comprehensibility with all three worlds. Thus, what is referred to here with the term truthfulness 
refers to the validity claim Habermas actually calls truth (cf. chap. 2.2.1). Furthermore the termi-
nology applied in the analysis of Yuthas et al. (2002) is especially misleading because in 
Habermas’ concept the term truthfulness is synonymous to what Yuthas et al. call sincerity, and 
thus refers to a different world relation all together. In other words, where Yuthas et al. obviously 
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want to refer to the objective world, they apply the term that de facto refers to the subjective 
world. 
3.1.3.2 The Challenge of Analyzing Validity Claims 
As we have demonstrated above, in the analysis by Yuthas et al. (2002), Habermas’ theory is ap-
plied by means of a software tool (Diction 5.0) that detects certain semantic characteristics in dif-
ferent annual reports. Concluding their efforts, the researchers rightly acknowledge that the use 
of a standard software not specifically designed for measuring the claims of comprehensibility, 
truth, legitimacy, and sincerity means that the “translation between Diction dimensions and the 
communicative action dimensions [is] not self-evident” (155). There is one dimension, however, 
in which such a ‘translation’ is not merely ‘not self-evident’ but self-evidently wrong. We are re-
ferring, of course, to the dimension of sincerity (or truthfulness). By focusing on this dimension 
it becomes clear that Yuthas et al. indeed acknowledge that it is the “most important [factor] in 
evaluating the degree to which discourse in this genre is communicative or strategic” (151). Nev-
ertheless it is evident that the researchers have difficulty acknowledging that sincerity refers to the 
inner world of an actor and cannot be evaluated simply by looking at annual reports: as we explain 
above, Yuthas et al. (2002) analyze sincerity by detecting the degree to which the rhetoric of an 
annual report differs from factual past performances. Accordingly, a firm with negative past per-
formances that uses optimistic rhetoric in the annual report is labeled insincere. This ‘translation’, 
however, appears to be illegitimate, because it cannot be ascertained that a firm with negative 
financial performances in past accounting periods, is not, on the whole, actually anticipating posi-
tive earnings (for future accounting periods) and thus sincerely uses optimistic rhetoric. Further-
more, by applying Habermas’ concept of truthfulness as such, Yuthas et al. (2002) assimilate the 
subjective world to the objective world: when analyzing the degree of truthfulness by comparing 
the rhetoric of the report with its financial information, they are in fact comparing utterances 
with objective data. Truthfulness, however, refers exclusively to the subjective world (cf. chap. 
2.2.1), and can only be evaluated with reference to the constancy of behavior (for instance by 
comparing past statements with subsequent behavior). Yuthas et al. (2002), however, deal with 
the claim of sincerity as if it where similar to the claim of truth by cross-referencing it with the 
factual past performances of a firm. They would most likely find it difficult to define the differ-
ence between sincerity on the one hand and truth on the other, thereby conflating the two terms. 
Moreover, by using the term truthfulness instead of truth (e.s.) they succumb to the same fallacy.  
When focusing on Reynolds and Yuthas’ (2008) more recent analyses one garners the im-
pression that the analysis regarding the claim of sincerity is—compared to that of Yuthas et al. 
(2002)—somewhat more differentiated, since the authors explicitly allude to the fact that “sincer-
ity focuses on the subjective beliefs” and, among the validity claims, is “perhaps the most difficult 
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to evaluate” (Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 55). When describing the accordant implications of these 
difficulties, however, they state that “it would be possible to have a report that is factually cor-
rect, but paints an inaccurate picture of performance” (ibid.). If what is meant by ‘performance’ is 
the actual past conduct of a firm (which seems evident), the authors are again not referring to sub-
jective beliefs, but to statements that are inaccurate with regard to something objective (past per-
formance). 
When further focusing on the claim of legitimacy we find that the manner in which both 
applications evaluate this dimension does not really do justice to the social context, because the 
latter is either prescribed by the researchers or simply not included in the analysis. Whereas truth, 
for instance, is rightly cross-referenced with objective data (annual reports) or the directive to 
supply it (standards for CSR reporting), legitimacy is cross-referenced solely with the rhetoric of 
the subject firm (annual reports) or with the unsubstantial directive to supply ‘information rele-
vant to the stakeholders’ (standards for CSR reporting). This shows how, in both cases, the re-
searchers do not properly turn to the social world for their evaluation. They do not question: (a) 
whether the ‘embellishing’ rhetoric of a specific firm is in fact experienced as illegitimate in light 
of specific social, economic, and political circumstances external to the textual reality of the an-
nual report; or (b) what can substantially be seen as ‘relevant information’ in light of a certain 
social context. We suggest here that interviews with reference groups could potentially provide 
greater insight on legitimacy in both cases. 
3.1.3.3 Challenging Aspects Regarding the Concept of Discourse  
The application of Habermas’ theory, conducted by Yuthas et al. (2002) appears most problem-
atic regarding the concept of discourse ethics, because the authors (a) only analyze annual re-
ports, i.e. one-way written statements, and (b), furthermore, do so without ever turning to the 
concept of the ideal speech situation. The researchers allegedly “apply Habermas’ principles of 
discourse ethics” (154), but do so without ever looking at neither the process of communication 
nor the degree to which ideal conditions are met; both being considerable elements of discourse 
ethics (cf. chap. 2.2.4). One must thus question whether this kind of research really operational-
izes, as it is stated, “the core of Habermas’ discourse ethics” (Yuthas et al., 2002: 155).39 Moreo-
ver Yuthas et al. (2002) confound validity claims and the ideal conditions for communication. 
This manifests itself most blatantly when they erroneously claim: “Habermas recognizes that the 
validity claims are commonly violated in practical discourse. Nonetheless, he suggests that they 
                                                
39 At least the disregard of the process of communication in the analysis is acknowledged by the researchers as a 
limitation: “if the topic of interest is ethical corporate discourse, limiting the analysis to annual reports may be re-
strictive” (Yuthas et al., 2002: 155). 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
33 
can be used as counterfactual ideals against which ordinary communication can be judged” (144). 
As we demonstrate in chapter 2.2, validity claims that are inevitably raised in communication 
oriented toward understanding and the counterfactual ideal speech situation are in fact two sepa-
rate things. 
Compared to the aforementioned, the more recent analysis of standards for corporate so-
cial responsibility reporting (cf. chap. 3.1.2), seems to be a much improved application in regard 
to the concept of discourse. Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) acknowledge that “communication 
[which] is only one-way” is insufficient to discuss the “means through which firms can establish 
moral discourse” (56). By thus considering the aspect of a communication process, they make the 
important finding that, in fact, most of the standards fall short regarding the discursive engage-
ment of stakeholders (e.s.).40 Not only the procedural aspect of discourse, but also the concept of 
the ideal speech situation are incorporated in the analysis of Reynolds and Yuthas. The authors 
allude to the fact that in order to be ethical, “discourse must be inclusive, democratic, and free of 
asymmetries” (47f). The only problematic aspect here is that the author do not directly consult 
Habermas’ texts but draw on an account of Habermas concept of ideal speech given by Michael 
Kettner (1993). This is unfortunate because it hinders the application of Habermas’ theory to a 
greater extent than it can advance it: whereas Habermas solely speaks of including those poten-
tially affected by the outcome of a certain discourse situation (cf. chap. 2.2.4), Kettner wants to 
include everyone who takes a mere interest in what will be debated (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 
57). Whilst Habermas’ counterfactual requirements for ethical discourse can already be expected 
to entail certain limits to the application in ‘organizational reality’ (see chap. 3.3), Kettner’s inclu-
sion of everyone interested only adds to this problematic: it poses the evident practical question 
of how an organization can allow for everyone interested to engage in its communication proc-
esses. Embarking on this extended idea of Habermas’ concept, we find that Reynolds and Yuthas 
have difficulty in applying these challenging conditions: when they present their findings they 
draw back to the more restrictive idea of a ‘stakeholder’ that more closely resembles Habermas’ 
concept of ‘those potentially affected’ (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 58). Hence, the circle of par-
ticipants of the discursive process is reduced from all those interested, to those for whom some-
thing is actually ‘at stake’. Then again we can see that Reynolds and Yuthas, in aiming to be con-
                                                
40 Unfortunately Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) make no effort to further interpret this finding. Thus we would like to 
note here that one possible explanation for this becomes evident, when we bring to mind that autonomous evalua-
tion, compared to e.g. role-taking or transparency, cannot be acted out by mere ‘lip service’, but is either verifiably 
practiced or not practiced at all. It is furthermore evident, that these standards are directed at reports, and that re-
ports as such are somewhat restrictive as discursive forms of communication. Of course the standards themselves 
may be analyzed regarding the degree to which they promote ideals of ethical communication, but the substantial 
form of communication they are directed at is, nonetheless, quintessentially unidirectional, mediated and thus non-
discursive. 
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sistent with recent considerations on ethics and stakeholder management, once more enlarge this 
circle of potential stakeholders by including ”the natural environment”, “non-human species” as 
well as “future generations” (57). Looking at Habermas’ rather anthropocentric concept that can 
only allow rational subjects with the competence to speak and act to participate in discourse (cf. 
chap. 2.2.4), the impression arises that Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) may unsuitably overextend 
their theoretical framework. 
3.1.3.4 Further Questions 
Yuthas et al. (2002) claim that Habermas’ ideals of communication may be counterfactual and are 
thus de facto generally violated, but can, nevertheless, be used to evaluate and judge ordinary 
communication (cf. 144)—a claim Habermas also makes regarding his framework: 
Der diskursethische Ansatz hat den Vorzug, die Kommunikationsvoraussetzungen spezifizieren zu 
können, die in den verschiedenen Formen der Argumentation gegeben sein müssen, wenn die Ergeb-
nisse solcher Diskurse die Vermutung der Vernünftigkeit für sich haben sollen. Damit eröffnet er den 
normativen Überlegungen empirisch-soziologische Anschlussmöglichkeiten (Habermas, 1990b: 
40f).xiv 
This is exactly the spirit in which the two analyses discussed above aim to apply Habermas’ the-
ory to public relations research: both applications try to utilize these empirical sociological links. 
As we point out above, however, some notable challenges emerge from this effort. Regarding 
both analyses, one must conclude that—besides the manifest misconceptions within the analysis 
of the annual reports—the major challenge comes with evaluating the validity claim of sincerity. 
Whereas truth and comprehensibility appear to be dimensions that can be evaluated by the ap-
plied methods remaining largely coherent within the theoretical framework, our demonstrations 
above show that sincerity can only be sensibly evaluated in an analysis that takes (past) statements 
about prospective conduct as a starting point and focuses on according subsequent behavior. 
Furthermore the dimension of legitimacy might be better illuminated by conducting interviews 
with relevant reference groups instead of focusing exclusively on the ‘internal reality’ of an annual 
report or simply prescribing what kind of information can possibly be relevant to stakeholders. In 
addition the above discussion of the applications in the ‘evaluative perspective’ reveals that a piv-
otal question remains regarding the concrete practices of public relations (in this case business 
reports or corporate social responsibility reports) that can coherently be analyzed in terms of a 
symmetrical communication process and can furthermore possibly be referred to as dialogical, or 
even discursive. Furthermore we have seen that it is not only the means of communication, but 
also the suggested participants (e.g. non-human species) of an allegedly discursive communication 
process that could be in conflict with the theoretical frame of reference. In the big picture, of 
course, these significant questions about communicative practices and participants also lead to a 
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controversy about the degree to which public relations can at all be described as dialogical and, 
moreover, discursive in terms of Habermas’ theory.41 
3.2 Practical Perspective: Modeling Public Relations Practice 
3.2.1 Relational Public Relations 
Maier (2005) applies Habermas’ concept of the public sphere (cf. chap. 2.2.5) and Gerard 
Hauser’s (1999) more recent account of the rhetoric of publics and public spheres (in contention 
with Habermas’ view to some degree) to public relations practice. Following an analysis of public 
relations practices during the Roman Catholic Church’s sexual abuse scandal in the USA between 
the years 2002 and 2003, he ultimately suggests “a new perspective on public relations” that 
could help institutions better cope with and improve their response to crises (cf. Maier, 2005: 
219f).  
In his brief analysis of the aforementioned sexual abuse scandal Maier shows that, by look-
ing at the case, Habermas’ account of the public sphere could both be confirmed and disavowed 
(cf. 221f). On the one hand, the scandal “awakened a variety of critical publics and intellectuals 
from all sides of the ideological spectrum” and the church, on the other hand, “played the role of 
the reluctant institution, relinquishing its secret files only when the public outcry was so loud it 
could not be avoided” (221). This negative publicity ultimately forced the church to adopt new 
policies and thus “the public sphere worked as Habermas suggested it should” (ibid.). Yet Maier 
needs to constrain this ideally-sounding conclusion since the church mostly did not respond di-
rectly to critical publics and aimed to firmly control the agenda. Thus he admits that the “direct, 
critical debate Habermas’ model requires was absent” (ibid.). Ultimately Maier concludes that 
“Habermas’ critical publics and public relations professionals are playing the same game from 
opposite sides: One demands a public sphere of agnostic critical publicity, while the other uses 
public relations techniques to evade that critical publicity” (222). Such situations can lead to 
“trench warfare” in which an organization is opposed by an angry, critical public (ibid.). At this 
point the author shifts to Hauser’s (1999) account of the public sphere, who “speaks to this 
problem by suggesting that both Habermas and public relations professionals rely on a simplistic 
understanding of what a public is and how it participates in public discourse” (Maier, 2005: 222). 
The central point that Hauser makes is that publics are fare more complex and speak with con-
siderably more subtle voices than originally assumed by Habermas (cf. Hauser, 1999: 37–56). To 
Hauser, Habermas’ account of the public sphere “excludes many arenas in which public dialogue 
                                                
41 For further considerations see e.g. chapter 5.1.2 (on the question regarding discourse participants) or chapter 4.3 
(on the question regarding coherency with Habermas’ theory). 
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occurs” (39). Thus he formulates the concept of a reticulate public sphere (cf. 57–81) that incor-
porates Habermas’ formal debate and rational-critical publicity into a much larger conversation, 
the “vernacular discourse”, which is “naturally occurring” and therefore “public conversations 
are naturally occurring as well” (Maier, 2005: 223). Maier stresses that his concept of Hauser’s, 
different from that of Habermas’, leads to the more encouraging conclusion that “publics are not 
dead” (ibid.). Maier sees Habermas’ account of the social transformation of the public sphere as 
merely “bewailing the death of rational-critical publics” whereas Hauser shows that public con-
versation and reasoning can at present be witnessed in ‘vernacular discourse’ (ibid.). 
In foregrounding meaning and interaction, Hauser suggests a theory of public relations that empha-
sizes the management of ambiguity and meaning, as opposed to control, power, and brand identity. 
Such a perspective seems particularly useful in public relations situations where ambiguity is consider-
able and stakes are high (ibid.). 
Referring to Hauser, Maier claims that public relations practitioners would be well-advised to 
“attempt to understand and interact with their publics” instead of attempting to “avoid or control 
the discourse” as he reflects in his analysis of the public relations practices of the Roman Catholic 
Church (223f). From this general perspective Maier deducts three central aspects to enable public 
relations practice in establishing successful relationships with publics, especially in response to 
crises (cf. 224f): The first of these aspects is openness to conversation and challenge. This may in-
clude reducing efforts to control the agenda and outcome in order to promote “true conversa-
tion” (224). The second is attentiveness to the discourse and activities of publics, their movements 
as well as their complexity. “True attentiveness” is not mere “listening” but requires a “thickness 
of description” that “cannot be found in the opinion polls and other quantitative metrics that are 
often the stock and trade of traditional public relations” (225). In practice this means that atten-
tiveness requires less statistical analysis but rather a focus on ethnography and hermeneutics—
public discourse is seen as a “social text” (ibid.). The final aspect of successful public relations, 
according to Maier is responsiveness; not “in formal terms as direct answers to the challenges” but 
in the same vernacular sense in that issues are raised within a reticulate public sphere (ibid.). 
These three aspects allow to apply Hauser’s expanded understanding of Habermas’ account 
of the public sphere to public relations by drawing on (a) the concept of a reticulate public sphere 
and (b) the interactional ideal founded within it. Referring once again to the case of the church’s 
sex scandal, Maier concludes that although “no amount of public relations could have avoided or 
hidden the crisis” one may assume that “more relational public relations could have helped to ne-
gotiate the conflict [...] better” (226, italics added). 
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3.2.2 Consensus-Oriented Public Relations 
A first and basic draft of the concept of consensus-oriented public relations (COPR) was pub-
lished by Burkart (1991) in the Journal Publizistik. It has since been further developed as an in-
strument for the planning and evaluation of public relations (cf. Burkart, 1993, 1994, 1996), and 
is currently still part of public relations discourse (cf. Burkart, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). Briefly 
summarized the aim of Burkart’s approach is to “gain suggestions for the analysis of real public 
relations communication from the perspective of Habermas’s concept of understanding”, espe-
cially focusing on the “relation between public relations experts offering information and mem-
bers of target groups who receive this information” (Burkart, 2007: 250). The author parallels 
public relations with mutual understanding as described by Habermas. The concept of communi-
cative action (cf. chap. 2.2.1) and Habermas’ program of formal pragmatics (cf. chap. 2.2.2) are 
utilized by Burkart so as to systematically differentiate and analyze communicative claims relevant 
to public relations practice, and to conceptualize public relations practice. Analogous to 
Habermas’ concept of world-relations and validity claims, Burkart begins with the ascertainment 
that public relations managers will have to expect criticism regarding their utterances on three 
levels: 
Members of the public will offer their doubts about the truth of presented public relations informa-
tion, especially when confronted with numbers, other data and facts. They will question the trustworthi-
ness of the company and its communicators as well as the legitimacy of the company’s interests (Burkart, 
2007: 251f, italics added). 
Thus it should be the aim of public relations practitioners to use this concept based on pragmat-
ics to eliminate ex post or (even better) prevent a critical challenging of the relevant information 
communicated ex ante (cf. 252). Especially in situations that hold a high chance of conflict, plan-
ning and evaluation of public relations practice should consider these communicative principles 
of mutual understanding (cf. e.g. Burkart, 2004, 2007).42 The overall aim of public relations prac-
tice using the COPR model can therefore be described as enabling an undisturbed communica-
tion process. Disturbances can be avoided as long as public relations practitioners can manage 
their conduct and utterances in ways that prevent the public from doubting one or more of the 
validity claims. But in a case where the background consensus of everyday communication is 
challenged by doubts, Burkarts’ model—analogous to Habermas concept (cf. chap. 2.2.4)—
suggests the mode of regular communicative action be changed to discourse in order to resolve 
the issue. The central task of consensus-oriented public relations is therefore to render this ‘re-
                                                
42 In respect to this position, Burkart aligns his concept with Grunig and Hunt (1984), who—in the field of public 
relations inquiry—reject theories of persuasion in favor of a focus on understanding (cf. 22); Habermas’ communi-
cative principles allegedly match this position (cf. Burkart, 2004: 459). 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
38 
pair-mechanism’ possible (cf. Burkart, 2010: 25f). In his effort to apply Habermas’ theory to pub-
lic relations, Burkart models a process of four subsequent stages (or ‘sub-ordinate targets’) of 
public relations practice that can each be planned, analyzed and evaluated on the basis of 
Habermas’ concept (cf. Burkart, 2008: 231–236):  
First, public relations has to communicate relevant information to a relevant segmented pub-
lic, since one major pre-condition to rational judgment is knowledge of facts. Of course ‘quality 
of information’ in the broader sense becomes the critical criterion in this stage, which should 
accordingly be evaluated on three pivotal levels: (a) on the level of first hand information dis-
persed by an organization through content analysis, (b) on the level of second hand information 
in the media through media response analysis, and (c) on the level of individual knowledge on the 
relevant issue among members of a segmented public through representative interviews (cf. 232). 
The findings from this evaluation then become relevant to decide whether to enter from the first 
stage onto the next.  
Second—if an issue provokes controversial response—public relations has to enable discus-
sion. This means inducing public debate through ‘classic’ media relations practices as well as 
through more direct forms of interaction, e.g. face-to-face communication or ‘online-dialog’.43 In 
order to conveniently address emerging criticism, an organization may for instance, systematically 
engage in the negotiation of an issue in the media, establish a website that contains a forum for 
discussion or arrange public expert hearings (cf. Burkart, 2008: 233). Again, the results of this 
stage should be evaluated through content analysis, media response analysis, interviews, or par-
ticipatory observation.  
If the phase of discussion does not sufficiently resolve an issue—i.e. if validity claims are 
still significantly challenged—the organization subsequently needs to engage in the third stage: 
discourse. This stage is concerned with questions of objective truth and normative rightness: The 
aim is mainly to promote what Burkart calls ‘virtual discourse’, a reflection and debate between 
experts on facts and norms, through different media formats, in order to reduce doubts regarding 
truth and legitimacy to a minimum (cf. Burkart, 2010: 28f). A subsequent or accompanying 
evaluation by means of the aforementioned methods (e.s.) is again suggested to measure the de-
gree of dissent.  
Eventually, the final stage is concerned with the definition of the situation and includes the 
monitoring of the status quo of the achieved degree of understanding (cf. Burkart, 2008: 235f). 
This last stage can therefore be described as a final, summative evaluation of the whole process, 
                                                
43 For an inquiry into the potentials of ‘online dialog’ for public relations see e.g. Michael Kent and Taylor (1998) or 
Burkart (2000). 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
39 
wherein the respective results must finally be communicated. This in turn means that if the whole 
process does not lead to (the unlikely event of) consensus and, and possibly even drifts into dis-
sent, it’s the diverse points of contention that will be subject to the communication in the last 
stage. 
Looking at the above concept, the interwoven connection of the four stages (information, 
discussion, discourse, definition of the situation) and Habermas’ program of formal pragmatics 
becomes obvious: the central question that is addressed and analyzed in all four stages is the 
question whether validity claims are being challenged, and if so, which ones and to what extent? 
By posing this pragmatic question, the model gains an ‘Ariadne’s thread’ for planning, analyzing 
and evaluating public relations practice with regard to understanding. 
3.2.3 Public Relations as Reputation Management 
Eisenegger and Imhof (2008) begin their application of Habermas’ theory to public relations with 
a critique regarding a ‘weak point’ of contemporary public relations discourse: 
[...] the topics covered by the [public relations] discourse in particular have so far referred much too 
exclusively to private business and the debate on reputation pursued in professional circles conse-
quently suffers from a corporate bias (125). 
Thus the authors intend to apply Habermas’ theory for the development of a theory-based defi-
nition of reputation that remains applicable for both commercial and non-commercial organiza-
tions. According to Eisenegger and Imhof an interdisciplinary definition is needed; especially 
since previous attempts are either too broad44—and therefore partly resist operationability and a 
breaking down into subcategories—or too specific45 in that they would only apply to the com-
mercial sector (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2009: 244f). Though also solely concerned with commer-
cial organizations, the approach by Manfred Schwaiger (cf. e.g. Schwaiger, 2004; Eberl, 
Schwaiger, 2005) seems to be an exception:  
[...] based on a theory-led definition that makes a distinction between cognitive and affective dimen-
sions [...] reputation is treated here as a two-dimensional construct. This reputation concept was also 
refined with reference to business organizations as its object. The approach is nevertheless interesting 
because [it] can in principle also be transferred to non-economic reputation bearers (Eisenegger, 
Imhof, 2008: 126f). 
The efforts by Schwaiger partially meet the holistic requirements of Eisenegger and Imhof since 
they lead to the definition of two fairly broad components of reputation: the cognitive (the assess-
ment of organizational competence) and the affective (the assessment of sympathy for a company) 
                                                
44 Here Eisenegger and Imhof primarily refer to attempts with a sociological background like e.g. Hayagreeva Rao 
(1994) or Wesley Shrum and Robert Wuthnow (1988). 
45 This concerns mainly definitions coming from public relations and marketing research; Charles Fombrun (1996) is 
a representative example. 
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(cf. Schwaiger, 2004: 842). However, from Eisenegger and Imhof’s point of view, this bipartite 
concept lacks a component to cover the assessment of the organizational conduct with regard to 
social norms (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 127).46 Hence Eisenegger and Imhof aim for a three 
dimensional model. The authors view reputation as “a phenomenon whose characteristic features 
can be observed exclusively in modern achievement-oriented societies”, a social-evolutionary 
view which allows them to develop modern reputation as “a parameter that is attributed or with-
held in all the function systems of differentiated modern societies based on the same fundamen-
tal logic” (ibid.). It is this reference to a ‘fundamental logic’ that establishes the connection to 
Habermas’ theory: The specific reference here is to Habermas’ system of world relations; i.e. the 
differentiation of an objective, a social, and a subjective world that constitutes a ‘grid’ for social 
interactions (cf. chap. 2.2.1 or Habermas, 1981a: 114–151). To show how this concept may be 
utilized to theoretically model the (three dimensional) constitution of reputation, Eisenegger and 
Imhof allot a certain type of reputation to each of the world relations (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 
2008: 128–130).47 
The objective world, in which agents are judged according to cause-effect relationships in a 
specific context, matches with the so-called functional reputation (cf. 128). 
 [...] political parties acquire functional reputation by measurably increasing voter shares. Journalists 
appear worthy of recognition when they boost viewer ratings or circulation figures. Finally, managers 
and companies enhance their functional reputation when they increase their profits or share values 
(ibid.). 
The respective verifying criterion that corresponds to the objective world is instrumental rational-
ity: in the dimension of functional reputation, agents are judged according to their use of appro-
priate means and achievement of particular aims (cf. ibid.). Thus functional reputation can be 
seen as “an indicator of subsystem-specific success” as well as “technical competence” (ibid.). 
Predominantly assigned to this category are agents with a cognitive world reference like experts, 
analysts, scientists, etc. that may appear as reputation intermediaries. These agents are the “driv-
ing authorities who judge and decide upon the functional reputation of those who act as reputa-
tion bearers“ (ibid.).  
The social world, in which conduct is judged according to social standards and values, is 
matched with the so-called social reputation (cf. ibid). Here the respective verifying criterion is ra-
tionality of value and the group of possible reputation intermediaries consists of agents with a 
                                                
46 In fact this is a factor that has been considered by Schwaiger (2004). Though he has not included it “directly in the 
reputation construct” and only “considered [it] as an independent variable” (Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 127). 
47 This allocation can be seen as rudimentarily analog to the allocation of certain aspects of rationality of action to 
the respective worlds as performed by Habermas—rudimentary because, as we clarify in the subsequent discussion 
(cf. chap. 3.2.4.3), the allocation takes different presuppositions into account, leading to different consequences. 
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normative world reference, like for instance, religious groups, civil-society agents or intellectuals. 
Whereas the functional dimension is linked to the logic of different functional systems, this type 
of reputation claims to be applicable to society as a whole. “That is why we expect politicians to 
shun dishonest methods and managers to include social and ecological standards in their calcula-
tions“ (ibid.). Here Eisenegger and Imhof advert the interdependency between both of the mod-
eled dimensions: Actions that are oriented toward certain performance targets (first dimension) 
will simultaneously be judged according to social norms (second dimension). Beyond that the 
‘scope’ of the social reputation is much wider than that of the first dimension, because the spec-
trum of those who are able to verify or judge moral conduct of a reputation bearer, consists in 
principle of the sum of agents who know of the former; whereas such a spectrum in respect to 
purpose oriented conduct will be limited to those with specific knowledge regarding these pur-
poses (cf. 128f). 
The subjective world, in which agents are judged according to their emotional attractive-
ness, is matched with the so-called expressive reputation (cf. 129). Compared to the remaining two, 
this dimension differs significantly regarding the relation of object and subject: 
The objective and social worlds confront reputation bearers as outer worlds with expectations of cog-
nitive-functional performance or ethical-normative demands. In the subjective dimension, the inner 
world of the agent himself is the criterion for attributing reputation (ibid.). 
Accordingly, the reputation bearer’s expressive actions are appraised with regard to an emotional 
logic: external third parties judge the former based on the emotionally repellent or attractive 
emanations of his character. A process, which then manifests itself in negatively or positively 
‘charged’ emotionality toward the reputation bearer (the degree of sympathy, attractiveness or 
fascination as a possible indicator for this). Possible reputation intermediaries are agents with an 
aesthetic world reference such as artists, designers, or public relations experts and fashion design-
ers.48 Due to the fact that this third dimension is concerned with the inner world of an agent which 
remains inaccessible to others, the appraisal particularly depends on the other (accessible and 
verifiable) dimensions: “Thus a company may appeal to our feelings because it proves to be a 
particularly innovative force with fascinating products in the functional dimension [or] an enter-
prise may gain our sympathy because it [...] places ethical principles above its own profit interests 
if necessary” (ibid.). This is the reason why reputation intermediaries that would typically be as-
signed to one of the other dimensions are included in the process of judging an agent regarding 
the subjective world: “experts, analysts and scientists no less than ethical entrepreneurs, members 
of civil society, politicians and the media can all attest to the emotional attractiveness [...]“ (129f). 
                                                
48 Thus, the reference is to agents that specialize in the creation and systematic manipulation of impressions that 
their clients make on others. 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
42 
However, in this subjective dimension, an agent will inevitably be judged according to the 
authenticity of his or her actions; more or less obvious strategic intent renders conduct as merely 
staged and feigned (cf. 130). 
In order to glean further aspects of reputation Eisenegger and Imhof explore the implica-
tions of the three-dimensional reputation constitution depicted above to action theory via a link 
to the complementary concept of trust. By expatiating upon the connecting semantics of the two 
concepts they show that trust and reputation have to be seen as “two sides of the same coin” 
(ibid.).49 On this note, reputation can be defined as recognition of trustworthiness and the constitu-
tive conditions of reputation can be depicted by means of an established concept—namely that 
of Bentele (1994), who describes how trustworthiness is based on the ability to correctly antici-
pate the actions of an agent whilst simultaneously expecting that this ‘conformity of action’ will 
continue in the future. This concept is used by Eisenegger and Imhof so as to combine the terms 
of reputation and trust in a way that it can then be linked to action theory: 
[when] institutions, organizations or persons possess a reputation in the perception of outsiders, then 
its recognition by reputation-endowing individuals is based on expectable actions in a functional and 
social respect. In a functional respect, reputation bearers are expected to fulfill their performance 
mandate and in social respect, it is assumed that they observe the norms and values of the society as a 
whole (Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 131). 
But an agent that simply adapts well-established expectations concerning the objective and social 
world would by no means obtain any positive effect on his or her reputation. More likely this 
agent would suffer from being viewed as conformist. To Eisenegger and Imhof, therefore, it ap-
pears as though more sophisticated action stands to reason: whilst the dimensions of functional 
and social reputation suggest a policy of conformation, a contrasting policy of delimitation is 
suggested with regard to expressive reputation (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2009: 250). It is only 
through the effort of delimitation that an agent is able to develop and cultivate a thoroughly indi-
vidual identity. It is this “stressing of distinctiveness [that] is the indispensable precondition for 
relevant reference groups to respond emotionally just to him and to no other reputation bearer“ 
(Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 131). This combination of fulfilling of social and functional expecta-
tions on the one hand and an expressive delimitation on the other, constitutes a ‘balancing act’ 
that can be seen as the central challenge to reputation management.  
                                                
49 Plausible examples for these connecting semantics are that one would refer to a reputation bearer as being “trust-
worthy”, as someone who “merits our trust” or even possesses “trust capital” (Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 130). 
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3.2.4 Discussion 
3.2.4.1 Relational Public Relations: a Normative Application with Marginal 
Theoretical Guidance 
Maier (2005) applies Habermas’ (1962, 1989) and Hauser’s (1999) considerations on the public 
sphere to analyze public relations, and to derive three general dimensions to promote relational 
public relations practices that allow for “weathering the storm” in a critical public (Maier, 2005: 
219). Two aspects of this effort appear especially noticeable: Maier (a) shifts from Habermas’ to 
Hauser’s account so as to avoid Habermas’ allegedly ‘too simplistic’ understanding of the public 
sphere, and (b) he—despite partially distancing himself from Habermas—ultimately promotes a 
notion of mutual understanding. The former aspect is noticeable because Habermas has explicitly 
reevaluated and partly reconceptualized those issues Maier wants to emphasize in his model (cf. 
Habermas, 1990b, 1992b; see also chap. 2.2.5).50 The latter aspect is noticeable because mutual 
understanding is nonetheless a core aspect of Habermas’ theoretical considerations (cf. chap. 
2.2).51 Both aspects seem to suggest that Maier could have coherently designed his model without 
including Hauser’s (1999) concept. Not to be misunderstood: Hauser’s rhetorical counter-
assumptions to Habermas’ concept of the public sphere—whether they are appropriate or not—
are not the issue here; but for the point Maier is trying to make, that is to ultimately stress open-
ness, attentiveness, and responsiveness as ‘imperatives’ for public relations practice vis-à-vis a 
reticulate public sphere, he could have found an adequate normative framework within Habermas’ 
theory. To give one example: Maier refers to Hauser in claiming that “communicators who at-
tempt to [...] control the discourse of their publics [...] ultimately fail” (Maier, 2005: 223). With 
reference to Habermas’ theory he would be able to arrive at the exact same conclusion, because 
to Habermas only validity claims that are defended through rational argument can withstand 
critical publics. Any attempt of force can only secure claims for the medium-term; in fact, this is 
what distinguishes claims to power from validity claims:  
Während Geltungsansprüche intern mit Gründen verknüpft sind und der illokutionären Rolle eine ra-
tional motivierende Kraft verleihen, müssen Machtansprüche durch ein Sanktionspotential gedeckt 
sein, damit sie durchgesetzt werden können (Habermas, 1981a: 408).xv  
                                                
50 Looking at the application demonstrated in chapter 3.4.2 we see that it is quite possible to speak of the “multiple 
sites of the public sphere” that individuals participate in as “members of diverse publics”, solely by drawing on 
Habermas’ framework (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 131). 
51 Looking at the application demonstrated in chapter 3.2.2, we see that it is quite possible to embark on roughly the 
same symmetrical position, solely by drawing on Habermas’ theory. In addition, the applications discussed in chap-
ter 3.3 can be seen as demonstrations of how Habermas’ theory can be drawn upon to promote public relations 
oriented toward mutual understanding—notwithstanding, of course, the challenges that these efforts entail: see e.g. 
subsequent discussions (3.2.4.2 and 3.3.4) and intermediate reflections (chap. 4.3). 
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Thus an attempt to control discourse will either require the exertion of force (i.e. sanctions) or 
will ultimately fail because power claims—unlike validity claims—lack an illocutonary binding 
force (see also chap. 2.2.2). Maier in his critique, however, sticks to the early text of Habermas’ 
post-doctoral thesis Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962, 1989) and does not take into account 
any of the author’s later efforts. It is thus quite comprehensible how Maier gets the impression 
that Habermas’ notion of rational, critical discourse is too fragile and how he appears rather dis-
appointed at how “dim the prospects of democracy seem to be” on Habermas’ account (Maier, 
2005: 221). Solely looking at Habermas’ post-doctoral thesis these objections are thoroughly ap-
propriate, in fact, as we demonstrate in chapter 2.2.5, they are generally rearticulations of consid-
erations that Habermas has put forth long since. 
Looking at Maier’s (2005) modeling effort, especially in comparison to the other two mod-
els discussed in this chapter below, one must conclude that the author demonstrates a fairly sim-
ple application, thoroughly normative and with only marginal theoretical guidance: he mainly 
concentrates on a general foregrounding of understanding (which he mostly takes from Hauser 
but, as we argue above, could just as well draw from Habermas’ concept) and thereby supports 
his general model of an open, attentive, and responsive public relations practice. Furthermore, the 
need or requirement of such dialogic public relations on behalf of the publics is simply presumed 
by the author. The brief analysis performed by Maier as well as his normative concept of ‘good 
public relations practice’ that ‘truly relates’ to its publics, are typical for the perspective of those 
practicing the discipline (cf. Bentele, 2003: 55; Röttger, 2009b: 15). Thus it is not surprising that 
Maier, alongside his academic efforts, is mainly a public relations practitioner. An obvious ques-
tion that emerges from Maier’s efforts is how appropriate is the author’s normative idea of public 
relations practices that ‘really relate’ to publics, in light of considerations on power differentials or 
concrete forms of (mediated) communications, and how coherent is this positive idea of ‘good’ 
public relations with Habermas’ theory? But Maier’s text—despite its positive and normative idea 
of public relations itself—via its critique regarding Habermas’ “melodrama of the bourgeois pub-
lic sphere” (Maier, 2005: 221), also points toward a pivotal question regarding this core concept 
in public relations: how can one adequately assess the multiplicity and, furthermore, the delibera-
tive and rational potential of a public sphere, ‘subject’ to organized efforts of public relations? Or 
as Robert Heath and Finn Frandsen (2008: 359) put it: “Must the evolution of the public sphere, 
necessarily be described as a process of disintegration, or has the public sphere, for the last dec-
ade or so, experienced an important communicative revival by virtue of the Internet (sic!) and the 
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new social media used by everybody, from government and companies to consumers, citizens 
and activists”?52 
3.2.4.2 The COPR Concept: a Situational Complement to Conventional Pub-
lic Relations53 
Burkart, who aims to consistently ground his efforts in a solid theoretical framework and also 
arrive at relevant implications for public relations practice, builds his model around a basic, dy-
adic argument: On the one hand he alludes to an increasing need in our present societies to ex-
plain interests and actions in order to gain public support, on the other hand he—in light of this 
increase—claims that public relations practice can and should be planned and evaluated as action 
oriented toward understanding (cf. Burkart, 2004). The fist part of this argument, the strong re-
quirement of public legitimacy, is substantiated with reference to Richard Münch’s (1991) con-
cept of communication society, whilst the second part of this argument is substantiated by draw-
ing on Habermas’ concept of understanding as the inherent telos of human speech (cf. chap. 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Whereas the latter provides a solid theoretical framework for the model, the 
former emphasizes the model’s practical relevance. This dyadic argument is worth a closer look 
because, at its core, we can detect an ‘inner conflict’ that points toward much of the critique that 
is leveled against Burkart’s model: in his social analysis, Münch—considering the dynamic of a 
modern communication society—concludes that Habermas’ concept of mutual understanding 
and discourse as a procedure which concentrates merely on the better argument is too naïve (cf. 
Münch, 1995). Thus, at the core of the aforementioned dyadic structure, we can observe that one 
part of the argument subversively ‘erodes’ the other: when Burkart (embarking on Habermas’ 
theory) claims that public relations can be planned and evaluated by means of the concept of 
mutual understanding (cf. Burkart, 2008: 224), he rejects the implications of the social analysis of 
a communication society, that he (referring to Münch) mounts to emphasize the relevance of his 
model (cf. Burkart, 2004: 459). 
The general objections against a communication theory that builds on a ‘naïve’ idea of mu-
tual understanding has been the basis of criticism of Burkart’s model on three levels: (a) the 
compatibility of the model and its theoretical framework (cf. e.g. Müller-Scholl, 1995), (b) the 
compatibility of the model and public relations practice (cf. e.g. Liebert, 1995; Merten, 2000; 
                                                
52 For further considerations see e.g. chapter 4.3 (on the question regarding the coherency with Habermas’ theory) or 
chapters 3.4 and 5.2 (on the question regarding the conceptualization of a diversified public sphere). 
53 As mentioned in the introduction, Burkart’s model of consensus-oriented public relations—other than most of the 
applications dealt with in this thesis—has been discussed in much detail (cf. e.g. Bentele, Liebert, 1995; Hömberg 
et al., 2010; Zerfaß, 2010; Kunczik, 2010). In the following discussion, we refrain from rearticulating this extensive 
debate but will, in brief, posit what, to us, appears as the major criticism. 
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Saxer, 2010),54 and (c) the compatibility of the theoretical framework and public relations practice 
(cf. e.g. Theis-Berglmair, 1995). The majority of the debate concerning Burkart’s model is, on all 
three levels, carried out in terms of critical reflections on dialogical or symmetrical communica-
tion. When reviewing these, it becomes apparent that Burkart’s model seems to provoke two 
pivotal questions: (a) can public relations adequately be grounded in a theoretical concept that 
centers around face-to-face communication (dialog) and (b), if so, does the concept of communi-
cative action (understanding) do justice to a profession that is primarily conceived in terms of 
functional rationality? 
Reacting to the objections confronting his model that are raised in light of these important 
questions, Burkart clarifies that he does not intend to naively “transfer Habermas’ conditions for 
understanding directly onto the reality of public relations” (Burkart, 2004: 462). This clarification, 
however, practically requires what can be referred to as two slight ‘shifts’ away from Habermas’ 
theory; namely the ‘shift’ (a) from discourse to discussion and (b) from consensus to (better) un-
derstanding. How is this to be understood? 
By ‘shifting’ from discourse to discussion we mean that Burkart has to insist that in the dif-
ferent stages of his model, (even in the stage he refers to as ‘discourse’) dialogic forms of interac-
tion are not mandatory (cf. Burkart, 2008: 232, 235). Thus rejecting (ideal) discursive practices in 
the process he aligns stages two and three of his model. Whereas in Habermas’ theory discourse 
is still aligned with ideal means of communication, i.e. ‘pure communicative action’ (cf. chap. 
2.2.4), Burkart speaks of “virtual discourse” in stage three of his model (Burkart, 2010: 28), which 
is not distinguishable from discussion (stage two) by means of (ideal) communicative practices. 
Hence, for this distinction he no longer draws on Habermas’ ideals but mainly relies on pointing 
toward the reflexivity of the communication between ‘speaker’ and ‘addressee’.  
By ‘shifting’ from consensus to (better) understanding we mean that Burkart generally ac-
knowledges the goal rationality underlying public relations and thereby also the unlikelihood of 
‘true’ consensus (cf. Burkart, 2007: 252). Rejecting the (restrictive) idea of consensus, the benefit 
of his model is ‘narrowed’ to producing ‘rational dissent’; a precise identification of a controversy 
that “is seen by some sociologists of conflict as a major step toward the minimization solution of 
social conflicts” (ibid.). Both of these ‘shifts’ are, of course, necessarily connected: if Burkart 
withdraws from an ideal notion of discourse that is associated with ideal terminology in which 
                                                
54 Obviously, regarding this level, Burkart’s consensus-oriented model significantly aligns with the normative per-
spective of symmetrical public relations often advocated by public relations practitioners: see e.g. chapter 3.2.1 and 
3.2.4.1; or, to provide another example: in an official statement published by the Public Relations Society of Amer-
ica (PRSA), public relations is described as a practice that (re-)establishes harmony in complex and pluralistic socie-
ties (cf. PRSA, 1999: ii). The preference of normative and positive concepts in public relations practice (cf. also 
Bentele, 2003: 55) explains the support Burkart’s model gains on the part of practitioners (cf. Bogner, 2000). 
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real public relations practice cannot be conceived, he consequently needs to dismiss the ‘emphatic’ 
idea of consensus because it is inevitably bound to the ideal conditions of ‘real’ discourse (cf. 
chap. 2.2.4).55 
Despite these ‘shifts’ consensus-oriented public relations still has to be seen as a practicable 
model that serves as an accidental or situational complement to conventional public relations (cf. 
Westerbarkey, 2008); e.g. in situations of expectable or ongoing conflict (cf. Saxer, 2010). It is 
especially in “situations when conflicts are to be expected” that public relations practitioners 
“have to take into account that their messages might be questioned by critical recipients” 
(Burkart, 2007: 251). In these situations the COPR model may serve as a framework to plan and 
evaluate the process in which to present ‘good arguments’ with an orientation toward under-
standing. The COPR model is by no means able to fully “prevent the emergence of conflicts” 
(253), but the implementation of the different practical stages may help to avoid that conflicts 
escalate (cf. 254).  
Regardless of these limitations, two essential and far-reaching questions emerge from 
Burkart’s efforts. Regarding the field of public relations we might ask: to what extent can differ-
ent practices of public relations be conceived in terms of dialogical communication and action 
oriented toward understanding? Regarding the theoretical framework we might ask: in how far 
can an application that appears to harmonize Habermas’ terms of communicative action with the 
strategic reality of public relations exist without theoretical aporia?56 
3.2.4.3 Public Relations as Reputation Management: Applying Habermas or 
Weber? 
Compared to other applications discussed in this thesis, the model developed by Eisenegger and 
Imhof shows a particular distinction that becomes apparent when looking at their application of 
the different terms of rationality. Even though the authors explicitly aim to apply Habermas’ the-
ory (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 127), it is primarily Max Weber’s (1972) concept of social action 
that is important for their model (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 127–130). The concept of com-
municative action, which is distinctive for Habermas’ theory (cf. chap. 2.2.1), is not part of the 
model’s theoretical framework. Thus, what considerably distinguishes this model from other ap-
plications discussed in this thesis is the complete disregard of mutual understanding as the inher-
ent telos of human speech and, thereby, Habermas’ core concept of rationality. Eisenegger and 
                                                
55 In this sense, one could attest that the English title Burkart chose for his model is rather misleading: ‘consensus 
oriented public relations’ implies that the model, in fact, draws on the idealizations of ‘real’ discourse, and tries to 
match it with public relations practice, when, in fact, Burkart rejects this and focuses primarily on a process of un-
derstanding that is not necessarily directed at consensus. 
56 For further considerations see e.g. chapter 4.3 (on the question regarding the possibility of theoretical aporia). 
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Imhof are solely interested in the instrumental dimension of the concept of world-relations. The 
fact that in Habermas’ theory this concept is necessarily complemented by a reflexive dimension 
that grounds the rational potential of human speech, is insignificant to their modeling effort. The 
different dimensions of reputation (functional, social, expressive) are matched with Weber’s 
terms of rationality (instrumental rationality, rationality of value, emotional logic of appraisal), 
without referencing the comprehensive concept of communicative rationality that, as we demon-
strate in chapter 2.2.1, underlies all other concepts of rationality in Habermas’ theory. Can we at 
all coherently refer to this concept as an application of Habermas’ theory when the terms of ra-
tionality of action remain thoroughly teleological, i.e. without associating (communicative) action 
oriented to understanding?  
Following an analytical distinction put forth by Evelyn Gröbel-Steibach (2004) it appears 
that Eisenegger and Imhof apply a concept of rationality that is quintessentially incompatible 
with Habermas’ theory: rationality, as conceptualized by Habermas, refers to the utilization of 
knowledge within a speech act that is interpreted in terms of a social action; it does not, how-
ever—as in Weber’s concept—refer to the rationality of a (teleological) action as such (cf. 99). 
Indeed, Habermas prominently conceptualizes his theory of action on the basis of Weber’s con-
cept, but ultimately he grounds his efforts in aspects of social action that are entirely disregarded 
in Weber’s theory (cf. Habermas, 1981: 369–452; 1984: 273–337). Rather, he develops his con-
cept of rationality in objection to Weber’s typology of action that he criticizes as being insuffi-
cient for the analysis of the problematic of social rationalization: 
Weber hat die inoffizielle Handlungstypologie für die Problematik der gesellschaftlichen Rationalisie-
rung nicht fruchtbar machen können. Die offizielle Version hingegen ist konzeptionell so eng ange-
legt, daß in diesem Rahmen soziale Handlungen nur unter dem Aspekt der Zweckrationalität beurteilt 
werden können (1989a).xvi 
In Weber’s terms, this being Habermas’ central objection, rationalization can only be described as 
instrumental or purposive rationalization. This originates from Weber’s sole focus on a theory of 
consciousness: He does not elucidate ‘meaning’ via a model of speech and possible understand-
ing but via the beliefs and intentions of the isolated subject (cf. Habermas, 1981: 377f; 1984: 
279f). 
Though explicitly claiming to apply the “three-world concept” as “derived by Habermas 
from Max Weber” (Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 127), the model developed by Eisenegger and 
Imhof, in fact merely relies on the general idea of the three forms of judgment. Hence their model 
can only be referred to as an effort of applying Habermas’ theory to public relations in a very 
restricted sense. Moreover we can find this evaluation confirmed in a recent publication of the 
model, where the author, instead of drawing explicitly on Habermas, refers to the three-world 
concept as a general “theorem in the social sciences” (Eisenegger, 2009: 12). Here the model is 
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presented more accurately as based on the general “idea that agents must continually prove them-
selves in three respects” (ibid.), and is, in this general sense, confirmed to be just as much an ap-
plication of concepts of, for instance, Karl Popper or Immanuel Kant as it is of Habermas (cf. 
13).  
3.3 Moral Perspective: Grounding and Enacting Public Relations 
Ethics 
3.3.1 An Ethical Imperative for Public Relations 
Pearson presented a dissertation (1989a) and published two further articles (1989c, 1989b) in 
which he applies Habermas’ theory to public relations ethics. The author modestly labels his ap-
plication an “exercise in model building in public relations” (Pearson, 1989b: 111). He aims to 
show that (a) “business ethics can be studied as a series of questions about how a business orga-
nization communicates”, that (b) “ethical communication is strongly related to the idea of dia-
logue” and that (c) “public relations plays a major role in managing the moral dimension of cor-
porate conduct” (ibid.).  
The author starts with an examination of three prominent epistemological concepts of 
post-modern rhetorical theory: objectivism, relativism and intersubjectivism (cf. 113–117). Three 
components are vital underpinnings for Pearson’s subsequent argument: first, the basic assump-
tions of the individual epistemological concepts; second, the particular role of rhetoric in each of 
these; and third, the connection to public relations that can be established with the respective 
concepts. 
Pearson states that rationalism and empiricism are two distinct philosophical ways of trying 
to gain absolute certainty (cf. 13). Irrespective of the grounding of these certainties—in thought 
or in the senses—the ambitious intent to attain absolute certainty defines these objectivist ap-
proaches. Rhetoric isn’t necessarily involved in either of the objectivist pursuits and they can 
both be undertaken, fully dispensing of communication; or as Pearson puts it: “Neither 
Descartes, Bacon, nor Locke needed to communicate with others in their search for certainty. 
This search was individual and personal” (114). This implies that the objectivist’s only concern 
with rhetoric is to find an effective strategy to—if he or she so whishes—convince someone else 
to accept a certain truth as being epistemically true. Whenever public relations practitioners aim 
to ‘educate’ people and try to gain public support by making people ‘understand’, they can be 
seen as subscribing to this objectivist view (cf. ibid.). 
The relativist perspective denies this possibility of the existence of a rational method to dis-
tinguish right from wrong (cf. ibid.). In language or rhetoric the relativist perspective often leads 
to rather cynical statements, because self-interest always constitutes motivation for action: for a 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
50 
relativist “[...] language is important, not because it plays an essential role in discovering what is 
true or right, but because it can make something look true or right when another viewpoint is 
equally valid” (115). From this perspective public relations practice can thus be described as sole 
sophistry in advancing self-interest. The respective public relations practitioners participate in “a 
mad cacaphony (sic!) of competing interests with no way to decide among them except self-
interest” (Pearson, 1989c: 69).  
The intersubjective perspective is described as a ‘middle ground’ between the former two, 
rejecting the objectivist claims and at the same time not embracing the altogether skeptical view 
of relativism. This particular position is defended by the core assumption that “rhetoric has a 
constitutive, creative role in the generation of knowledge” (Pearson, 1989b: 115f).57 To advocates 
of intersubjectivism, the alternative to relativism and objectivism lies in the agreement among 
members of a community (cf. 117). Such agreements are neither strictly objective since they are 
determined by social and historic conditions and thereby contextual, nor are they strictly relative 
since they exceed the subjective and the arbitrary; they are in fact a “result of intersubjective 
communication and are out there in the community” (117; italics in original). A public relations 
practitioner who subscribes to intersubjective assumptions will level his communication accord-
ing to a participative mode of discourse in which plurality and diversity of perspective is of par-
ticular relevance.58 
Following the epistemological examination depicted above, Pearson introduces Rogene 
Buchholz’ (1985) three historical concepts to describe how businesses approach their moral envi-
ronment (namely: social responsibility, social responsiveness, and public policy), and goes on to 
draw analogies between these concepts and the aforementioned epistemologies. Through this 
comparison, Pearson aims to produce a better understanding of Buchholz’ concept regarding the 
history of corporate public affairs. 
Social responsibility, the first approach in Buchholz’ chronology, is typical for 1960s public 
relations practice (cf. Pearson, 1989b: 118). The idea is that business ought to serve social needs 
that are neither economic nor achievable through liberal economic mechanisms. This approach 
gradually became problematic, given increasing moral pluralism and a ‘crumbling’ of generally 
held values about the purpose and conduct of businesses. Thus there existed a criticism of a 
missing set of universally accepted moral principles that could serve as a guideline for socially 
                                                
57 This claim however can be made with different magnitude: Knowledge can be defined as rhetorical (a) “because it 
is intersubjectively sanctioned”, (b) because it “plays a decisive role in deciding on first principles” or (c) because 
“all epistemological endeavor is rhetorical” (Pearson, 1989b: 116). Whilst ‘claim a’ can be seen as being fairly weak, 
‘claim c’ fully “collapses the empirical into the symbolic”; ‘claim b’ however takes a middle ground between the two 
(ibid.). 
58 Here Pearson refers to Hugh Culbertson (1989) who also formulates this ‘breadth of perspective’ as being relevant 
as a public relations concept. 
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responsible business conduct, but the possibility of successful mediation between the different 
values was nevertheless still upheld (cf. ibid.). According to Pearson, this historical concept of 
social responsibility can be linked to objectivism because in Buchholz’ approach, corporate con-
duct aiming at social goals can be successfully reconciled with business goals, wherein the discov-
ery of moral truth and the ‘right’ course of action is assumed to be a realistic possibility (cf. 120). 
The social responsiveness approach is typical of the 1970s (cf. 118). The idea is to fully 
avoid moral debate while simply focusing on the effectiveness of corporate response mecha-
nisms. This implies that the aim consists of pragmatically adapting the broadly accepted values of 
a given environment, rather than acting according to a ‘sense of responsibility’. Hence business is 
passive and only responding to its environment. To effectively blend in according to a ‘main-
stream’ of social values, public business conduct is based on data provided by public affairs de-
partments through social audits and scanning (cf. 119). In the social responsiveness approach, the 
difficulties implied by the absence of universal principles are avoided through embarking in a 
‘passive quietude’ or ‘cynical activism’, thus representing the relativist view (cf. 120). 
In the 1980s what Buchholz terms the public policy approach became apparent (cf. 119). It 
developed subsequently to the realization that it is of central importance to gain an understanding 
of the public policy process that enables organizations to actively influence this process in favor 
of relevant business interests. Thus business organizations become an “active participant” in an 
“essentially political process” (ibid.). The key observation to Pearson is that moral questions that 
emerge from the business becoming an actor within the public policy process must be “asked in 
terms of how business participates in what is fundamentally a communication process” (120). 
The public policy approach not only overcomes the radical relativism held by the social respon-
siveness approach, but also resists returning to the objectivist assumptions of the social responsi-
bility approach and can thus be linked to intersubjectivism:  
The public policy approach to business’ moral responsibilities as described by Buchholz has the po-
tential for overcoming or synthesizing an earlier opposition in the same way that post-modern rhetori-
cal theory represents a synthesis of competing epistemologies. In the same way that the objectivism-
relativism-intersubjectivism triad seems to represent moments in a dialectical process, so does the so-
cial responsibility-social responsiveness-public policy triad represent a dialectical process (121). 
The important similarity between the two dialectical processes described by Pearson is that they 
both end in a synthesis that prominently focuses on communication variables (cf. ibid.). This very 
emphasis on communication, which is absent in the preceding stages of thesis and antithesis in 
the respective dialectical processes, is of central importance to Pearson’s model. 
Neither objectivist nor relativist epistemologies require that one mind communicate with another in 
the discovery of truth. Post-modern rhetorical theory, on the other hand, claims it takes two minds to 
make truth, whether scientific or moral. Likewise, the public policy approach says business cannot act 
unilaterally but must consult and communicate with others through public policy mechanisms. The 
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public policy approach implies an emphasis on intersubjective processes, whereas this is not true for 
either the social responsibility approach or the social responsiveness approach (ibid.). 
For Pearson this analogy builds the basis to conceptualize and model public relations as well as 
business ethics. Because he accepts that “moral truths are rhetorical and are grounded in the way 
we communicate” he claims that “the study of business ethics is the study of the public commu-
nication processes that decide corporate action” (121f); and this is the process he sees in public 
relations practice. The model that he develops thus makes the implicit argument that dialog is the 
focal concept of public relations—or, for that matter, ethical public relations. To Pearson dialog 
“represents a transcendence of [the] two other approaches to public relations, both of which are 
essentially monologic as is shown by the epistemological assumptions underlying each” (122). He 
posits that the collision of incompatible value systems—which he, in reference to Andrew 
Gollner (1983), sees as public relations’ raison d’être—doesn’t necessarily have to lead into a rela-
tivistic and cynical debate ad infinitum but can indeed be mediated by means of communication: 
“The important question becomes, not what action or policy is more right than another, but what 
kind of communication system maximizes the chances that competing interests can be trans-
formed” (Pearson, 1989b: 125). Thus the focus shifts from the question of whether certain poli-
cies communicated by public relations practitioners are morally right or wrong to the question of 
whether the communication process in which these practitioners participate is ethical. Accord-
ingly his model suggests that to ‘overcome’ the tendency toward rather monologic styles of 
communication, the promotion of ‘interorganizational dialog’ is “a key ethical imperative of pub-
lic relations practice” (123).59 Moving on to the practical implications of this imperative, Pearson 
points to Habermas’ concept of the ideal speech situation (cf. chap. 2.2.4) that allegedly purports 
‘clear cut rules’ for public relations practice: “Moving to a higher level of abstraction during a 
public relations interaction would allow participants to raise questions that, in day-to-day com-
munication, are part of a background consensus shared within a community of discourse” 
(Pearson, 1989b: 125). To respond to the critical question of how such ideal conditions can be 
measured within actual public relations practice, Pearson refers to Richard Farace et al. (1977) 
who—building on coorientation theory—establish a method for measuring structural aspects of a 
communication environment that involves questioning the participants on topics that concern 
these aspects: “A communication environment that promotes dialogue and, therefore, legitimate 
decision outcomes, would be marked by mutual agreement among communicators about struc-
tural attributes of the environment and mutual satisfaction with those structural attributes” 
(Pearson, 1989b: 126). And since public relations departments are concerned with the communi-
                                                
59 It is through this emphasis on dialog, that Pearson sees his model, based on discourse ethics, in accord with other 
models that promote dialog; especially that of Grunig and Hunt (1984). 
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cative conduct through which an organization participates in these structures, Pearson sees them 
charged with and responsible for the moral dimension of corporate conduct—he refers to them 
in terms of a ‘corporate conscience’ (cf. 128): the aim of public relations, as seen by Pearson, lies 
within the managing of communication systems “such that they come as close as possible to the 
standards deducted from the idea of dialogue” (ibid.). This can and should ultimately be achieved 
by fulfilling five concrete conditions for ethical public relations, which Pearson derives directly 
from Habermas’ concept of the ideal speech situation: each respective communicator should 
agree on and satisfy (a) equal “opportunity for beginning and ending communicative interaction”, 
(b) equal “length of time separating messages”, (c) equal “opportunity for suggesting topics and 
initiating topic changes”, (d) each “response [... counting] as a response”, and (e) equal “channel 
selection” (Pearson, 1989c: 82f). 
3.3.2 Discourse Ethics and Codes of Ethics in Public Relations 
Very similar to the application demonstrated above is Roy Leeper’s effort (1996).60 Leeper, much 
like Pearson (1989a), argues for discourse ethics as a “grounding [...] for the practice of public 
relations” (Leeper, 1996: 133). This argument contains three basic elements: (a) aiming to show 
discourse ethics’ compatibility with the two-way symmetrical model of public relations by Grunig 
and Hunt (1984); (b) demonstrating its applicability to the issue of codes of ethics in public rela-
tions; and (c) utilizing Habermas’ theory, as applied by Pearson (e.s.), as an approach to public 
relations practice concerning the Exxon Valdes oil spill in 1989. Leeper emphasizes the relevance 
of his application by pointing out the importance of ethical study in the field of public relations 
on one hand, and by perceiving a prevalent apathy toward the issue among both scholars and 
practitioners on the other (cf. Leeper, 1996: 133–135). Furthermore he stresses that “the situ-
ational perspective in ethics, the predominant approach in public relations, is difficult to justify” 
and therefore needs to be confronted by an objective “philosophical underpinning” (140). 
It is the priority of understanding and the speakers’ readiness to justify validity claims (cf. 
chap. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2), in which Leeper sees the major links between Habermas’ theory and the 
model developed by Grunig and Hunt. Habermas’ notion of understanding as the inherent telos 
of human speech is allegedly reflected in the central assumption of the model of two-way sym-
metrical public relations: “Communication leads to understanding. The major purpose of com-
munication is to facilitate understanding among people and such other systems as organizations, 
                                                
60 As we demonstrate in the subsequent discussion (cf. chap. 3.3.4.2), Leeper’s effort may be seen more as a further 
argument for Pearson’s application (cf. chap. 3.3.1), than as an own, ‘original’ application of Habermas’ theory to 
public relations. Hence, in the following, we reproduce the author’s effort only in brief. As we demonstrate in 
chapter 3.3.4.2, though, an inclusion of Leeper’s effort in the context of this thesis is highly justified due to the 
author’s raising of claims that produce conflicts with Habermas’ concept (e.i).  
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publics or societies. Persuasion of one person or system by another is less desirable” (Grunig, 
1989: 38; cited in Leeper, 1996: 136). The finding of this parallel (or as one could say: ‘depiction 
of a shared ideal’) leads Leeper to the assumption that “Habermas’s theory would thus seem to 
lend support to this model of public relations” (Leeper, 1996: 136). Building on a discussion ex-
ercised by Richard Johannesen (1990), Leeper then applies discourse ethics to professional codes 
of ethics and deals with certain general objections that have been raised against them (cf. Leeper, 
1996: 141–142). In conclusion he writes that “the approach taken by Habermas seems to be rele-
vant to devising, implementing, and justifying codes of ethics for the public relations field” (142). 
Finally Leeper draws on the Exxon Valdez oil spill incident to apply to it the normative condi-
tions for unrestricted and unconstrained discourse (cf. ibid.), approaching it “from the viewpoint 
of the four validity claims” (143). Utilized as such, Habermas’ approach, according to Leeper, 
may fulfill two central purposes: it can (a) serve as a post-communication test for the ethical va-
lidity of practical public relations and (b) be used as an “anticipatory guideline” that may help 
public relations practitioners develop adequate communication strategies (cf. ibid.). 
3.3.3 Five Steps of Enacting Discourse Ethics in Public Relations 
Rebecca Meisenbach (2006) draws on Habermas’ principle of universalization (cf. chap. 2.2.4) so 
as to derive ‘five steps’ that enable an organization to enact discourse ethics and may moreover 
be used in practice to “assess [...] ethical problems and to identify alternative courses of action” 
(39). The author then applies these steps for enacting Habermas’ theory to the American Red 
Cross’ (ARC) handling of the so-called ‘Liberty Fund’ in 2001 (cf. 48–54).61 
Opening her argument Meisenbach begins by critiquing the fact that studies addressing the 
issue of ethics in organizations often “start and end with prescriptions for ethical courses of ac-
tion in a particular situation” but rarely consider “theoretical and philosophical bases for a moral 
theory for organizational communication” (40). Hence the author calls for an increasing study in 
“macro-level organizational ethics” and advises to first address “moral theory and a process for 
moral argumentation before moving into practical ethics” (ibid.). According to Meisenbach, this 
issue of “moral grounding” can be addressed by discourse ethics, which, due to its “communica-
                                                
61 In two subsequent articles Meisenbach and Feldner (2007, 2009) further explore the potential of the established 
framework by drawing on it to analyze practical public relations with regard to the ‘Save Disney’ campaign from 
2002 to 2005. In the 2007 article, however, the authors focus less on ethical conduct as such, but rather on organi-
zational legitimacy based on Habermas’ concept of validity claims, whereas the 2009 article integrates both perspec-
tives. The way in which Meisenbach and Feldner (2007) apply Habermas’ concept of validity claims to the process 
of corporate legitimacy, appears—even though the authors do not present an own model—rudimentarily similar to 
the application demonstrated in chapter 3.2.2; and just as in this application, Meisenbach and Feldner ultimately see 
the primary contribution of their analysis in allowing for greater understanding of the ways in which the legitimacy 
claims of an organization are challenged based on the dimensions of truth, rightness, and sincerity (cf. Meisenbach, 
Feldner, 2007: 223f). 
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tive approach” has “valuable potential for organizational ethics” (ibid.). In response to Warren 
French and David Allbright’s (1998) claim that discourse ethics “requires an operators’ manual as 
well as proactive implementations if it is to be of use to business” (French, Allbright, 1998: 191; 
cited in Meisenbach, 2006: 41), the author aims to “articulate specific ways that [discourse ethics] 
can be interpreted and implemented” (Meisenbach, 2006: 41). Based on the universalization prin-
ciple Meisenbach suggests “five steps for enacting discourse ethics” specifically designed “to real-
ize the moral principle in communicative action” to be “followed by both individual and organi-
zational rhetors” (45). The first step consists of generating an utterance that makes claims about 
its validity; preferably one that has both local and universal import and is thus “best suited for a 
discourse ethics procedure” (46). Hence, in this first step, the terms and meaning of a statement 
are defined. During the second step the rhetor needs to determine the individuals that are poten-
tially affected by a particular claim considered to be set into force (cf. ibid.). Third, the claim is 
articulated to the individuals and parties believed to be affected. This step—in anticipation of the 
following two—should be based on dialogical communication structures such as face-to-face 
interaction, internet chats, or conference calls (cf. 47). Ergo promoting a discursive modus of 
communication in the third step brings about the possibility of allowing the participants to “an-
ticipate the consequence of the utterance” through equal and full participation in the discursive 
debate, which constitutes the fourth step (ibid.). In the fifth step participants finally “make a 
judgment about whether the claim and its consequences are acceptable to all affected and are, 
therefore, ethical” (ibid.). To the evident objection that ethical outcomes may be hindered by the 
high likeliness of disagreement over the validity of a claim, Meisenbach responds, claiming that a 
“discussion can end in the identification of unreconciled differences” and yet the proceedings of 
the five-step-model would still be of use since the “original rhetor and dissenting stakeholders are 
likely to have at least a better understanding of each others’ positions” (48). In this situation a 
given organization can still “decide to proceed with its plan—that is, stand by its utterance while 
being aware of the challenges” (ibid.). 
As mentioned above, Meisenbach then applies the steps derived from the universalization 
principle to the ARC’s handling of its ‘Liberty Fund’, which was established shortly after the Sep-
tember 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, in order to alleviate human 
suffering brought on by these attacks. The ARC’s main problem was that it published inconsis-
tent information on how the money in the ‘Liberty Fund’ was to be spent. When the Organiza-
tion published information on its website on October 8, 2001, stating that money from the ‘Lib-
erty Fund’ (which had collected more than $500 million in public donations during the first 
month) would also be used to “prepare and mitigate in the event of more attacks, [...] publics and 
donors felt that they had been misled” by the ARC (49). It required the retirement of the ARC’s 
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CEO and a hearing held by the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Commerce and 
Energy before the ARC announced its decision to change the use of the donations to exclusively 
focus on people directly affected by the September 11th attacks. In the aftermath of these events 
the ARC “paid for full-page advertisements in major newspapers [...] to further publicize the 
changes and ask the public to trust them again” as well as establish “a new ‘Donor Direct’ plan 
designed to endure better understanding of donor and organization intent” (ibid.). 
Beginning her analysis of the events outlined above, Meisenbach determines the October 
8, 2001 statement as the “utterance containing validity claims, fulfilling the first step in the proc-
ess” (51). Looking at the second step of determining those potentially affected by the utterance, 
the author concludes that the ARC “consulted with very few individuals and groups even within 
the organization about the fund’s creation” (ibid.). Considering the potential participants for an 
accordant discursive discussion (ARC employees, donors, victims’ families, etc.) she also ac-
knowledges the “difficulty of determining where to cut off ever-broadening circles of involve-
ment” (ibid.). Continuing her analysis Meisenbach finds the major problem of the process within 
the third step of presenting the utterance to the affected parties: even though the amount and 
range of communication used by the ARC would appear to be quintessentially sufficient at first 
glance she finds that most of the methods used “can be classified as monologic forms of com-
munication” (52) and speaks of a “failure to dialogically communicate the utterance to publics” 
(53). As a result from this ‘failure’ the discussion in step four turned out to be highly insufficient 
in respect to the ideal drawn on by Meisenbach: The “[m]edia and other stakeholders” only 
gradually “negotiated their way into the discussion over the utterance” and the consequences of 
the utterance were accordingly not successfully anticipated (ibid.). Finally, in the fifth step of 
judging the validity of the utterance’s claims, “the organization painfully learned that many 
stakeholders did not agree that the utterance was valid and acceptable” (54). Meisenbach shows 
that the validity of the claim was challenged on all three levels: truth (“the public [argued that] it 
was not true that the ARC was using the funds as described in the utterance”), morality (“groups 
did not believe it was right or just for the ARC to use the funds for anything other than helping 
the victims and their families directly”)62, and sincerity (“considering the [ARC’s] initially confusing 
and reticent stance on presenting the utterance”) (ibid.). 
                                                
62 This finding by Meisenbach appears to be partially incomprehensible since she herself notes that “surveys revealed 
that 80% of respondents supported the fund’s goals of taking a broad understanding of who should be helped” 
(Meisenbach, 2006: 54). If we now subtract the spectrum of indifferent respondents from the remaining 20%, we 
are left with only a marginal challenge to the claim of morality. 
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3.3.4 Discussion 
3.3.4.1 An Ethical Imperative: Paralleling Public Relations and Ideal Speech 
Pearson’s application of Habermas’ theory is fairly simple: he merely transfers the ideal condi-
tions for ethical communication—as defined in the ideal speech situation—onto public relations 
practice. This effort is substantiated by the building of an analogy between two groups of con-
cepts: the three epistemological concepts (objectivism, relativism, intersubjectivism) and the three 
historical concepts (social responsibility, social responsiveness, public policy). This analogy ap-
pears compelling particularly because Pearson equally describes both groups of concepts in terms 
of a dialectical process. In the analogy each stage of one dialectical process (thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis) can hence be matched with the according stage in the other. Moreover, Pearson dem-
onstrates that both processes end in a synthesis that shows a focus on communication variables.  
The most interesting aspect for the assessment of Pearson’s application is his depiction of 
these dialectical processes, because it implies the superiority of the latest concept (synthesis) over 
the former two. This is reflected in the author’s conviction that the epistemological concepts are 
not to be seen as more or less equal schools of philosophical thought, but as a constellation in 
which intersubjectivism is the “powerful and cogent” concept by which the other two are in fact 
“challenged and transcended” (Pearson, 1989b: 120f). This hierarchy illustrates that the author is 
somewhat ‘enthusiastic’ about discourse ethics.63 This in turn might explain Pearson’s optimism 
regarding the practical realization of the concrete rules for ethical public relations he derives from 
Habermas’ ideal speech situation. Even though acknowledging the possibility of dialog lapsing 
into monologue (cf. Pearson, 1989b: 123), as well as structural constraints in practical public rela-
tions (cf. 128), Pearson still upholds the practical relevance of ‘genuine dialog’ for ethical prob-
lems in public relations. As demonstrated above, he goes on to suggest to measure the practical 
adherence to ideal conditions of discourse by means of the method presented by Farace et al. 
(1977), which he sees relevant “for the [analysis of the] quality of organization/public relations 
interaction” (Pearson, 1989c: 76). This method, however, focuses on conversational rules, analyz-
ing communication relationships between subordinates and their superiors (cf. Farace et al., 1977: 
18–43). It is hence conceptualized for interactions between individuals within organizations. 
Whilst Pearson sees “no reason why similar measures cannot be applied to communication rela-
                                                
63 To further elucidate Pearson’s perspective, i.e. his ‘enthusiasm’ for discourse ethics, it is insightful to examine one 
of his important sources for the assessment of the objectivism-relativism dichotomy, namely Richard Bernstein 
(1983). Bernstein finishes his criticism of this dichotomy in favor of intersubjectivism and virtually dedicates his 
work “to the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founded 
in dialogical communities” (231). It seems as though Person also embarks on this endeavor; even more so, in trans-
ferring the ideals of mutual understanding onto public relations—practices that Bernstein on the other hand re-
markably criticizes as distorting, undermining, and blocking dialogical communities (cf. 230). 
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tionships between organizations” and states that such an application “would be an important step 
toward developing a full blown theory of dialogue for organizations” (Pearson, 1989c: 77), one 
can object here regarding the type of interaction in question: it is at least arguable whether a 
method that focuses on interactions between (natural) individuals is adequate in analyzing those 
forms of interaction generally relevant in public relations (cf. Theis-Berglmair, 1995). But accord-
ing to Pearson, business conduct is appropriately described as occurring “within the parameters 
of a dialogic communication process between a business organization and [...] organizations, 
groups or individuals” (Pearson, 1989b: 127). Furthermore he, typical for a researcher who sub-
scribes to the idea of communication symmetry,64 sees public relations departments as authorita-
tive in managing the moral conduct of a corporation—as the ‘corporate conscience’ (cf. 128). 
Ultimately Pearson even parallels (discursive) public relations practices with the idea of democ-
racy as depicted by Donald Day (1961) as a “political philosophy that does not specify what the 
good life is” but that provides a “methodological framework within which each individual may 
fulfill his own contemplation of the good life” (Day, 1961: 5f; cited in Pearson, 1989b: 127). 
Even though this aspect is only traced as a parallel, Pearson, nonetheless, suggests that public 
relations practices may contribute to the democratic processes as depicted by Day. 
In the context of this thesis Pearson’s application of Habermas’ theory raises three pivotal 
yet partially overlapping questions. First, can public relations practices adequately be described as 
intersubjective and, moreover, discursive communication? Second, can discourse ethics form a 
suitable fundament for ethical public relations practice (moreover in concepts that ultimately 
‘upraise’ public relations departments as the ‘corporate conscience’) without leading to theoretical 
aporia? And third, how and to what effect do public relations departments factually participate in 
and influence political communication, i.e. broader democratic processes?65 
3.3.4.2 Codes of Ethics: Between a Procedural Imperative and Substantial 
Norms 
In the context of this thesis Leeper’s effort can only be referred to as an own and original appli-
cation of Habermas’ theory with some limitation, and should rather be seen as a further argu-
ment for the application demonstrated by Pearson (cf. chap. 3.3.1) for three reasons. First, the 
compatibility of discourse ethics and the two-way symmetrical model by Grunig and Hunt, which 
Leeper aims to show, has already been clearly demonstrated by Pearson (1989c) as well as Grunig 
(1992). Second, the short analysis of the Exxon Valdez oil spill is merely an application of 
                                                
64 See e.g. also Grunig and Hunt (1984) or Cutlip et al. (2006). 
65 For further considerations see e.g. chapter 5.1 (on the question regarding discourse as a fundament for public 
relations practice) or chapter 5.2 (on the question regarding public relation’s influence on processes of political 
communication). 
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Pearson’s concept and not connected with further conceptual considerations. Third, the only 
actually ‘original’ contribution which Leeper particularly articulates as an application to public 
relations codes of ethics, remains an unspecific application of discourse ethics to codes of ethics 
in general. In fact, the objections to codes of ethics that Leeper uses as a basis for applying dis-
course ethics are totally indefinite toward the issue of public relations: they are general concerns 
like the static terms of codes of ethics, their failure to be universal, the problem of a lack of en-
forcement or the intercultural differences that preclude such codes (cf. Leeper, 1996: 141f). Thus 
what has been enunciated as an ‘application to public relations’ appears more like a fairly general 
exercise in discourse ethics as such. Whilst Leeper aims to show how the approach taken by 
Habermas can be relevant in “devising, implementing, and justifying codes of ethics for the pub-
lic relations field” (142), he really just demonstrates how Habermas’ approach can be applied to 
codes of ethics in general. This generality is reflected in the “conclusion drawn from the applica-
tion” where Leeper states that the “use of the Habermasian approach can be beneficial both in 
testing and legitimating past practices as well as serving as a guide when entering into communi-
cation” (144). Here one is left with the impression that Leeper concludes his application rather 
inauspiciously by assimilating public relations to communication in general—thus admitting the 
triviality of the article’s insights for the field of public relations in particular. Ultimately Leeper’s 
article reads less like an inquiry into public relations and more like a defense of discourse ethics in 
general. This impression is imposed, not only through Leeper’s extensive depiction of Habermas’ 
theoretical program,66 but also through his conclusion of the article, in which he fails to remark 
on the specific relevance of applying Habermas’ theory to public relations, only stressing the “ul-
timate worth of the approach taken by Habermas” in general (ibid.).67  
Despite the fact that Leeper focuses on codes of ethics in general rather than specifically 
on issues related to public relations codes of ethics, his application still seems to raise an impor-
tant question in the context of this thesis because he states that Habermas’ concept is relevant for 
“devising” an explicit “code of ethics for the public relations field” (Leeper, 1996: 142). It ap-
pears that what Leeper is refering to here as ‘devising an explicit code of ethics’ implies specific 
normative contents. This, in fact, would exceed what Pearson (1989b) presents as ‘five conditions 
                                                
66 The author devotes the better half of his effort solely to a reproduction of Habermas’ theoretical program. 
67 A possible explanation for this generality, i.e. Leeper’s notable effort to ‘defend’ Habermas’ concept of discourse 
ethics as such, rather than applying it to public relations in particular, may be the fact that, aspecially Habermas’ 
concept of discourse ethics has found itself under exceedingly high ‘scrutiny’ during the 1990s. (cf. chap. 5.1.3). 
Only three years after the publication of Leeper’s article, Habermas makes a momentous shift toward pragmatism, 
thereby renewing his concept of (moral) truth (cf. Habermas, 1999), mainly as a response to the critique by Richart 
Rorty (cf. Koller, 2004: 169f). Whereas the earlier apprach by Pearson—as we demonstrated in chaptes 3.3.1 and 
3.3.4.1—is a vivid example of a rather ‘euphoric’ and fairly naïve aplication of discourse ethics, Leeper appears to 
try to emphasize the relevance of the theoretical framework more than actually seeking to apply it.  
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for ethical public relations’ (e.s.) because Leeper shifts from procedural conditions to substantial 
norms. The fact that Leeper does not speak of an ethical imperative but of an explicit code of 
ethics and, thus indicates an effort of devising normative contents, raises the pivotal question 
whether Habermas’ framework of discourse ethics, which seems to focus solely on communica-
tive procedures (cf. chap. 2.2.4), allows for an application as undertaken by Leeper. In other 
words: can Habermas’ theory be coherently applied to the grounding of substantial norms in 
public relations codes of ethics?68 
3.3.4.3 The Five-Step Model: Challenges of Enacting Discursive Ideals in 
Public Relations Reality  
Meisenbach demonstrates in what way Habermas’ universalization principle can be broken down 
into “steps that offer both a practical procedure for organizations and their rhetors to follow in 
pursuit of ethical rhetorical action and an analytic framework for understanding and critiquing 
the ethical actions and failures of organizations” (Meisenbach, 2006: 55). By doing so—especially 
through her application of the ‘Liberty Fund’ incident—she also reveals several challenges for 
implementing the model as a procedural framework for an organization’s communication, some 
of which are insightfully addressed in the discussion and conclusion of her article (cf. 55–58). We 
address two fundamental challenges of the five-step model in the following: 
Whilst the first step of generating an utterance is rather unproblematic, the second step 
brings about a challenge: it is the determination of all individuals “potentially affected by the en-
actment of a particular claim” (46) that evokes a serious problem of practicability. Considering 
potential participants for a discursive discussion, Meisenbach acknowledges the “difficulty of 
determining where to cut off ever-broadening circles of involvement” (51). Regarding this prob-
lem, and also bearing in mind the limited resources of an organization, Meisenbach makes the 
practical suggestion to judge exclusively who should participate (cf. 56). But such judgments 
(however necessary in light of limited resources) would intentionally create a distinct number of 
‘outsiders’, i.e. a certain group of ‘concrete others’ that may indeed be affected by certain discur-
sive outcomes—the latter would thus, according to Habermas’ concept, be necessarily unethical 
(cf. chap. 2.2.4). Meisenbach summarizes this challenge very tersely when emphasizing that a 
“decision reached where stakeholder voices have been overpowered is not morally valid. Yet 
translating this equality into organizational reality is fought with difficulty and requires further 
consideration” (Meisenbach, 2006: 56). Whilst step three, again, seems fairly manageable, step 
four poses what one could refer to as a ‘logistical problem’: the equal recognition of all voices 
and, furthermore, the time and space needed to discursively anticipate possible consequences, 
                                                
68 For further considerations on this question see chapter 5.1.1. 
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constituting an obstacle that cannot adequately be met. Meisenbach clearly acknowledges this 
when she emphasizes that “corporations are not in the business of giving everyone an equal voice 
and chance for discussion; they are focused on increasing profit margins” (57). Thus, as demon-
strated in chapter 2.2.4 the ideal requirements for ‘real’ discourse are balefully confronted with 
the obvious spatiotemporal constraints of reality. The conflict between ideal requirements and 
reality is even more aggravated when the concept is applied to organizations that orient their ac-
tions toward success rather than toward mutual understanding. In light of fundamentally conflict-
ing social rationalities (i.e. lifeworld rationality vs. system rationality), the practical application of 
Meisenbach’s five-step model, not as a tool for post-communication analysis but as a design for 
the actual planning of real public relations, seems fairly unlikely. 69 
Regardless of these challenges, Meisenbach claims her model to be a “concrete and spe-
cific” design for enacting discourse ethics in public relations practice (58). Regarding the induce-
ment and extent of such ‘enacting’, Meisenbach does not restrict her model to a mere ‘response-
mechanism’: following her analysis of the ARC’s donation scandal, she argues that if the organi-
zation would have used the model right from the beginning of its communication of the new 
fund, the crisis could have been avoided (cf. 55). Here the question emerges whether this means 
that the model should have been implemented before there was any conflict on the issue? If so, 
Meisenbach—in spite of a fairly detailed and critical discussion following her article—overlooks 
something essential: by suggesting the model also to be implemented in routine, everyday public 
relations, i.e. without the necessity of a factual conflict, she elides the formal distinction between 
an instrumental mode of everyday communication on the one hand and discourse on the other 
(cf. chap. 2.2.4). In the application discussed in chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.4.2, for instance, this for-
mal distinction is more clearly considered in this regard. Here it is stated that the discursive prac-
tices presuppose a disturbed background consensus, i.e. challenged validity claims. Other than an 
application that completely disregards the idea of discourse and reestablishing consensus (cf. 
chap. 3.2.3), Meisenbach’s five-step model, which aims to enact discourse ethics, has to be under-
stood first in terms of a ‘repair mechanism’: its strengths lie in establishing guidelines for coping 
with a disturbed background consensus or to be applied as a framework for post-communication 
analysis. 
Ultimately, Meisenbach—though demonstrating a more elaborate application—much like 
Leeper (cf. chap. 3.3.2 and 3.3.4.2), seems to view Habermas’ discourse ethics as more than just 
an exercise in revealing an irreducible moral point of view. She appears to wonder why Habermas 
                                                
69 It is noteworthy that Meisenbach, different from the other two authors referred to in this ‘moral perspective’ 
(Pearson and Leeper), explicitly addresses this problematic aspect. 
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is only “interested in articulating and justifying” his approach and leaves the effort of “using and 
implementing” the procedure for actual real situations to others (Meisenbach, 2006: 54). Haber-
mas’ noticeable reservation in this regard, however, may signal his understanding of discourse 
ethics as merely a philosophical program of justifying a moral point of view (cf. chap. 2.2.4), ac-
knowledging the ‘prostration’ of his concept (cf. chap. 5.1.3). As Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz (2000: 
150) points out, Habermas does not explicitly engage in the problematic of enacting his philoso-
phical program. Meisenbach (2006), however, aims for a practical enactment. This effort entails 
important further questions regarding public relations, like: what types of organizations are—in 
light of their specific rationale of action—to be seen as more, and what types are to be seen as 
less likely to ‘enact’ discourse ethics as suggested by Meisenbach? What specific forms of com-
munication may be implemented by an organization to sufficiently (or at least approximately) 
meet communicative requirements of discourse ethics? How can organizations practicably deal 
with the challenge of determining who might be affected by an utterance, and should therefore 
be part of discourse?70 On a more fundamental level, of course, these practical questions of en-
acting discourse ethics are preceded by the same basic question that applies to the applications 
demonstrated in chapters 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2: do efforts that draw on Habermas’ concept 
of communicative action, or even discourse, so as to generate guiding statements for public rela-
tions practice not necessarily entail theoretical aporia?71 
3.4 Societal Perspective: Conceptualizing Public Relations in its 
Social Context 
3.4.1  The Concept of the Public Sphere as an Analytical Framework for 
Public Relations  
Applying and partially expanding Habermas’ concept of the public sphere (cf. chap. 2.2.5), Inger 
Jensen (2001) develops an analytical framework that allows one to view public relations in regard 
to historically evolving functions of the public sphere. The author suggests a “reintroduction of 
concepts of the public sphere in public relations theory” and calls attention to “organisational 
legitimacy and identity” as an “emerging function of the public sphere” (133). This ‘emerging 
function’ is then combined with “three different concepts of the company in society” to form an 
“analytical framework for reflecting potential viable or problematic aspects in the future” (ibid.). 
                                                
70 The enacting of discourse ethics, regardless of the concrete field of public relations, surely and primarily entails 
more fundamental theoretical problems, the approaching of which is—given the thematic focus—inadequate in 
this context. For a comprehensive assessment of problems of enacting discourse ethics see e.g. Apel and Kettner 
(1992) or Gottschalk-Mazouz (2000: 109–242). 
71 For further considerations see e.g. chapter 4.3 (on the question regarding possible theoretical aporia). 
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Jensen begins her argument by assessing that even though public relations is concerned 
with the way organizations interact with the public sphere, only a small fraction of public rela-
tions literature focuses on this aspect (cf. ibid.). The bigger fraction—this being Jensen’s initial 
objection—ignores an essential analytic dimension of public relations, namely its concern with 
“issues and values that are considered publicly relevant” (ibid.). Jensen argues that Habermas’ 
concept of the public sphere and its preconditions “should be further developed to reflect on 
public relations as a profession in its social context” (134). Preconditions e.g. entail fundamental 
democratic rights, some of which are retained and protected within constitutional rights like free-
dom of speech, association, and assembly or the constitutional protection of privacy (cf. chap. 
2.2.5). Referring to Habermas (1992a, 1996) the author points out, however, that such basic con-
stitutional guarantees alone cannot prevent a deformation of the public sphere (cf. Jensen, 2001: 
134). This can only be achieved by an ‘energetic civil society’, i.e. by individuals reproducing the 
link between private and public spheres via the private interpretation and public discussion of 
requirements and failures experienced in the various systems in which they are engaged (cf. 135). 
The important trait of this process is that whenever private communication is raised onto a level 
of public concern, “the specific empirical cases are amplified and attributed an aspect of general 
interest” that “activates the public sphere for the short or long term” (125f). Jensen now suggests 
that the concept of the public sphere can be utilized as an analytical framework that refers to the 
discursive processes occurring within a complex network of individuals and organizations. 
These discursive processes are differentiated and therefore normally represent a variety of conflicting 
positions. However conflicting the positions are, a common trait of the discourses is that they are 
launched as being of common concern, in principle of everybody’s interest. Therefore, as part of the 
process, the networking agents aim to expose their viewpoints via potentially accessible media and fo-
rums (136). 
Such public sphere discourses practiced by ‘networking agents’ can be viewed as an ongoing ‘civi-
lized’ form of open disagreement on primal matters of common concern via potentially accessi-
ble media. To produce a better understanding of the relationship between organizations and the 
public sphere, Jensen complements the analytically differentiated functions of literary and politi-
cal public sphere processes (cf. chap. 2.2.5) by a third function: wherever public agenda setting is 
not directed at political decisions but rather at self-referential identity policy, Jensen speaks of the 
public sphere processes of organizational legitimacy and identity (cf. Jensen, 2001: 136f). Thus 
this third function of the public sphere can be understood as the “self-referential process of iden-
tifying the raison d’être of an organisation” (137; italics in original). 
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Jensen then goes on to differentiate three socially constructed72 concepts (or ‘predominant 
images’) of the company, each representing a different stage of historical development in liberal 
democratic societies (cf. 137–140): (a) the economically successful but socially innocent company which is 
linked to liberal market economy and focuses merely on the increase of profits; (b) the economically 
successful and legal company which is also legally restricted from harming common goods and thus 
focuses on both economic success and the legal scope; and (c) the economically successful, legal, and 
responsible company which is in addition held responsible for all its conduct and therefore focuses 
not only on profits and laws, but also on social legitimacy and responsibility. These three socio-
historical concepts, according to Jensen, hold “analytical potential for public relations research” 
(140), since they can each be linked to a specific quality and quantity of public relations: whereas 
the first concept hardly entails any public relations, the second entails some need for lobbying 
and public affairs, whilst the third concept involves a high degree of sophisticated public relations 
practices (cf. 141). By relating these concepts to the different public sphere processes, general 
trends in public relations can be illustrated. The company embodying the first concept solely fo-
cuses on the market and is not related to the public sphere; thus “public relations is not relevant” 
here (ibid.). The company that needs to follow explicit governmental regulations regarding its 
actions reflects the second concept; it is strongly related to the political public sphere and will 
hence engage in lobbying or ‘government relations’—particularly ‘undercover’ public relations 
services are of relevance here, since in these discourses a company would not be considered a 
legitimate agent (cf. 142). The relation between the company in the third concept and the public 
sphere is now marked by a significant ‘transfer of burden’ that occurs between the processes of 
the political public sphere and the public sphere of organizational legitimacy and identity:  
[...] some of the discourses are no longer making claims to the government. Instead they address the 
public sphere, organisations and companies themselves with arguments about the necessity for com-
panies to become responsible in a broader sense. By transferring some of the burden to companies, a 
new function of public sphere processes seem to be established. A networking process of discourse 
has emerged with viewpoints of what it means to be a legitimate and responsible organization [...]. 
(143) 
It is this change of discourse that increasingly places responsibility on companies and challenges 
them to practice deliberate public relations in order to respond to and engage in these discourses. 
Unlike Habermas’ original concept, the public sphere here practices criticism and control not 
only regarding the state, but to an increasing degree, also with regard to the functional systems of 
the economy. In order to act responsibly an organization will then have to adjust to social norms 
and values that—due to the ‘blending in’ of the three concepts—may be manifold and ambigu-
                                                
72 Here Jensen builds on Searle’s (1995) concept according to which social realities are constructed by means of 
institutionalized actions. 
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ous. The aforementioned ‘transfer of burden’ thus leads to a more complex ‘networking situa-
tion’ that “is hard to integrate in management thinking and practice” (144). To cope with this 
emerging “ambiguous concept and new functional public sphere” which poses a central “chal-
lenge to public relations”, Jensen particularly suggests “integrating and developing better analysis 
of the public sphere dynamics that go beyond organisational communication with its own imme-
diately relevant stakeholders” (145f).  
3.4.2 Combining the Concepts of the Public Sphere as well as Lifeworld 
and System in a Framework for Public Relations 
Another approach that applies Habermas’ theory to public relations on the societal level is dem-
onstrated by Leitch and Neilson (2001). Here the authors conceptualize some core concepts of 
public relations—namely ‘publics’, ‘relations’, and ‘organizations’—by drawing on Habermas’ 
theory so as to suggest a “revised version of these [...] concepts” as a framework that “offers 
scholars and practitioners new ways of thinking about public relations” (127). Leitch and Neilson 
demonstrate how Habermas’ concept of the public sphere (cf. chap. 2.2.5) and his distinction 
between lifeworld and system (cf. chap. 2.2.3) can be drawn upon to fill a ‘gap’ in public relations 
theory by supplying a theoretical framework that clearly distinguishes between different types of 
publics, different types of organizations, and different types of relations between them. 
Regarding the concept of ‘publics’, Leitch and Neilson commence with the criticism that in 
most (both dialogic or strategic) approaches, publics are understood from the subject position of 
the organization (cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 128). Subsequently these approaches resist an under-
standing of publics as actively involved in the continuous construction of their own goals, strate-
gies and identities—a “gap” in public relations theory that can “lead to serious conceptual flaws” 
(ibid.). This ‘gap’ becomes apparent, when the according approaches treat organizations and pub-
lics as equivalent and interchangeable entities and thus the difference between publics and orga-
nizations becomes solely one of perspective. With reference to Timothy Coombs (1993), the 
authors argue that this idea is ultimately reinforced by “the complete absence of the concept of 
power in mainstream public relations theory” (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 128).73 It is with regard to 
this ‘gap’ that Leitch and Neilson demonstrate the potential of Habermas’ theory to develop a 
differentiated concept of publics (cf. 128–131), and furthermore a theory-led distinction between 
different types of organizations as well as different types of relations (cf. 131–137). The authors 
relate their understanding of publics directly to Habermas’ account of the public “as all private 
citizens who may participate in the public sphere” (130). This account, however, not often ac-
                                                
73 Further developing this criticism, Leitch and Neilson (2001) show, for instance, that the ‘organizational perspec-
tive’, i.e. the inability to adequately distinguish between organizations and publics, may lead to an inadequate link of 
symmetrical communication and communication ethics (129f). 
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knowledged within mainstream public relations literature, allows one to view publics “as groups 
who develop their own identities, and perhaps representation of their collective interests, in rela-
tion to the system” through shared sets of meanings (131). The participating individuals are, of 
course, not members of single publics but instead “participate in the multiple sites of the public 
sphere as members of diverse publics” (ibid.). Thus multiple subject positions of an individual 
may strongly overlap, even conflict, and have to be seen as constantly altering. 
Drawing on the aforementioned concept of the public as well as on Habermas’ concept of 
the realms of lifeworld and system, Leitch and Neilson distinguish between three types of organi-
zational relations (cf. ibid.): (a) Intersystem organization relations, which involve public relations prac-
ticed between organizations of the political and the economic system; (b) intraorganizational rela-
tions, which involve public relations practiced between an organization and its own internal pub-
lics; and (c) organization-public relations which involve public relations practiced between an organi-
zation and publics that exist externally to both the particular organization and other system orga-
nizations. Within Habermas’ framework organizations should be seen as system-based entities 
(cf. 132). Subsequently they follow the logic of instrumental or strategic action: their inherent 
rationality is—other than with communicative action—goal driven.74  
In order to distinguish between different types of organizations Leitch and Neilson extend 
Habermas’ original concept of the public sphere: drawing on Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s 
(1990) notion of the increasing institutionalization of the public sphere, Leitch and Neilson dis-
tinguish between “lifeworld organizations of the public sphere” on one hand and “system orga-
nizations of state and economy” on the other (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 132).75 This concept is then 
completed by a third, ‘hybrid’ type of organization that shows some characteristics of both, life-
world and system, and is referred to as ‘mixed organization’.76 Each of these three types of orga-
nizations can be further characterized by examining their distinctive relation to publics (cf. 133f): 
first, system organizations are located vis-à-vis publics, which thus may counteract systems’ colo-
nization of the lifeworld (defensive role) or pursue their own specific goals which may not only 
mean furthering certain interests within the existing system, but also changing the system itself 
(offensive role). Second, lifeworld organizations can be characterized as emerging out of publics 
                                                
74 For example: strategic approaches to public relations would be based on organizational objectives, whereas communi-
cative approaches would be based on the assumption that objectives are formed in an intersubjective communica-
tion process (cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 132).  
75 In Faktizität und Geltung (1992a) Habermas has also included this concept of ‘lifeworld organizations’, which he 
refers to as non-economic and nongovernmental connections or voluntary associations, into his framework. These 
associations fulfill the function of an interconnection between the society component of the lifeworld and the 
communication structures of the public sphere (cf. Habermas, 1992: 443–451; 1998: 366–373). 
76 For practical examples regarding these three types of organizations see Leitch and Neilson (2001: 132f) or the 
discussion below (cf. chap. 3.4.3.2).  
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during processes of debate and action. Third, mixed organizations are located on the ‘seam’ be-
tween lifeworld and system, and thus relate ambivalently to publics. 
Leitch and Neilson further apply Habermas’ theory to examine public relations’ core con-
cept of ‘relations’ with regard to a broader social context, i.e. in terms of objectives, strategies, 
resources and power (cf. 134–137).77 This broad perspective also surfaces in their definition of 
public relations as being concerned with “the many ways in which different types of publics in-
teract with different types of organizations, and vice versa, on a strategic terrain of competing 
discourses and unequal access to power and resources” (134). First, a system organization en-
gages in practicing relations with publics, which are purely strategic because it aims to “maximize 
the support of publics and to minimize or neutralize opposition so as to achieve organizational 
objectives” (135). Accordingly public relations practice seeks to determine public debate, or as 
George Cheney and George Dionisopoulos (1989) put it, establish certain frames of reference 
that predetermine the interpretation of information relevant to the organization. The successful 
establishment of such frames promises “favorable zones of meaning” between an organization 
and its publics, constructing an “environment in which it is far easier for an organization to 
achieve its objectives” (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 135). Obvious impediments of according public 
relations practices, however, root in the particular objectives of an organization and their specific 
‘dissonance’ with objectives apparent among relevant publics: “linking the norms and values of 
[...] individuals who make up the various publics with the objectives and requirements of the or-
ganization” (ibid.) thus becomes a major challenge for public relations practice.78 As the case may 
be, concessions might have to be made on part of the organization i.e. its objectives. The percep-
tion of a system organization’s actions and objectives among publics is thus always the product 
of a negotiation process (136). Public relations’ ability to facilitate the creation of the aforemen-
tioned frames of reference—apart from the organizations objectives—depends on the availability 
of “discourse resources” in an organization as well as among publics (ibid.). Discourse resources 
here refer to the ability of an organization to enlist the support of publics and other system orga-
nizations,79 and the ability or will of the publics to engage in discourse.80 Apart from the creation 
                                                
77 Although Leitch and Neilson introduce three types of organizations they go on only to specify the concept of 
‘relations’ with regard to two of them; they do not specifically depict the relations of mixed organizations. 
78 Regarding this difficulty of linking objectives of an organization with the norms and values of publics also see Judy 
Motion and Leitch (1996). 
79 This ‘ability to enlist support’ could for instance practically advert to an organization’s budget or the know-how 
available to an organization’s public relations department. 
80 Leitch and Neilson distinguish between ‘unorganized’ and ‘organized’ publics contingent upon the occurrence of 
e.g. institutional structures, clearly articulated agendas, or legitimate spokespeople (cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 136). 
The authors indicate that unorganized publics do not necessarily mean that the creation of a preferable frame of 
reference and the enlistment of the publics support for organizational action is easier. On the contrary: unorgan-
ized publics may be more difficult to communicate with, and may challenge more resource intensive public rela-
 
Applying Habermas’ Theory to Public Relations 
 
68 
of frames of reference that enable forms of interpretation favorable to an organization, public 
relations practice might aim to “alter or construct” the “nature and composition of publics them-
selves” (ibid.). This may be most distinctively the case when individuals have had no experience 
whatsoever with an organization before becoming an object of public relations attention. 
Though lifeworld organizations will obviously share some of the characteristics depicted 
above, they also show unique features in their relations to system organizations and to the publics 
from which they have emerged (cf. ibid.). As Leitch and Neilson point out, lifeworld organiza-
tions—that can be characterized as ‘outcomes’ of the activities occurring in publics (e.s.)—
practice public relations with their publics that can be seen as quite similar to practices associated 
with interorganizational relations (cf. 136f). In respect to system organizations on the other hand, 
the effort becomes one of strategic interaction that Leitch and Neilson describe in terms of a 
‘war of opposition’ that is lead with the intent of maximizing “public sentiment and conscious-
ness so as to put pressure on the system to concede some of the demands and goals of the life-
world organizations” (137). 
3.4.3 Discussion 
3.4.3.1 Public Sphere Processes of Organizational Legitimacy and Identity 
The application demonstrated by Jensen (2001) consists of two basic elements: (a) three abstract 
concepts of public sphere processes, and (b) three different historical concepts of the acceptable 
company. Both elements are worthy of further review. 
As depicted above, Jensen complements the two processes that are elements of Habermas’ 
concept by a third, namely the public sphere processes of organizational legitimacy and identity. 
We briefly want to clarify how this ‘complement’ relates to the other two processes of the literary 
and political public sphere. Habermas differentiates between literary public sphere processes to 
describe the reflexive development of personal identities as well as concepts of others on the one 
hand, and political public sphere processes to describe the constitution of legitimacy vis-à-vis the 
realm of the state on the other (cf. chap. 2.2.5; or Jensen, 2001: 136f). Jensen’s concept of the 
public sphere processes of organizational legitimacy and identity is distinct from the political pub-
lic sphere processes in the sense that the former are not concerned with problems relevant to the 
realm of the state, and they are parallel to the literary public sphere processes in the sense that 
they are indeed concerned with more general interests. These processes aim not for political solu-
tions but for self-referential ‘identity policy’ (cf. 137). They are parallel—not identical—to the 
                                                                                                                                                   
tions practices on the part of the system organization (cf. ibid.). Heath (1994) for instance shows that regarding 
publics without leaders, an organization will have difficulty defining distinctive zones of meaning, and will find it 
impossible to establish compromise. 
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literary public sphere processes, because they constitute organizational, not personal identity and 
legitimacy: in the public sphere processes of organizational legitimacy and identity organizations 
“contribute with narratives and cases of general interest as stories about ways of being an organi-
sation—not a person—in society” (ibid.). It is these new emerging processes that Jensen sees as 
the central challenge to current public relations (cf. 145). 
On the basis of the concepts of the acceptable company suggested by Jensen, the author 
aims to demonstrate a historic “tendency from the predominance of the first concept, passing the 
second and towards the third concept” (138). In this ‘evolution’ of the characteristic image of an 
acceptable company, the different stages don’t replace one another, but rather have to be viewed 
as coexisting, because at any given time different agents with different values reproduce different 
images. These images, however, are associated only with companies, i.e. economic or commercial 
organizations. Thus, the aforementioned category of public sphere processes conceptualized by 
Jensen is, in the existing framework, restricted to a company’s legitimacy and identity. The frame-
work can, hence, only be associated with public relations practiced by this distinct type of organi-
zation; it does not capture the processes of legitimacy and identity of e.g. non-governmental or-
ganizations. Hence, it could be of interest to further explore Jensen’s application by integrating in 
it predominant images of other forms of organizations. Such an effort could further elucidate the 
potential of the concept of public sphere processes of (different forms of) organizational legiti-
macy and identity. 
Jensen’s application of Habermas’ theory shows how the economic, legal and social re-
sponsibilities of companies developed historically, and how the currently predominant concept 
can be associated with the emergence of a new concept of public sphere processes that is suitable 
for connection with Habermas’ theory. The construction of such a framework allows one to ap-
proach further questions, some of which Jensen alludes to in her concluding remarks (cf. 145f). 
One possible further question that her considerations raise is: how are public relations practices 
involved in the legitimizing of amplified influence of social, political, and economic organiza-
tions—a question that should be approached by including the perspective of (social, political, 
economic) power and conducting according analyses. Another pivotal question that could be 
approached on the basis of Jensen’s considerations is: how do different types of organizations, 
differently relate to the public sphere and how do they differently affect public sphere processes 
with their public relations efforts. From Jensen’s societal perspective, this question also concerns 
the general processes through which public relations practiced by different social actors may gain 
access to and influence on the media (a question which could then be raised in the context of 
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normative considerations on democracy and rational public deliberation)?81 We see here how, 
unlike those models embarking on a ‘practical perspective’, Jensen’s application is not restricted 
to public relations as an isolated factor of public communication processes, but can furthermore 
assess those elements that in fact constitute these processes. 
Ultimately it must be concluded that, since Jensen’s considerations are conducted on a 
fairly abstract level, it is possible that other processes that are important for the analysis of public 
relations practices in a social context exist next to and within the mentioned categories of public 
sphere processes. Jensen acknowledges that empirical studies would probably reveal “a great vari-
ety of processes, which would not all be captured by the concepts” she suggested in her frame-
work (Jensen, 2001: 46). Here one could pose questions regarding the integrity of these catego-
ries, as well as concrete further processes. 
3.4.3.2 Beyond the Corporate/Public Perspective 
By also focusing on the aspect of power as well as taking into account different types of organi-
zations, the application by Leitch and Neilson (2001) shows how Habermas’ theory can—on the 
same societal level as Jensen’s application (cf. chap. 3.4.1)—be utilized to conceptualize a greater 
spectrum of relations that extends beyond the ‘bilateral’ processes between an economic organi-
zation and its publics. Even though conceptualizing three different types of relations, Leitch and 
Neilson only go on to further elaborate their application in the direction of what they refer to as 
‘organization-public relations’. Within this perspective, different aspects of public relations are 
demonstrated especially with regard to two of the three organizational types (system, and life-
world organizations). It seems appropriate to further elucidate these categories of organizations, 
that is, the basis on which they can be differentiated. To give an example of what these categories 
practically entail, Leitch and Neilson instance the fictitious controversy on a motorway project 
(cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 132). In this instance, both the motorway developer and the regulatory 
agency that is responsible for the planning of the motorway constitute system organizations. A 
public, like a suburban neighborhood affected by the construction of the motorway, that comes 
together to oppose the project, constitutes a lifeworld organization. The third category, namely 
the mixed organization, could be constituted by an established environmental organization that 
receives some state funding, has excess to official forums and, as such, assists the people of the 
affected neighborhood in negotiating with the involved system organizations. 
Whilst the first category appears to be thoroughly discreet due to the clear association with 
the realm of the system, the other two types of organizations seem to be rather ambiguous. This 
                                                
81 For further considerations on a number of these pivotal questions see e.g. chapter 5.2. 
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is reflected in the inconsistent terminology of Leitch and Neilson, who repeatedly refer to mixed 
organizations also as ‘mature lifeworld organization’ and to lifeworld organization also as ‘orga-
nized public’. This terminology may suggest that it is essentially the procedural or emergent char-
acter of the categories that refuses the establishing of a clear distinction: the public gradually be-
comes organized to form a lifeworld organization, which may mature to evolve into a mixed organi-
zation. The necessity of this procedural distinction between different degrees of organization 
becomes evident when focusing on the concept of the lifeworld and its distinction from the sys-
tem (cf. chap. 2.2.3): hence an organization can only be seen as truly anchored in the lifeworld as 
long as it is thoroughly non-economic and non-governmental. This entails obvious limits to the 
degree of organization: if what Leitch and Neilson refer to as ‘the process of becoming orga-
nized’ or the ‘cementing’ of “formal membership and leadership structures” (Leitch, Neilson, 
2001: 133) entails the introduction of symbolic media (money and power), than the organization 
in question inevitably operates according to the rationale of the system—not the lifeworld. It 
seams to be difficult to define useful characteristics to describe lifeworld organizations and estab-
lish useful categories to distinguish them from the economy, the state, and other functional sys-
tems. Habermas (1992a), who also criticizes the deficit of existing definitions, refers, like Leitch 
and Neilson, to the investigation conducted by Cohen and Arato (1990). These establish the fol-
lowing criteria to distinguish types of organizations from the functional systems such as economy 
and the state from those organizations coupled with the lifeworld: 
Plurality: families, informal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy allow for 
a variety of forms of life; publicity: institutions of culture and communication; privacy: a domain of indi-
vidual self-development and moral choice; and legality: structures of general laws and basic rights nee-
ded to demarcate plurality, privacy and publicity from at least the state, and tendentially, the economy 
(Cohen, Arato, 1990: 346; cited in Habermas, 1992a: 445; italics in original). 
In Habermas’ terms, only such forms of organization can promote a ‘discursive design’ that allow 
for lifeworld rationality and can be seen as an “organizational substratum” that is “emerging from 
the private sphere” (Habermas, 1996: 367). Corresponding to this, Leitch and Neilson state that 
the “distinction between publics and lifeworld organizations develops over time and is an ongo-
ing process” (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 133). To give a practical example, a lifeworld organization 
may form in the course of a heterogeneous social movement. Such a social movement, likewise 
what one would refer to as ‘the gay’, ‘the feminist’ or ‘the environmental’ movement, has a great 
number of different agendas and partially conflicting actions (cf. Melucci, 1988). As such, it is not 
(jet) a social actor in the sense that it has established own and uniform rules and goals—which 
are important aspects of an organization (cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 132). But a social movement 
may become a social actor “at the point where [a lifeworld organization] takes form” (133). 
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The aforementioned criteria established by Cohen and Arato (1990) are also the basis on 
which can further be elucidated why mixed organizations are characterized by Leitch and Neilson 
to be located on the ‘seam’ between lifeworld and system and can be said to fulfill ambiguous 
relations to publics (e.s.). What they refer to as a process of ‘maturing’ implies that these organi-
zations change what the authors called an ‘offensive’ or ‘defensive role’ vis-à-vis the system, to an 
‘amelioration role’. Thus these organizations “might assist the introduction of the logics of the 
system into the lifeworld” (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 134). Leitch and Neilson instance the organiza-
tion of Greenpeace as fulfilling such an ‘amelioration role’; the difficult situation of Greenpeace as a 
mixed organization on the ‘seam’ between the two rationales is underscored by Greenpeace’s policy 
of refusing funds from corporations and governments (ibid.).  
Ultimately the aspects discussed above are only a small fraction of potential further consid-
erations that can be conducted on the basis of Leitch and Neilson’s application. Obvious starting 
points for further considerations are the two categories of relations, though conceptualized, but 
disregarded in the following by the authors, namely ‘intersystem organization relations’ and ‘intra-
organizational relations’. Also, it is pointed out, that the framework needs more theoretical lining 
drawn from organizational theory (cf. 137). And even though the authors do not engage in ethi-
cal considerations, they claim that their application could be a basis to “develop links with appro-
priate theory on communicative ethics” (138). Looking at these possible further considerations 
the application by Leitch and Neilson, which is acknowledged to possibly have “raised more 
questions than it has answered” (137), can be viewed as a ‘nucleus’ for further, public-centered 
efforts in public relations theory. 
Further pivotal questions that can be raised in the course of Leitch and Neilson’s applica-
tion are: what different types of public relations practices are typical for each of the three types of 
relations? How do the different types of organizations are different in their ‘discourse resources’? 
Even though one would assume a clear superiority of system organizations in this regard, Leitch 
and Neilson claim that lifeworld organizations “have the potential to equal system organizations 
in terms of access to recourses including public relations” (ibid.). An interesting question regard-
ing the theoretical framework would be: how coherent is Leitch and Neilson’s concept of the 
mixed organization as ‘on the seam’ between lifeworld and system with Habermas’ theory? Are 
these types of organizations not inevitably following goal rationality instead of promoting mutual 
understanding, and are thus more clearly referred to as system organizations? Or similar: can and 
if so, under what premise, a lifeworld organization that allegedly equals system organizations in 
terms of access to resources such as professional public relations expertise, still coherently re-
ferred to as coupled with the lifeworld? Furthermore, Leitch and Neilson, subsequent to their 
conceptualization of the public and the public sphere, reveal the dominant public relations mod-
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els as “inadequate frameworks for public relations practice” when looking at the “face of the 
complexities and subtleties inherent in the concept of multiplicity” (138). This multiplicity, i.e. the 
“multiple subject positions occupied by individuals within multiple publics within the multiple 
sites of the public sphere”, subsequently leads to the important question of how to adequately 
assess ‘publics’ and the ‘public sphere’ so as to avoid too simplistic concepts (137). The applica-
tion of Leitch and Neilson does not further investigate in this direction but the authors explicitly 
suggest according further inquiry on the basis of the conducted application (cf. ibid.).82 
                                                
82 For further considerations on a number of questions raised above see chapter 5.2. 
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4 Intermediate Reflections 
Before we engage into particular further considerations in the following chapter, we first want to 
conduct some general reflections regarding the applications discussed in chapter 3. We com-
mence by making some global recapitulatory remarks regarding the demonstrations and discus-
sions of applications as conducted in the previous chapter (chap. 4.1). Furthermore, we compare 
the entirety of these applications with Susanne Holmström’s (1997) idea of the ‘intersubjective 
public relations paradigm’ (chap. 4.2); we do so, with the intent of emphasizing a fundamental 
difference amongst the various efforts of applying Habermas’ theory. Connected to the emphasis 
of this difference we voice the suspicion that some of the applications may entail theoretical apo-
ria. Following we further elucidate some similarities and conflicts between Habermas’ theory on 
the one hand and the applications on the other (chap. 4.3). In so doing we first clarify how public 
relations can be conceived in terms of Habermas’ theory, and then draw on this account to make 
explicit whether and in how far the aforementioned difference entails theoretical aporia in some 
of the applications. 
4.1 Recapitulatory Remarks 
4.1.1 Different Theoretical Foci, Different Theoretical Complexity  
In the previous chapter we explored different facets of applying Habermas’ theory to public rela-
tions. Within four different ‘perspectives’ we demonstrated how the extensive theoretical pro-
gram depicted in chapter 2.2 can be drawn upon for an analysis and modeling of public relations 
practice (cf. chap. 3.1 and 3.2), in grounding and enacting public relations ethics (cf. chap. 3.3), as 
well as for broader macro societal considerations on public relations (cf. chap. 3.4). In doing so, 
we made comprehensible how the different applications put different emphases on different core 
concepts of Habermas’ theory: the applications presented in chapters 3.1 and 3.3 primarily focus 
on discourse ethics, the applications demonstrated in chapters 3.2.1 and 3.4 primarily focus on 
the concept of the public sphere or rather the two-tiered concept of lifeworld and system, whilst 
the applications presented in chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 furthermore primarily emphasize pragmatic 
considerations and the system of validity claims. The applications demonstrated in chapter 3.2, 
for instance, different from those applications discussed in chapter 3.3, focus neither on morally-
based directives, nor on ethical principles. Moreover, in chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.4.2 we demon-
strated how criticism regarding a practical level application has prompted a ‘shift’ away from 
characteristic concepts of Habermas’ theory. Here an application is explicitly distanced from the 
ethical implication of the concept of communicative rationality and thereby also from those ap-
plications demonstrated in chapter 3.3. The conceptual considerations and the procedures pro-
moted by this application are supposed to be solely concerned with effectiveness from the per-
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spective of the communicator: organizations are recommended to apply the model not for the 
purpose of realizing ethical communication and conduct, but so as not to “postpone or cancel 
their plans” (Burkart, 2007: 253). This ‘shift’, however, as a reaction to criticism regarding uto-
pian forms of symmetrical communication in public relations, did lead to some limiting remarks, 
though not to a dismissal of Habermas’ concept of communicative action altogether. In chapters 
3.2.3 and 3.2.4.3 we, furthermore, demonstrated how a complete disregard for terms of commu-
nicative rationality consequently leads to a rejection of Habermas’ concept. 
Besides dealing with these different theoretical foci, we also demonstrated how Habermas’ 
theory can be applied by means of very different conceptual complexity. Whilst in the ‘evaluative 
perspective’ (cf. chap. 3.1) Habermas’ theory is simply enacted for a critical analysis of certain 
aspects of practical public relations—not without undergoing some considerable misconceptions 
of the theoretical framework (cf. chap. 3.1.3)—other applications, especially those discussed in 
chapter 3.4 and partially those in chapters 3.2 and 3.3, undertake elaborate theoretical efforts. The 
wide range of this spectrum is evident when comparing the detailed argument based on 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere as well as his distinction between lifeworld and system 
conducted by Leitch and Neilson (2001; cf. chap. 4.4.2) on the one hand, and the considerations 
of Maier (2005; cf. chap. 4.2.1), which are strikingly cursory regarding the theoretical framework, 
on the other. 
4.1.2 The Pivotal Questions 
In chapter 3, a variety of questions were raised in the course of demonstrating and discussing the 
different forms of applications. Some of these questions were already assessed in the respective 
sub-chapters (discussions), some were concluded as essential, pivotal questions emerging from 
the different applications. Taking an inclusive and comparative look at the conducted discussions 
in chapter 3, different groups of questions can be formed: 
First, corresponding to the structure of chapter 3, i.e. according to the different ‘perspec-
tives’, we can distinguish between: questions concerning the potential of Habermas’ theory for 
the analysis of practical aspects of public relations like the analytical application of validity claims 
and the ideal speech situation (cf. chap. 3.1); questions concerning aspects of modeling public 
relations practice like the conceptual ‘handling’ of Habermas’ concept of communicative action 
(cf. chap. 3.2); questions concerning the grounding and enacting of public relations ethics like the 
measuring the quality of ‘ethical’ discourse or the operability of inclusiveness in practical public 
relations (cf. chap. 3.3); and questions concerning societal aspects, like the conceptualization of 
publics and the public sphere or the role of public relations in the broader democratic process, 
i.e. the circulation of power (cf. chap. 3.4). 
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Second, we can see that in all the discussed perspectives, an important, overarching group 
of questions centers on the communicative process. Here the focus seems to lie especially on the 
conception of public relations practice in terms of dialog (cf. chap. 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) and, fur-
thermore, the different facets of the conflict between public relations practices on the one hand, 
and ideals of (ethical) communication as promoted by Habermas’ theory on the other (cf. chap. 
3.1. and 3.3). It may be questioned, for example, whether or not concrete forms of public rela-
tions resist Habermas’ terminology because they are fundamentally non-dialogic, i.e. mediated 
and asymmetrical forms of communication, directed at mostly passive recipients. On a macro 
societal level this group furthermore entails questions concerning the role of the media system 
vis-à-vis actors trying to gain access to and influence in it. 
Third, all types of questions briefly sketched out above can, of course, be posed in terms of 
conceptual coherency. On the one hand this entails the coherency of an application with the 
theoretical frame of reference, as demonstrated e.g. concerning the analytical application of the 
validity claims of sincerity and legitimacy (cf. chap. 3.1.3.2), or the inclusion of non-human par-
ticipants in discourse (cf. chap. 3.1.3.3), the conceptual paralleling of communicative action and 
public relations (cf. chap. 3.2.2 and 3.3), the disregard of understanding as the inherent telos of 
human speech (cf. chap. 3.2.3), the establishing of substantial codes of ethics (cf. chap. 3.3.2), or 
the conceptualization of distinct types of organizations (cf. chap. 3.4.2). On the other hand, as we 
have seen in chapters 3.2.4 and 3.3.4, for instance, a question regarding the coherency of an ap-
plication can certainly be posed in terms of a question concerning the compatibility of the general 
theoretical framework and the field of public relations as such. Such critique can, for instance, be 
put forth from the stance of different theoretical paradigms, as seen in the confrontation of the 
applications in chapters 3.2 and 3.3 with the organizational perspective of Theis-Berglmair 
(1995), or in the critique conducted from the constructivist perspective of Merten (2000). 
Of course, in the context of this thesis, these groups are merely one way of summarizing 
the important questions emerging from the demonstration and discussion of potential applica-
tions of Habermas’ theory—some overlap between these groups is evident and further groups 
are undoubtedly conceivable. Looking at the considerations conducted in chapter 3, however, 
these groups seem to adequately reflect and summarize the important questions. 
4.2 In Search of a Category: The Intersubjective Paradigm 
At first glance, it appears that the recapitulatory remarks made above reflect the immense diver-
sity of the applications to a greater extent than demonstrating their similarities. Thus it appears 
appropriate to assume a more abstract perspective from which to gain some comprehensive and 
categorical insights on the applications demonstrated in chapter 3. To do so, we can make use of 
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some meta-theoretical considerations conducted by Holmstöm, who in her dissertation (1996) 
and subsequent articles (1997, 1999), explores the contrasting theories of Habermas (1981a, 
1981b) and Niklas Luhmann (1987) as “paradigms for reflection on the public relations phe-
nomenon” (Holmström, 1997: 24). The crux of the matter in Holmström’s efforts is the central 
conflict between the socio-theoretical paradigms of Habermas and Luhmann: the disagreement 
on one of sociology’s most fundamental problems, namely the relation between an individual 
subject on one side and a social structure on the other. 
From a normative, subject-oriented tradition, Habermas argues that it makes sense to work with indi-
vidual categories on the level of social systems. In contrast, Luhmann, from a functionalist, systems-
oriented position, maintains that, in the evolution of modern societies, qualities have emerged 
whereby social relations can no longer be traced to conscious acts by individuals (26). 
Whilst Habermas advocates the possibility of common reasoning by means of intersubjective 
communication within the lifeworld, i.e. within a common interpretative framework (cf. chap. 
2.2), precisely this is rejected by Luhmann, who postulates that it is the different logics of social 
systems that construct reason (cf. Holmström, 1997: 27). Subsequently Habermas embarks on 
the critical tradition that aims to construct normative theories , employing critical analysis to im-
prove society; meanwhile Luhmann concentrates on the mere question of how society functions 
without trying to describe certain aspects as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. His social-systematic paradigm im-
plies that social relations are only possible via social systems (cf. 30–35). From this perspective 
the possibility of understanding as promoted by Habermas is denied because each system is cre-
ated upon its own logic and thus self-referential: cognition “is bound to the specific logic of the 
observing system” (31), a perspective from which everything is observed and evaluated and that 
produces a unique image of the world. Hence conflicts, for instance on social responsibility or 
perceptions on its very concept, can never be collectively solved by means of all-embracing 
norms or consent, since every system is bound to its own perceptions. But the process of reflec-
tion allows a system to establish an understanding of itself as the environment of other systems. 
Hence “restrictions and co-orientation mechanisms in [the system’s] decision-making process” 
are developed “with regard to other social systems” (34). The ultimate motive that drives reflex-
ive behavior is the securing of the system’s own autonomy. Habermas’ critical theory perspective 
on the other hand can be drawn upon to show that conflicts relevant to public relations occur 
“where the system with its strategic goal rationality, imposes itself upon lifeworld rationality” 
(29). A conflict—on socially responsible behavior for instance—may be solved by explicitly im-
plying lifeworld rationality in the process of public discourse. Holmström now points out that if 
public relations is, on the basis of Habermas’ theory, characterized as an effort of an organization 
to engage in discourse, e.g. to gain legitimacy in society, it is looked at according to an intersub-
jective paradigm. Thus it is idealized as a practice for re-establishing the coupling between system 
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and lifeworld and may be described as “an ‘interpreter’ between the communicative rationality of 
the lifeworld, which is oriented towards understanding, and the system’s goal rationality” (ibid.). 
Holmström, furthermore, points out that the intersubjective paradigm consequently leads to an 
understanding that promotes public relations as a practice described as symmetrical communica-
tion (cf. ibid.). In order to adequately align with the theoretical concept constituting this para-
digm, what is called ‘public relations dialog’ will need to fulfill four central criteria: (a) its under-
lining rationality needs to be that of understanding and not that of strategic goals, (b) it needs to 
be performed on behalf of an individual subject, (c) the employed language needs to meet the 
conditions for the potential challenging of validity claims, and (d) it should be preceded by the 
genuine intention of reaching mutual understanding (cf. ibid.).  
If we match these paradigmatic considerations with the applications discussed in chapter 3, 
we can produce a better understanding of the scope of applications presented here. On the one 
hand, some of the applications explicitly build on dialogic criteria (cf. chap. 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3). 
On the other hand, the application demonstrated in chapter 3.2.3, for instance, though generally 
drawing on the intersubjective paradigm, does not do so by promoting the aforementioned dia-
logical criteria. And, beyond that, the applications demonstrated in chapter 3.4, adhere to a 
broader societal perspective, which produces a strategic understanding of public relations. 
Ultimately, the above considerations elucidate something essential: they show how 
Holmström’s account of the intersubjective paradigm can only coherently refer to those applica-
tions of Habermas’ theory that model public relations practices as symmetrical communication, 
not including macro-level considerations. Those analyses demonstrated in chapter 3.1, which 
simply apply Habermas’ concept to evaluate certain aspects of practical public relations from a 
critical theory perspective, the model of Eisenegger and Imhof, which focuses solely on strategic 
action (cf. chap. 3.2.3), just as the applications on the societal level (cf. chapter 3.4), do not seem 
to fit the depicted paradigm. Accordingly, if we muster Holmström’s considerations with the 
total of applications demonstrated in chapter 3—applications that all draw on the very same gen-
eral theoretical framework—we see that the line drawn by the authors paradigmatic distinctions 
does not define a category that equally includes all these applications, but rather creates a ‘border-
line’ that divides them. Looking at this conflict further emphasizes a suspicion we already ex-
pressed in some of the above discussions: there may exist some significant theoretical aporia in 
some of the applications. To further elucidate this manifest suspicion, it is helpful to first explic-
itly demonstrate how public relations is conceived, not in applications of the theory, but in 
Habermas’ very own terms. 
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4.3 Similarities and Conflicts with the Theoretical Framework 
4.3.1 Public Relations in Terms of Habermas 
Looking at the field of social theory at large, Ihlen and van Ruler (2009: 6) find that public rela-
tions “has received remarkably scant attention”. The evaluation of Habermas’ efforts in this re-
gard, is surprisingly contradictory. On the one hand he is said not to study public relations as 
such (cf. e.g. Ihlen, Ruler, 2007: 243; Holmström, 1997: 37)—a claim that, looking at Habermas’ 
considerations in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962), appears not to be entirely true and is later 
rearticulated by Ihlen and van Ruler to say that Habermas pays attention to public relations only 
“in passing” (Ihlen, Ruler, 2009: 7). On the other hand we find claims that Habermas provides a 
comprehensive and fundamental review of public relations (cf. Liebert, 1995: 38)—an assumedly 
exaggerated evaluation that appears to be based on the author’s confusion over republications of 
Habermas’ texts.83 These inconsistencies are a further motivation to aim for a detailed demon-
stration in the context of how public relations is conceived in Habermas’ terms. 
4.3.1.1 The Changing Functions of the Press and the Primacy of Advertising 
Habermas’ understanding of public relations can be demonstrated following his concept of the 
transformation of the public sphere in general (cf. chap. 2.2.5), and his account of the changing 
function of the model of the free press in particular (see especially Habermas, 1962: 200–215; 
1989: 181–195). As depicted in chapter 2.2.5, the press can be conceived as an important factor 
in Habermas’ concept of the public sphere (see also Habermas, 1962: 44–57; 1989: 31–43). The 
momentous developments of the press in the 17th and 18th centuries are essential to the emer-
gence of what Habermas refers to as ‘liberal bourgeois publicity’; developments that produced 
moralistic and critical journals (moralische und kritische Schriften) which form an important founda-
tion of public reasoning. The early press was organized in small private businesses and devel-
oped, in a first step, from an institution of mere collecting and publishing of daily news to an 
important contributor to public opinion. In a second step, this function was further enhanced by 
the press embarking on what Habermas calls pedagogical and political functions, enhancing its 
critical and moralistic potential (cf. Habermas, 1962: 200f; 1989: 181f). The characteristic struc-
tures of this early press were that they were organized as homogenous ‘convolutes’ in which the 
functions of litterateur, journalist, editor, and publisher converged, and that they often ignored 
the economic function of the underlying business. Such early press was dominated by publicist, 
                                                
83 It seems that Liebert bases this evaluation on the fact that he finds Habermas treating public relations not only in 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962), but also in a later publication in the volume Medienforschung (Habermas, 
1985b). Referring to both texts separately, Liebert misses the fact that the latter is actually no more than an identi-
cal republication of a section of the sixth chapter in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 
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not economic, imperatives. It merely prolonged or extended public debate and can thus coher-
ently be referred to as an institution of the public. To Habermas it is: “wirksam in der Art eines 
Vermittlers und Verstärkers, nicht mehr bloßes Organ des Informationstransportes und noch 
kein Medium der Konsumentenkultur” (Habermas, 1962: 202).xvii  
The pivotal point in the further development of the press and its political functions is the 
development of the constitutional state (cf. Habermas, 1962: 203; 1989: 184). Here the press no 
longer needs to defend its ‘opinion-function’—because the latter is now constitutionally pro-
tected—and consequently returns from publicist to economic or commercial imperatives: the 
press evolves into a business that primarily produces the good of advertising space. This devel-
opment has momentous consequences. On the one hand it leads to an enhanced importance of 
private, economic interests within the business itself, on the other hand it enhances the external 
influence of interests that encroach upon this business from other private enterprises (cf. 
Habermas, 1962: 204f, 1989: 185f); a process of gradual ‘commercialization’ that ultimately en-
hances the possibility of manipulation: 
Seitdem der Absatz des redaktionellen Teils mit dem Absatz des Annoncenteils in Wechselwirkung 
steht, wird die Presse, bis dahin Institution der Privatleute als Publikum, zur Institution bestimmter 
Publikumsteilnehmer als Privatleuten – nämlich zum Einfallstor privilegierter Privatinteressen in der 
Öffentlichkeit (Habermas, 1962: 204).xviii 
It is the principles of economic, technological, and organizational concentration and centraliza-
tion that fundamentally change the structure of the press that extend its publicist reach and effec-
tivity and thereby extend the influence of private interests (cf. Habermas, 1962: 106f; 1989: 
187f).84 Whilst the early press, as described by Habermas, was an extended function of public de-
bate, the evolving press of mass media extends the influence of private interests on public debate; 
and this influence of privileged private interests changes the public sphere as such. Whilst the 
distinction between the realm of the private sphere and the realm of the public sphere conse-
quently implies that private interests are separated from public interests, the new structures of 
mass media and advertising lead to private people (e.g. owners of corporations) influencing the 
private people as the public (cf. Habermas, 1962: 208; 1989: 189); and this form of influence has 
evolved significantly: to Habermas, systematic advertising became a form of effective manipula-
tion by means of market research. Furthermore, he describes a development in which the adver-
                                                
84 In the liberal model of the public sphere, institutions of public reasoning were protected from state-run interfer-
ences by being anchored in the realm of the private sphere. But due to further economic, technological, and orga-
nizational concentration between the middle of the 19th and the middle of the 20th century, they became an impor-
tant factor of power. (The first big private press corporations evolved at the end of the 19th century in Europe and 
the USA.) Hence, it was especially the anchoring in the private sphere that now thwarts the critical publicist func-
tions of the press. The amount of involved capital as well as the importance of the function regarding public opin-
ion led to great efforts to make the press subject to the control of the state turning private institutions into public 
ones (cf. Habermas, 1962: 205f; 1989: 186f). 
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tising industry not only gains influence on existing publicist organs but, in fact, develops its own 
publicist organs such as catalogs and consumer magazines. Habermas claims that this ‘invasion’ 
of private advertising in mass media consequently leads the public to debate over goods of con-
sumption rather than political matters—a process he refers to as the soft compulsion of constant 
consumption training (cf. Habermas, 1962: 208–211; 1989: 189–192). 
4.3.1.2 Meinungspf l ege : From Advertising to Public Relations 
Analogous to these developments, advertising increasingly fulfills an important additional func-
tion: the accelerated influence of private interests in mass media is not only used to further eco-
nomic interests, from the beginning this influence is linked to political interests as well—the fur-
thering of privileged private interests has a political dimension. To Habermas, the awareness and 
realization of this political dimension of advertising is the initial point of public relations prac-
tices, which he describes as gradually evolving into a key phenomenon in modern western socie-
ties in the second half of the 20th century (cf. Habermas, 1962: 212; 1989: 192f). Subsequently 
Habermas also goes on to claim that public relations has to be seen as having originated in the 
United States, and was introduced in Europe only after World War II (cf. Habermas, 1962: 212; 
1989: 193).85 Habermas furthermore differentiates public relations from forms of advertising, by 
referring to the degree to which it addresses the public sphere distinctively in political (not eco-
nomical) matters: “Private Reklame wendet sich jeweils an andere Privatleute, sowie sie als Ver-
braucher in Frage kommen; der Adressat der public relations ist die ‘öffentliche Meinung’, sind 
die Privatleute als Publikum und nicht als Konsumenten unmittelbar” (Habermas, 1962: 212).xix 
Initially one could assume here that public relations is seen as a participative form of nurturing 
consensus, as a participant of public debate that is seen as constitutive of the liberal, public 
sphere. But public relations practices, by Habermas also referred to as Meinungspflege (opinion 
management), are only disguised in the form of Räsonnement: 
Die Beeinflussung der Konsumenten entleiht der klassischen Figur eines räsonierenden Publikums 
von Privatleuten ihre Konnotationen und macht sich deren Legitimationen zu nutze: die rezipierten 
Funktionen der Öffentlichkeit werden der Konkurrenz organisierter Privatinteressen integriert  
(ibid.).xx 
To Habermas, the practices of public relations (i.e. the attempts to directly place privileged pri-
vate opinion in different channels of communication or manufacture events that stimulate struc-
tures of mass media in a certain way), in aiming at making or creating news, ultimately dissolve 
the basic formal distinctions between content and advertising in journalism. Public relations for-
mulates private organizational interests in terms of public interests, pretending as if the private 
                                                
85 This, however, is a perspective that has been generally refuted in public relations research (cf. e.g. Kunczik, 1997). 
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people could still liberally debate them in terms of Räsonnement, when in fact this debate is domi-
nated by the organization that aims at the engineering of consent in its own favor. Drawing on 
Charles Steinberg (1958), Habermas claims this engineering of consent to be the central task of 
public relations, because it allows for a “promotion to the public, suggesting or urging acceptance 
of a person, product, organization or idea” (Steinberg, 1958: 74; cited in Habermas, 1962: 213). 
The readiness to provide acceptance is promoted by the false consciousness that acceptance is 
formed within processes of public opinion based on liberal Räsonnement. But the aforementioned 
structures of mass media combined with public relations practices only produce what Habermas 
calls staged public opinion (cf. Habermas, 1962: 214; 1989: 195). Staged public opinion, in turn, 
produces not only acceptance of a certain brand but, moreover, a form of ‘quasi-political-credit’ 
for a firm, an industry, or a whole system. To Habermas, this form of public opinion is ‘alienated’ 
from the public opinion he sees as a product of liberal Räsonnement, to the degree to which privi-
leged private interests, via the practices of public relations, manipulate the converging of interests 
(cf. ibid.). These practices, only disguised as a liberal form of debate, cannot allow for mutual 
unconstrained debate that presupposes rational consent, therefore leading to engineered consent: 
“Dem im Zeichen eines fingierten public interest durch raffinierte opinion-molding services er-
zeugten Konsensus fehlen Kriterien des Räsonablen überhaupt” (Habermas, 1962: 214).xxi In 
other words, rational consent collapses into mere good will produced by professional and strate-
gic publicity. Ultimately public relations, as described on Habermas’ account, functions as a cata-
lyzer of what he refers to as refeudalization (cf. chap. 2.2.5): 
Die bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit nimmt im Maße ihrer Gestaltung durch public relations wieder feudale 
Züge an: die ‚Angebotsträger’ entfalten repräsentativen Aufwand vor folgebereiten Kunden: Publizität 
ahmt jene Aura eines persönlichen Prestiges und übernatürlicher Autorität nach, die repräsentative 
Öffentlichkeit einmal verliehen hat (Habermas, 1962: 214).xxii 
As a significant factor of refeudalization, public relations contributes to turning a liberal public 
into compliant consumers ready to follow, escalating the new manipulative principle of publicity, 
which disables Habermas’ ideal of critical publicity. Organizations practicing public relations do 
not engage in public debate so as to concentrate on the topic on which a compromise is to be 
achieved. They do so, so as to strengthen their own, specific position—they display representa-
tion and unfold prestige (cf. Habermas, 1962: 220; 1989: 200). Thus, public relations does “not 
genuinely concern public opinion but opinion in the sense of reputation” (Habermas, 1989: 
200f); a form of courtesy that organizations can in turn transfer into political pressure. And since 
these practices are adapted by all forms of associations, since not only private organizations, but 
public authority aims for publicity in addressing citizens as consumers, Habermas stresses the 
dubiousness of publicity as the organizational principle of the democratic state (cf. Habermas, 
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1962: 227; 1989: 206). Public relations, as described by Habermas, does not contribute to democ-
racy—it prevents democracy.86 
The account of public relations given by Habermas in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962) 
strongly reflects the author’s critical theory perspective, inquiring about ideological and material 
conditions that may restrict human freedom and emancipation. The concept clearly conceives of 
public relations in terms of a means for strategically enforcing particular interests. Or as Kunczik 
(2010: 519) puts it: to be anything but systematic manipulation, public relations would have to be 
‘unhinged’ from its social function as an instrument of the privileged. To the degree public rela-
tions is practiced so as to strengthen a client’s own, specific position it stands in conflict with 
Habermas’ ideal concept of democracy (cf. 414). His considerations do not, like Benno Signitzer 
and Carola Wamser (2006: 393) suggest, emphasize “the emancipatory potential” of public rela-
tions—in fact they emphasize the opposite. 
4.3.1.3 Three Revisions and a Modified Theoretical Framework 
Today, as we demonstrated in chapter 2.2.5, the text from which we draw the above concept of 
public relations, has to be seen in a new context: not only has Habermas meanwhile acknowl-
edged a number of reductions and misconceptions on his account, but his general theoretical 
efforts have developed significantly. This has led Habermas to make some revisions on the con-
cept as well as efforts to embed his early considerations into his current theoretical framework 
(cf. Habermas, 1990b: 11–50; 1992). Looking at this new context, the interesting question with 
regard to our considerations is of course: in how far do the revisions affect the concept of public 
relations depicted above, and how can we translate the original understanding of public relations 
from Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit into Habermas’ modified theoretical framework?  
As we see it, the revisions made by Habermas only scarcely effect our above demonstra-
tions because the concept of the public sphere transforming into a platform for the furthering of 
private interests by means of an infiltration of power, which is essential to the aforementioned 
concept of public relations, remains largely untouched (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 29; 1992: 437). In 
this regard, Habermas solely revises the analysis of this infiltration of power and his subsequent 
assessment of the changes in the public’s behavior as too simplistic, leading him to label his ac-
count of the resisting power and critical potential of an, in fact, much differentiated mass public, 
as too simplistic (cf. chap. 2.2.5). This, however, does not affect the depicted concept of public 
relations as such, but it does of course affect the idea of the consequences of what has been as-
                                                
86 This position in Habermas’ early text can be seen as diametrically opposed to that of then-German scholars in 
public relations at the time like Carl Hundhausen (1951, 1957, 1969), Albert Oeckl (1964, 1967, 1976) or 
Ronneberger (1977, 1982). According to Kunczik (Kunczik, 2010: 93), these authors generally advanced the view 
that if it where not for public relations, democracies would collapse into chaos. 
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sessed as public relations participation in a process of refeudalization. Public relations efforts to 
engineer consent do not—as it were alongside a model of a linear causal process—simply form 
compliant consumers ready to follow, but are met with the resisting power of a pluralistic and 
differentiated mass public. Regardless of the different idea of the consequences, public relations 
still appears to be one of many key factors in an arrangement that conditions citizens to become 
compliant consumers. Public relations is one of the mechanisms “that in democracies constituted 
as social-welfare states function[s] to alienate citizens from the political process” (Habermas, 
1992b: 450).  
According to Habermas’ new terminology, public relations, i.e. strategic communication 
between an organization and its publics, is self-evidently a form of strategic action. More accu-
rately, being depicted by Habermas as a form of manipulation, public relations, in the grid of 
social actions, is a form of conscious deception and, as such, a subcategory to concealed strategic 
action (cf. Habermas, 1981a: 440–452; 1984: 328–337). Just as any other form of (concealed or 
open) strategic action, conscious deception is mutually exclusive with communicative action: it 
“cannot be carried out with the simultaneous intention of reaching a consensus” (Habermas, 
1994: 51). Furthermore, since strategic action can be seen as the complementary concept to the 
concept of the system (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 182), it is plausible that public relations, to the ex-
tent that it is conducted by economic or political organizations, is inevitably bound to system 
rationality. Both, the clear distinction from communicative action as well as the affiliation with 
the system make plausible why public relations can hardly be seen as qualified to, if only ap-
proximately, fulfill the demanding preconditions of unconstrained symmetrical communication à 
la discourse ethics (cf. Habermas, 1990a: 86–94). 
 In contrast to the early ideology-critical approach in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, the new 
framework makes it possible to assess public relations by means of a theoretical terminology that 
allows for empirical sociological investigations on the basis of “the preconditions for communi-
cation that have to be fulfilled in the various forms of rational debate and in negotiations if the 
results of such discourses are to be presumed to be rational” (Habermas, 1992b: 448). In other 
words, on the basis of Habermas’ normative approach one can investigate to what extent con-
crete forms of public relations circumvent discursive arrangements. 
4.3.2 Theoretical Aporia? Confronting the Applications with Habermas’ 
Terminology 
Having demonstrated how public relations is conceived in Habermas’ terms we can now further 
elucidate whether and how some of the efforts of applying Habermas theory to public relations 
depicted in chapter 3 hold the assumed theoretical aporia with regard to Habermas’ concepts of 
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ethics, communicative action, the public sphere and deliberative democracy, as well as lifeworld 
and system. 
Maybe the most apparent theoretical inconsistencies appear where Habermas’ concept of 
discourse ethics is drawn upon to ground and enact public relations ethics (cf. chap. 3.3). Unlike 
Habermas himself, these applications conceive of public relations as a possible contributor in 
realizing the ideal speech situation. In so doing, all of the applications demonstrated in the course 
of the ‘moral perspective’ not only align public relations with the concept of communicative ac-
tion, they moreover make an effort to transfer conditions for ethical communication as ‘con-
densed’ in Habermas’ universalization principle onto public relations practice. We assessed some 
of the challenges this entails in chapter 3.3.4. In chapter 5.1 we will develop some further argu-
ments in this regard. 
Though not with the same far-reaching ethical demands, the applications demonstrated in 
chapters 3.2.1, and 3.2.2 also suggest that public relations can be conceived in terms of commu-
nicative action—as mutual argumentation, not manipulation. Different from Habermas, who sees 
public relations as aiming to engineer consent in favor of privileged interests, these applications, 
by conceptualizing public relations as ‘consensus-oriented’ or ‘relational’, seem to view public 
relations as aiming for a power-neutral ‘nurturing’ of consent. The authors advocating these ap-
plications, on the grounds of Habermas’ terminology, maneuver their concepts to the impossible 
and unsustainable position in which the strategic communication between an organization and its 
publics (i.e. instrumental action based in system rationality) is conceived of as action with an ori-
entation toward understanding. We have assessed some of the challenges that emerge from this 
contradiction especially in connection with Burkart’s model (cf. chap. 3.2.4.2). 
As can be expected, the applications paralleling public relations with action oriented toward 
understanding, or moreover discursive ideals, also assess their contribution to public sphere 
processes and democracy different than Habermas. Whilst Habermas’ concept, as demonstrated 
above, views public relations as interfering with the political public sphere by promoting mere 
publicity—thereby alienating citizens from the political process—, these applications appear to 
conceive of public relations as quite the reverse: organizations practicing public relations appear 
(at least implicitly) as societal participants, analogous to the ideal of citizens in the concept of 
deliberative democracy, who “share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective 
choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate insofar as they 
establish a framework for free public deliberation” (Cohen, 1989: 21). This can be confirmed by 
referring to the application by Pearson (cf. chapter 3.3.4.1) who claims that his concept of ethical 
public relations promotes a discursive arrangement that allows for the ‘forceless force’ of the 
better argument and thereby also promotes a political philosophy that itself “does not specify 
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what the good life is” but that provides a “methodological framework within which each individ-
ual may fulfill his own contemplation of the good life” (Day, 1961: 5f; cited in Pearson, 1989b: 
127). Public relations conceived as such, is seen as supportive of a political public sphere unsub-
verted by power. 
By conducting their considerations in terms of communicative action rather than system-
atic manipulation, the aforementioned applications, different from Habermas, necessarily assimi-
late public relations with the concept of the lifeworld. But within the drawn upon theoretical 
framework, organizations practicing public relations, be they political or economic organizations, 
are part of the systematically integrated field of action (cf. chap. 2.2.3). The system, as conceived 
of by Habermas, cannot adopt the mode of communicative integration without damage to its 
systematic logic and thus its ability to function (cf. Habermas, 1990b: 36). The fact that the men-
tioned applications, regardless of the clear distinction between lifeworld and system, want to con-
ceptualize and plan public relations practice in terms of action oriented toward understanding, 
thus, not only evokes irreducible conflicts within the framework, but also seems to suggest that 
these applications are practically dysfunctional.87 The disregard of the lifeworld-system distinction 
does at times even lead some authors of these applications to formulate rather undesirable re-
quests: “To achieve social progress grounded in morally-binding mutual consensus, it is impera-
tive that companies recognize problems inherent in current domination structures and take 
measures to neutralize power differentials” (Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 62). It is noticeable that 
these authors do not speak of a situational minimization of power differentials in favor of a dis-
cursive arrangement, but in fact call for their neutralization. The pressing question of how to 
ensure the aspired ‘social progress’ in a setting where companies make efforts to neutralize power 
differentials remains unanswered. Unlike Yuthas and Reynolds, Burkart realizes the absurdity of 
such claims and consequently emphasizes the situational character of his model (cf. Burkart, 
1995). 
We can see above how a number of applications of Habermas’ theory to public relations 
ultimately appear to differ with their theoretical framework. In concluding chapter 4.2 we alluded 
to the fact that some of the applications demonstrated in chapter 3, though drawing on 
Habermas’ intersubjective paradigm, do not try to parallel public relations with communicative 
action. These applications are more coherent with Habermas’ theory and his concept of public 
relations as a generally strategic and manipulative form of action. Subsequently, the applications 
demonstrated in chapter 3.4, for instance, make it possible, in fact, to object to the dialogical as-
                                                
87 A similar argument is developed by Zerfaß (2010: 55–62) in connection with the applications by Burkart and Pear-
son. 
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sumptions of authors like Maier or Burkart (cf. chap. 3.2), as well as Pearson, Leeper and 
Meisenbach (cf. chap. 3.3). This is the case, because the broader societal perspective applied in 
chapter 3.4 and the according considerations on power, allow one to view symmetrical public 
relations as just one more strategic option (among a number of other options) to ensure the sur-
vival and success of an organization (cf. Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 135). Regarding models of sym-
metrical public relations, Leitch and Neilson (2001) tersely point out that these “attempt to at-
tribute communicative action to system organizations” whilst Habermas stresses that “communi-
cative action is a characteristic of the lifeworld alone” (132). A societal-level application that 
draws on Habermas’ distinction between lifeworld and system can, furthermore, be consulted to 
criticize the ethical claims of those applications demonstrated in chapter 3.3. It can help to show 
that the concept of communicative action here is rather naïvely transferred into the reality of 
corporations, ignoring the theoretical incompatibility of communicative action and system ration-
ality.88 
Ultimately, from Habermas’ stance, all applications conceptualizing public relations in 
terms of communicative action, claimed to be dialogical, promote a discursive process, or even 
stronger, claimed to be ethical in this regard, are participating in what Habermas describes as an 
effort of disguise; as an effort to appear as a form of Räsonnement (e.s.). From Habermas’ critical 
perspective, calls for greater ‘trust’ in public relations practice merely seem like efforts to conceal 
the actual role this practice plays in a process Habermas terms refeudalization. In this sense, 
those applications demonstrated in chapters 3.1, 3.2.3 as well as 3.4 coherently embark on 
Habermas’ concept of public relations as a strategic and instrumental form of action. Those ap-
plications demonstrated in chapters 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3 on the other hand, try to draw on 
Habermas’ theory so as to model relational, consensus-oriented and discursive public relations. 
These applications can indeed be said to contribute to the false ideology Habermas is aiming to 
unmask. Examining the theoretical aporia above, the fact that the last-mentioned group of appli-
cations tries to conceive of public relations in Habermas’ terms of communicative action is, as 
Benson (2008: 5f) puts it, “surprising to say the least”. 
                                                
88 Leitch and Neilson (2001: 135f), for instance, explicitly underline the largely unjustified ethical claims associated 
with the two-way symmetrical model by Grunig and Hunt (1984); see also Juliet Roper (2005). This critique applies 
even more so to those applications discussed in chapter 3.3, because these utilize a more restrictive concept of un-
derstanding and symmetry. Other than the advocates of the two-way symmetrical model, who appear to conceive 
even of symmetrical communication first in strategic terms (cf. Grunig, Repper, 1992: 123), the application discussed 
in chapter 3.3, moreover, aim to apply Habermas’ concept of ideal speech to public relations. A number of chal-
lenges that this entails are already discussed in chapter 3. 
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5 Further Considerations 
In this chapter, we conduct some further considerations regarding two of the four ‘perspectives’ 
from which we demonstrated and discussed possible applications of Habermas’ theory in chapter 
3, namely the moral perspective of grounding and enacting public relations ethics on the basis of 
Habermas’ concept of discourse ethics (chap. 5.1), as well as the perspective of conceptualizing 
public relations in a macro societal context (chap. 5.2). 
Regarding the moral perspective, we commence with a brief assessment of the difficulty of 
justifying substantial codes of ethics for public relations (chap. 5.1.1). Following we then combine 
two arguments demonstrated in chapter 3 so as to generate a further question for adjacent theo-
retical considerations on public relations as the corporate conscience and questions of moral re-
sponsibility for the natural environment (chap. 5.1.2). Finally we allude to some general con-
straints that emerge from the ‘prostration’ of discourse ethics (chap. 5.1.3). 
Regarding the societal perspective we draw on Habermas’ more recent texts on the political 
public sphere and processes of political communication so as to conduct further considerations 
on the public sphere, opinion-formation, mass media, and public influence by means of public 
relations. Here, we first assess the function in which public relations engages in the public sphere 
(chap. 5.2.1), to then put special emphasis on the power structures of mediated mass communica-
tion and their effect on public relations conducted by different social actors (chap. 5.2.2). Follow-
ing we present two further considerations on these power structures (chap. 5.2.3), before further 
developing our above considerations on public relations of the so-called ‘lifeworld organizations’ 
(chap. 5.2.4). 
5.1 On Discourse Ethics and Public Relations 
5.1.1 The Difficulty of Justifying Substantial Ethical Codes 
In discussing pivotal aspects of applying Habermas’ theory to public relations ethics, we pointed 
out that devising substantial norms for codes of ethics, as implied by Leeper (1996), would not 
only exceed Pearson’s (1989b) claims regarding an imperative for public relations, but might ul-
timately lead to a conflict with the theoretical framework as such (cf. chap. 3.3.4.2). As demon-
strated in chapter 2.2.4, the principle of discourse ethics “prohibits singling out with philosophi-
cal authority any specific normative contents” (Habermas, 1990a: 122). This singling out of spe-
cific normative content, though, appears to be what Leeper actually has in mind when aiming for 
substantial norms for codes of ethics. In so doing, Leeper ultimately goes beyond discourse eth-
ics’ procedural imperative that is justified by revealing the irreducible moral point of view. Con-
sequently, Leeper’s project of devising normative content cannot be referred to as a coherent 
application of Habermas’ theory—at least not in the narrower sense. It may be more accurately 
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described as an effort to apply Karl-Otto Apel’s version of discourse ethics: Apel, unlike 
Habermas, advocates a transcendental-pragmatic version of discourse ethics that allows the tem-
porary preservation of substantial conventions and institutions that are formed by adherence to 
the universalization principle (cf. Apel, 1988). Habermas on the other hand, who labels Apel’s 
efforts as an unsuitable overextension of the normative approach (cf. Habermas, 1992a: 10), is—
as demonstrated in chapter 2.2.4—solely concerned with the revelation of a (counterfactual) 
moral point of view.89 
Ultimately, considering the aforementioned conflict, Leeper’s application can be seen as a 
‘borderline case’ that, in aiming for normative content, produces an inevitable problematic re-
garding its theoretical frame of reference. In the context of this thesis, this critical aspect of 
Leeper’s application is, hence, useful to elucidate an important theoretical boundary of 
Habermas’ program for ethical considerations in public relations: it can only be coherently drawn 
upon to apply a critical point of view for the analysis of (public relations) practices (as e.g. dem-
onstrated in chapter 3.1) or for the justification of an imperative for ethical (public relations) 
conduct (as e.g. demonstrated in chapter 3.3.1). Furthermore, we have pointed out in chapter 
3.3.4.3 that the effort of enacting the procedural imperative of the universalization principle itself 
entails a series of challenges, fully irrespective of their interface with public relations. 
5.1.2 Nature: A Challenging Aspect of Applying Discourse Ethics to Pub-
lic Relations 
5.1.2.1 Corporate Conscience and the Natural Environment 
In chapter 3.3 we demonstrated how ethical considerations drawing on Habermas’ theory are 
connected with the pretense of conceptualizing public relations as the organizational or corporate 
conscience. The understanding of public relations as the corporate conscience is widespread, 
especially among scholars who subscribe to the idea of communication-symmetry (cf. e.g. 
Grunig, Hunt, 1984; Cutlip et al., 2000), as well as amongst practitioners: “Good public relations 
has been called the corporate conscience—an indispensable attitude of modern and progressive 
business. By keeping its conscience alive and alert, through good conduct and effective commu-
nications, corporate enterprise will merit a continued vote of public confidence” (Hill, 1958: 173). 
As Shannon Bowen (2008: 276f) points out, “[r]esearchers and practitioners alike maintained for 
decades that public relations officers should act as a corporate conscience”, a pretense that re-
flects the “ideal social role of public relations, in which public relations facilitates dialog that is 
beneficial to society in general”. Heath and Richard Nelson (1986), for instance, just like Pearson 
                                                
89 For further distinction between both versions of discourse ethics see e.g. Habermas (1983: 93–108; 1990: 82–98; 
2005: 84–105) or Uwe Steinhoff (2006). 
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(1989b), Leeper (1996), or Meisenbach (2006)(see also chap. 3.3), build on the argument, i.e. to 
guarantee the ethical decision-making of an organization, public relations departments need to 
facilitate dialog with according stakeholders. This implies that beyond acting as accidental ethical 
counsel on consequences of management decisions, as documented by Christopher Spicer (1997) 
or Kenneth Plowman (1998), for instance, public relations practitioners are appointed to the con-
siderable task of enacting the ethical conscience of an organization by means of communication. 
Hence, what can be conceived as public relations’ central function, the managing of communica-
tion between an organization and its publics, is attributed a thoroughly ethical connotation.  
In chapter 3.1.2 we demonstrated how Reynolds and Yuthas (2008), in aiming to be consis-
tent with concepts in stakeholder management, also “include ‘the natural environment’ as a 
stakeholder, and do not eliminate from consideration non-human species and future generations” 
regarding the condition of generality (58). Recent publications on stakeholder management in-
creasingly define not only the stakeholder as “any individual or group who can affect or is af-
fected by the actions, decisions, policies, practices, or goals of the organization”, but, further-
more, explicitly include the natural environment and non-human species (Carroll, Buchholtz, 
2006: 67f). Not only is the natural environment an increasingly important factor in considerations 
on stakeholder management, it is also a fairly prominent aspect in public relations research. 
Grunig and Jon White (1992: 40f), for instance, when demonstrating the effect of worldviews on 
public relations, allude to the problematic of an organization exercising dominance over its natu-
ral environment. There also exists an evident interest of public relations researchers in how pub-
lic relations departments handle issues regarding the natural environment, especially with a focus 
on environmental disasters and with regard to questions of ethics (cf. e.g. Harrison, Prugh, 1989; 
Smith, 1993; Bowen, Power, 1993; Benoit, 1995; Livesey, 2002). The Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
which occurred in Alaska in 1989, as a most notable example—reflected by the sources above—
has attracted strong interest of the public relations scientific community. Furthermore, we can 
see that standards of responsibility reporting, beyond focusing on the social, prominently include 
the natural environment as a factor of organizational accountability (cf. Reynolds, Yuthas, 2008: 
50–53). The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), for instance, issued a specification 
standard (the 14000 series) that provides requirements allowing to measure the performance of 
an organization (cf. e.g. Marcus, 1997); these requirements are especially concerned with non-
human surroundings of an organization, i.e. natural resources, land, water, air, flora and fauna. 
If one acknowledges, like Reynolds and Yuthas (2008) do, the natural environment of an 
organization as being an important aspect of public relations, and hence accepts the above con-
cept of the stakeholder, one also generates a challenging demand regarding the aforementioned 
ethical concept of the corporate conscience: the public relations function, conceptualized in 
Further Considerations 
 
91 
terms of a corporate conscience, would have to prove to be conscious not only of human, but 
also of non-human stakeholders—it needs to be ‘environmentally conscious’. To further explore 
the potentials and challenges of Habermas’ theory for public relations in this regard, we can take 
this conclusion as a starting point to explore how Habermas’ moral theory responds to questions 
of the moral responsibility of human beings for their natural (i.e. non-human) environment. 
5.1.2.2 Discourse Ethics and the Question of Moral Responsibility for the 
Natural Environment  
In chapter 2.2.4 we demonstrated that Habermas’ concept of discourse ethics is centered around 
the interactions of ‘competent speakers’—rational subjects capable of speech and action. This 
indicates momentous implications regarding issues in ecological ethics. Consequently, Habermas 
acknowledges: “Der anthropozentrische Zuschnitt scheint Theorien des Kantischen Typs im 
Ansatz blind zu machen für Fragen, die sich aus der moralischen Verpflichtung des Menschen 
für seine nicht-menschliche Umwelt ergeben“ (Habermas, 1991: 219).xxiii This significant con-
straint, of course, hasn’t gone unnoticed amongst Habermas’ critics, and so Joel Whitebook 
claims that as “opposed to all forms of naturalistic ethics anthropocentrism holds that man is the 
only locus of value and the only being that commands respect in the universe” (Whitebook, 1979: 
52). Combined with this critique regarding anthropocentrism in ethics, the author objects that 
ethics cannot simply adhere to the question of how to justify normative claims amongst a group 
of rational beings, but must be able to include those intuitions of compassion for non-human 
species. In replies to this critique and a similar argument by Thomas McCarthy (1982), Habermas 
is forced to assess such questions of moral responsibility for the natural environment. He does so 
by competing two arguments, one centered around the concept of anamnetic solidarity (cf. Ha-
bermas, 1982; 1984: 475–570), the other based on the capacity to suffer (cf. Habermas, 1991: 
119–226; 1993: 19–111). 
Habermas puts forth the first argument in connection with considerations of Walter 
Benjamin and Max Horkheimer:90 
Gesetzt den Fall, daß die Nachgeborenen nur dank der Leiden und Opfer vergangener Generationen 
in den Genuß einer institutionalisierten Freiheit, in den Genuß wenn nicht geradezu einer gerechten 
Ordnung, so doch von Prozeduren gelangt sind, die Unrecht minimieren – dürfen sie eine Welt, die 
eine solche Entstehungsgeschichte hat, eine ‚gerechte’ nennen? (Habermas, 1984b: 515f)xxiv 
Habermas here refers to a feeling of compassion that is stimulated by commemorating past sacri-
fice and suffering: even a far developed and perfectly just world could not cancel out past sacri-
fice. Thus, this kind of compassion becomes an inevitable precondition without which an ideal 
                                                
90 Regarding the concept of anamnetic solidarity see also Helmut Peukert (2009: 300–308). 
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future society is itself thoroughly unjust. The author now claims that such a concept of anamnetic 
solidarity can be allied with his ethical program when we view past generations as necessary par-
ticipants of the ideal and counterfactual idea of discourse (cf. Habermas, 1982: 246f; 1984: 516). 
Just as well, he states that we can interpret a feeling of compassion vis-à-vis our natural environ-
ment: compassion and solidarity regarding both past generations and the natural environment 
appear as limit concepts in a discourse ethic that is consistently thought out to the end (cf. 
Habermas, 1982: 246). 
In dieser Hinsicht ist ‚Mitleid’, Mitleid mit dem Schmerz einer Verletzung der moralischen und leibli-
chen Integrität vergangener Generationen, in ähnlicher Weise ein Grenzbegriff der Diskursethik wie 
‚Natur an sich’ ein Grenzbegriff der transzendentalpragmatischen Erkenntnistheorie ist (Habermas, 
1984b: 517).xxv 
Nevertheless, to Habermas’ program of discourse ethics, the concept of anamnetic solidarity can 
only serve as a metaphor, since it is not only concerned with sacrifice as a state of affair, but as 
moral injustice. When returning to the original ethical concept it appears that to characterize sac-
rifice as unjust, the related matter would, of course, itself have to be made subject to a discursive 
procedure. But due to its centering around the interactions of ‘competent speakers’, discourse 
ethics is unable to reveal sacrifice on behalf of the natural environment as truly unjust. This re-
veals: whilst an anthropocentric idea of anamnetic solidarity can—without mystification—hardly 
be allied with Habermas’ concept, his speech-centered program of discourse ethics remains en-
tirely immune to the introduction of the natural environment, to a concept of nature-in-itself. 
Habermas’ second argument in response to the objections by McCarthy (1982) and 
Whitebook (1979), aims to further reduce discourse ethics’ immunity toward entities that cannot 
fit the concept of the competent speaker. The author starts by acknowledging that, “our moral 
feelings, judgements, and actions are directed not only to subjects capable of speech and action” 
(Habermas, 1993: 105f). He instances categorical obligations toward animals: 
[...] Tieren gegenüber fühlen wir uns kategorisch verpflichtet. Jedenfalls hat der Abscheu gegen Tier-
quälerei eine größere Verwandtschaft mit der Empörung über eine Verletzung moralischer Gebote als 
mit der bedauernden oder abschätzigen Einstellung gegenüber Personen, die, sagen wir, aus ihrem 
Leben nichts rechtes machen [...]. Wir ‚sollen’ Tiere nicht brutal vernachlässigen oder gar grausam 
quälen (Habermas, 1991: 221).xxvi 
In his effort to justify duties toward animals by appeal to his theory of intersubjectivity, 
Habermas speaks of a ‘quasi-moral responsibility’ that can be anchored in interactions with ani-
mals as well as the knowledge of their capacity to suffer (cf. 221–125). In other words: by con-
necting an entity’s entitlement to morality solely to its capacity to express suffering and partici-
pate in human interactions, Habermas ultimately denies moral rights to a vast spectrum of the 
non-human environment. Quite understandably scholars who, unlike Habermas, have their focus 
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specifically on questions of environmental ethics, quite frankly, reject his attempts as absurd (cf. 
Krebs, 1997).  
5.1.2.3 Are Discourse Ethics Suited to Promote Environmental Conscious-
ness in Public Relations? 
Bearing the remarks made in the previous paragraph in mind, especially the last-mentioned cri-
tique from the side of environmental ethicists, it is difficult to read the question in the title of this 
paragraph in anything other than a cynical manner. As clearly demonstrated above, Habermas’ 
principle of generalizations in fact only means generalization within the exalted circle of compe-
tent speakers. It only demands equal consideration of the interests of “all those we may assume 
are capable of adopting the perspective of all others” and that, through their potential ‘yes’ or 
‘no’ responses, can contribute to determining whether a norm could “meet with the agreement of 
all and hence is valid” (Habermas, 1993: 108). It is only consistent that Habermas concludes his 
efforts by acknowledging that, within his theory of intersubjectivity, categorical obligations vis-à-
vis animals are “a tricky moral question” and that human responsibility for plants and the preser-
vation of whole species “cannot be derived from duties of interaction and thus cannot be morally 
justified” (111, italics in original).  
Im Mitleid mit dem gequälten Tier, im Schmerz über zerstörte Biotope regen sich moralische Intui-
tionen, die durch den kollektiven Narzissmus einer letztlich anthropologisch zentrierten Betrach-
tungsweise nicht ernstlich befriedigt werden können (Habermas, 1991: 29).xxvii 
Moreover, Habermas may even be too moderate in the critique of his own concept, when stating 
that it may not ‘fully satisfy’ some moral intuitions: what he labels the ‘collective narcissism’ of 
his anthropocentric concept not only fails to satisfy intuitions of environmental consciousness, it 
can, moreover, be accused of contributing to an anthropocentric hybris of mankind, which in fact 
promotes ignorance of the natural environment (cf. Meyer-Abich, 1986: 79–83). Thus we see, for 
instance, how Yuthas and Reynolds’ (2008) claim to include the natural environment as a 
stakeholder in the process of ethical public relations conduct conceived on the basis of Haber-
mas’ theory (cf. chap. 3.1) can indeed be charged with missing sufficient theoretical grounding. 
Furthermore calls for a conceptualization of public relations as the corporate conscience, phi-
losophically substantiated by discourse ethics, can be abrogated on the same grounds. At least 
from the perspective of those who advocate a concept of the stakeholder, which includes the 
natural environment of an organization (cf. Carroll, Buchholtz, 2006), the previous argument can 
constitute a strong case against the application of Habermas’ theory to public relations. In a time, 
in which “sustainable development” is one of the “most important concepts for enterprises, or-
ganizations, governments and institutions” and “responsibility” is to be seen as one of the major 
“quality measurements of professional public relations” (Bentele, 2004: 487), a framework that 
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promotes ignorance of the natural environment may be a dubious theoretical resource for the 
grounding and enacting of public relations ethics. 
5.1.3 General Constraints: The Prostration of Discourse Ethics 
The arguments gathered in the previous demonstration regarding questions of the moral respon-
sibility for the natural environment only constitute an exiguous fraction of an extensive discus-
sion on the constraints of discourse ethics (cf. e.g. Gebauer, 1993; Gottschalk-Mazouz, 2000; 
Albert, 2003). Habermas immediately acknowledges the massive problems he is confronted with 
in this debate: 
[...] meine restriktive Auffassung von der Leistungsfähigkeit der philosophischen Ethik [ist] vielleicht 
eine Enttäuschung; auf jeden Fall ist sie auch ein Stachel: die Philosophie nimmt niemandem die prak-
tische Verantwortung ab. Übrigens auch nicht den Philosophen, die sich, wie alle anderen, moralisch-
praktischen Fragen von großer Komplikation gegenübersehen und gut daran tun, sich zunächst ein-
mal ein klares Bild von der Situation zu verschaffen. Dazu können die Geschichts- und Sozialwissen-
schaften mehr betragen als die Philosophie (Habermas, 1991: 30).xxviii 
The fact that Habermas explicitly turns ethics over to other sciences, to some clearly constitutes 
the prostration of discourse ethics (cf. Leschke, 2001: 68f) and shows how his program of phi-
losophical justification has crashed (cf. Reese-Schäfer, 2001: 87). Habermas trivializes his own 
concept when stating that the “moral intuitions of everyday life are not in need of clarification by 
the philosopher” (Habermas, 1990a: 98). To him it is incumbent on moral theory to explain the 
moral point of view (cf. 211). In light of this blatant retraction, the efforts to ground and enact 
public relations ethics by means of Habermas’ philosophical program as demonstrated in chapter 
3.3 may seem rather naïve—regardless of the demonstrated contradictions between public rela-
tions conduct and communicative action (cf. chap. 4.3)—especially so when these efforts are 
connected with the ‘emphatic claim of moral truth. It must be conceded that Habermas’ philoso-
phical self-perception and his narrow focus on a moral theory that is restricted to explaining the 
moral point of view is no reason why others should confine their efforts in the same manner and 
not utilize his program to engage in all facets of practical philosophy (cf. Reese-Schäfer, 2001: 
88f). But applications that interpret Habermas’ theory as though ethical discourse is at the hori-
zon of practical realization and aim at deriving concrete steps for enacting the program, or ones 
that try to establish concrete codes of ethics on its basis and at the same time claim their philoso-
phical authority, are not theoretically coherent with the concept of discourse ethics in Habermas’ 
sense. 
5.2 On the Public Sphere, Public Opinion, Mass Media, and In-
fluence 
In chapter 4.3 we demonstrated how public relations is conceived in terms of Habermas’ theory 
by drawing on the author’s considerations on the press and its changing functions as given in 
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Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Habermas, 1962, 1989). Subsequently we concluded that, regard-
less of Habermas’ revised assessment of the effect of an infiltration of power on the public 
sphere, public relations still appears to be one of the key manipulative factors in an arrangement 
that conditions citizens to become compliant consumers (cf. chap. 4.3.1.3). Here public relations 
‘encroaches’ on the public sphere, furthering the influence of privileged private interests. Bentele 
and Wehmeier (2009), in one of their recent articles, make the following passing comment: “As 
far as we can see, Habermas revised his original highly critical point of view concerning public 
relations [...]” (348).91 Despite the notion that Habermas appears to understand “lobbyists in their 
social function as being parallel to politicians or actors of the civil society” (ibid.), the two 
authors unfortunately desist from further substantiating their claim of a revised view concerning 
public relations. 
In the following, we want to take the aforementioned claim of Bentele and Wehmeier, 
which indicates a change of trend in Habermas’ concept of public relations, as an occasion to 
further consider some aspects regarding the public sphere and the influence of public relations 
practices on it, based on Habermas’ more recent considerations on the political public sphere and 
processes of political communication (cf. Habermas, 1992a, 2005a, 2006, 2008). This will also 
give us the chance to touch on some of the questions that emerged from the demonstrations and 
discussions in chapter 3, namely those regarding the processes through which public relations 
practiced by different social actors may gain access to and influence on the media (cf. chap. 
3.4.3.1), the rational potential or ‘resistivity’ of a reticulate public sphere vis-à-vis such efforts of 
‘manipulation’ (cf. chap. 3.2.4.1), or regarding the different types of organizations, their different 
‘discourse resources’, as well as the different effects that public relations, practiced by distinct 
types of organizations, have on the public sphere (cf. chap. 3.4.3). 
5.2.1 The Public Sphere, Opinion-Formation, and Two Ways for Influence 
In short Habermas conceives of the public sphere as a network for communicating information 
and points of view (i.e. opinions) that is reproduced through communicative action (cf. 
Habermas, 1992a: 436; see also chap. 2.2.5). As such, the public sphere allows for processes of 
communication that filter and synthesize streams of communication in a way that they “coalesce 
into bundles of topically specified public opinions” (Habermas, 1996: 360; italics in original). The 
process of opinion-formation and focusing in the public sphere is characterized as an assorting of 
utterances according to issue and contributions (affirmative or dismissive). The formed focused 
                                                
91 The authors here refer not to the revisions conducted adjacent to the 1990 republication of Strukturwandel der Öffen-
tlichkeit that we drew on in chapter 4.3.1.3, but to a recent conference paper, i.e. Habermas’ opening speech at the 
2006 annual conference of the International Communication Association (ICA) in Dresden (cf. Habermas, 2006). 
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opinions may then be ‘bundled’ into public opinion when they are carried by general approval.92 
Because the public sphere, as the network for communicating information and opinions, allows 
for the forming of such public opinion, it is the locus where “[i]nfluence develops” and where 
influence “becomes the object of struggle” (Habermas, 1996: 363)—the public sphere appears as 
a ‘battleground’ over public opinion, which is, both a source for and an object of influence.  
Habermas depicts two basic ways for an actor to gain the general support needed to form 
public opinion that allows for substantial influence. The first is the participation in a more or less 
exhaustive and rational public controversy over information, proposals, and reasons (cf. 
Habermas, 1992a: 438). The ‘more or less’, derived from Habermas’ normative perspective, refers 
to the degree to which such a controversy is subverted by power, as indicated by standards of 
ideal communication (cf. chap. 2.2.4): a relatively discursive (egalitarian and undistorted) contro-
versy unsubverted by power is (tendentially) seen to lead to ‘qualified public opinion’, whilst a 
relatively manipulated controversy, e.g. by means of market research and public relations prac-
tices, is (tendentially) seen to lead to compliance.93 The second way to gain support is through 
reputation or prestige. Here Habermas builds on Talcott Parsons’ (1967) concept of influence:94 
‚Einfluß’ zehrt von der Ressource der Verständigung, aber er stützt sich auf einen Vorschuß and ent-
gegengebrachtem Vertrauen in aktuell nicht überprüfte Überzeugungsmöglichkeiten. In diesem Sinne 
stellen öffentliche Meinungen politische Einflußpotentiale dar [...] (Habermas, 1992a: 439).xxix 
Hence, influence also feeds on a resource that resists testing in a current controversy. An exam-
ple here is the high reputation enjoyed by an organization, allowing the reputation bearer to in-
fluence others’ beliefs with utterances that do not have to be specifically substantiated in the 
situation. According to Habermas this second way is the path generally taken by public relations, 
which enfolds “prestige” and does not “genuinely concern public opinion but opinion in the 
sense of reputation” (Habermas, 1989: 200f).95 Corporations or organizations practicing public 
relations attempt to voice their utterances, which are generally not authorized as such, with an 
‘authoritative’ effect by covering them with prestige (cf. Habermas, 1981b: 408f). And even if 
                                                
92 Public opinion is not to be confused with representative survey results: “It is not an aggregate of individually gath-
ered, privately expressed opinions held by isolated persons [...]. Political opinion polls [at the most] provide a cer-
tain reflection of ‘public opinion’” (Habermas, 1996: 362). Public opinions generally result from the efforts of 
opinion-building elites on the one hand, and the multiple reactions of a highly differentiated mass public on the 
other; as such, they have to be seen as extremely difficult to grasp (cf. Habermas, 2008: 171). 
93 The applications demonstrated in chapters 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.3, which disregard macro societal considerations, 
either explicitly or implicitly embark on the notion that public relations can symmetrically engage in controversies 
unsubverted by power and hence contribute to the development of qualified public opinions. As such these appli-
cations oppose Habermas’ concept, which as we demonstrated in chapter 4.3, conceives of public relations as con-
tributing to communicative processes that promote mass loyalty. 
94 For Habermas’ considerations based on Parsons’ concept see also Habermas (1981b: 408f; 1987: 273f). 
95 Recollecting the different applications of Habermas’ theory we see that the practical level application demon-
strated in chapter 3.2.3 conceptualizes public relations in this second manner of gaining support. 
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public relations was to take the first path, that is engage in a public controversy, Habermas’ the-
ory suggests that they do so not by enacting practices of argumentation in the sense of rational 
discourse (cf. Habermas, 2005a: 387): a particular organization that engages in public controversy 
does so with the intent of furthering its privileged private interests; in Habermas’ terminology, 
such participation in a controversy is not a form of argumentation but may more correctly be 
described as a form of ‘bargaining’ because it involves a “conflict between particular interests” 
(ibid.).  
5.2.2 Mass Media, Social Actors, and Different Potentials for Influence 
Above we depict how public relations may be seen as engaging in public processes of opinion-
formation in order to gain general support and influence within the public sphere. Within these 
considerations we find Habermas highlighting the system of mass media. Habermas describes the 
public sphere as dominated by mediated mass communication (cf. Habermas, 2008: 155f). In the 
struggle over public opinions and influence occurring in the public sphere, mediated mass com-
munication is seen as fulfilling neuralgic functions: (a) its structures mould the public sphere with 
abstract and asymmetrical communication (cf. 155–163), whilst (b) its dynamics are constitutive to 
a distinct power structure of the public sphere (cf. 163–179). 
The structures of mediated mass communication show characteristic deficits regarding the 
requirements of discursive argumentation. On the one hand mediated mass communication is 
abstract in the sense that it lacks forms of simple interaction between physically present parties 
engaging in egalitarian argumentation. Mediated communication is directed at mostly passive 
recipients, and it ‘overrides’ instantaneous glances, gestures, thoughts, and reactions of present 
speakers and addressees: “Abgekoppelt von einfachen Interaktionen, beginnen die semantischen 
Gehalte jenseits der imperativen Kraft von reziprok erhobenen Geltungsansprüchen frei zu flott-
tieren” (160).xxx On the other hand, the structures of mediated mass communication are asym-
metrical in the sense that they sharply separate the roles of actors in the arena from the roles of 
spectators in the gallery (cf. Habermas, 1992a: 453). Mediated mass communication is organized 
like a stage that prevents a change of roles between the few actors on it and the large public in 
front of it: “diese Akteure [...] diskutieren nicht etwa miteinander, sondern zielen auf die Mei-
nungsbildung eines anonymen Publikums ab, ohne ihrerseits Rede und Antwort stehen zu müs-
sen” (Habermas, 2008: 161).xxxi From the stance of the ideal requirements of discursive argumen-
tation the lack of face-to-face interactions and reciprocity between roles of speakers and address-
ees are evident shortcomings. 
Furthermore Habermas demonstrates that the dynamics of mediated mass communication 
can be viewed as ‘canalized’ by media power (Medienmacht), which momentously affects the public 
sphere’s power structure as a whole (cf. Habermas, 1992a: 454f; 1996: 376f; 2008: 174f). What 
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Habermas refers to as media power originates in the high degree of centralization and increasing 
pressure of selection in mass media and is exercised as authoritative in selecting information and 
shaping the presentation of messages. These dynamics of mediated mass communication are 
continuously worked on by different actors who “struggle for access to and influence on the me-
dia” (Habermas, 2006: 417). This is the case, because the media, as mentioned above, dominates 
a public sphere, which is the ‘soil’ from which legitimation must be gained. Thus media power is 
subject to the strategic use of political and social power to influence the agenda as well as to trig-
ger and frame public issues by means of professional public relations practices (cf. 415).  
What Habermas refers to here as actors who struggle for access to and influence on the 
media enter the system of the media from three general directions: (a) from the center of the 
political system (politicians, political parties, etc.), (b) from the functional systems (lobbyists, spe-
cial interest groups, etc.), and (c) from civil society (advocates, intellectuals, churches, nongov-
ernmental organizations, moral entrepreneurs, etc.) (cf. Habermas, 2008: 170). The sum of these 
actors, coupled with mass media professionals, participate in the construction of public opinion. 
In this social function of struggling for access to and influence on the media these actors are, as 
claimed by Bentele and Wehmeier (2009: 348), indeed ‘parallel’ (e.s.). Not parallel, however, are 
the potentials of these actors to transfer power via mass media into public influence. Politicians 
and political parties are by far the most influential suppliers of the media system, because they 
not only imply professional methods of communication but also hold a strong position with re-
gard to negotiating privileged access to media (cf. Habermas, 2006: 419). Representatives of func-
tional systems have a less privileged negotiation position but likewise employ highly professional 
public relations practices to transform their social power into “political muscle” (ibid.).  
Dank eines höheren Organisationsgrades und größerer materieller Ressourcen sind Lobbys und special 
interst (sic!) groups in der Lage, professionelle Techniken der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und des politischen 
Marketing zu nutzen, um soziale Macht in politischen Einfluß zu transformieren (Habermas, 2008: 
176).xxxii 
Habermas also points out that a lack of distance between the functional systems and the media is 
“more frequent and normal” than between media and the political center (Habermas, 2006: 421). 
Efforts to translate economic power into political influence by means of professional public rela-
tions can be “seen to have a measurable effect” when “ecological or health insurance policies 
impact on the substantial interests of major corporations” (ibid.). Finally, the third type of actors, 
which have their ‘roots’ in civil society, find themselves—compared to politicians and lobby-
ists—in the weakest position (cf. 419). Referring to “emergent associations”, which Habermas 
sees at the “core of civil society” (Habermas, 1996: 367), he makes the following statement: 
[...] Assoziationsverhältnisse bilden gewiß nicht das auffälligste Element der Öffentlichkeit, die von 
Massenmedien und großen Agenturen beherrscht, durch Institutionen der Markt- und Meinungsfor-
Further Considerations 
 
99 
schung beobachtet und mit der Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, Propaganda und Werbung der politischen Par-
teien und Verbände überzogen wird (Habermas, 1992a: 444).xxxiii 
The peripheral status of actors anchored in civil society stems from their comparably low ‘orga-
nizational capacities’, that is their low degree of professionalization and funds (cf. Habermas, 
2008: 174), as well as the media’s favoring of input from the direction of well-organized actors of 
the mentioned functional systems (cf. Habermas, 1992a: 458f). 
5.2.3 Further Parameters of Influence: Reflexivity and Crises Con-
sciousness 
In the paragraph above we demonstrated how the potentials to transfer power via mass media 
into public influence are unequally distributed amongst different groups of actors, generally dis-
advantaging civil society actors. Roughly speaking, Habermas’ normative perspective implies that 
these circumstances undermine effective impulses of lifeworld rationality within the public sphere 
and hinder the construction of considerate public opinions (cf. chap. 5.1.1). Nevertheless, we can 
find two significant indications in Habermas’ more recent texts that (a) may allow one to view 
public relations as participating in an overall public communication that still allows for the gen-
eration of considerate public opinions (at least under certain conditions within the media system), 
and (b) allows one to view civil actors as more influential than suggested by the established 
power-structure (at least under sporadic conditions within the public sphere). 
As seen in chapter 4.3.1.3 Habermas reviewed his originally pessimistic stance regarding the 
resisting power and the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally differentiated mass public. He 
now appears to emphasize that different efforts to use public relations practices to gain influence 
in the public sphere via mediated mass communication cannot be conducted without constraints. 
These constraints are generally founded in what Habermas refers to as the “peculiar reflexivity” 
of the public sphere (Habermas, 2006: 420). Reflexivity here means that all participants are gen-
erally free to reconsider a perceived public opinion. This reflexivity leads Habermas to claim that 
the unequal distribution of the means of exercising influence on the public sphere as depicted in 
chapter 5.2.2 does not necessarily distort the formation of considerate public opinion: “strategic 
interventions in the public sphere must, unless they run the risk of inefficiency, play by the rules 
of the game” (419f). From Habermas’ normative perspective, there are two vital conditions for 
this ‘game of reflexivity’ to function in a way that considerate public opinions can be generated, 
even if powerful actors try to strategically intervene in the process: 
First, a self-regulating media system must maintain its independence vis-à-vis its environments while 
linking political communication in the public sphere with both civil society and the political center; 
second, an inclusive civil society must empower citizens to participate in and respond to a public dis-
course that, in turn, must not degenerate into a colonizing mode of communication (420). 
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Habermas acknowledges both conditions as being “troubling” (430), but with reference to find-
ings of recent research on the cognitive role of heuristics and information shortcuts in the devel-
opment and consolidation of political orientations, he, nevertheless, gives a rather optimistic out-
look. These studies suggest that “people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about their 
political choices, without possessing a large body of knowledge about politics” (Dalton, 2006: 
26f; cited in Habermas, 2006: 420). Subsequent to an assumed fulfillment of the above condi-
tions, that is an independent media system and a vital feedback of public discourse, Habermas 
notably remarks with regard to public relations: he states that, in processes of political communi-
cation that proceed under these ideal conditions, “even the powerful actors will only contribute 
to the mobilization of relevant issues, facts and arguments” (Habermas, 2006: 420). In short, if 
we can rightly assume a functioning reflexive public sphere, strategic public relations that aims 
for the building of prestige and ‘bargains’ for particular private interests may, on the whole, even 
contribute to a general process of public communication that allows for the generation of con-
siderate public opinions. 
As demonstrated in chapter 5.2.2 the unequal influence of actors depends in part on the 
dynamics of mediated mass communication, and in part on the ‘organizational capacities’ of the 
actors. Thus it is important to notice that each group of actors practicing public relations enters 
the public sphere under specifically different circumstances regarding (a) the ‘societal back-
ground’ behind the actor (the state, the functional systems, the civil society) as well as (b) the 
dispositions of the dynamics of mediated mass communication for the specific actor’s public 
relations efforts. In this constellation actors from civil society appear to be in a rather disadvanta-
geous position. This is only the case, however, in a ‘business-as-usual’ situation. In perceived cri-
sis situations, these actors have the capacity to shift the day-to-day circulation of power. 
[...] generell lässt sich feststellen, daß sich auch in mehr oder weniger vermachteten politischen Öf-
fentlichkeiten die Kraftverhältnisse verschieben, sobald die Wahrnehmung von relevanten gesell-
schaftlichen Problemlagen ein Krisenbewusstsein an der Peripherie hervorruft (Habermas, 1992a: 461; 
italics in original).xxxiv 
In these crisis situations, civil society actors are able to dramatize contributions and by means of 
mass protests, sensational actions, or incessant campaigns present them effectively enough, so 
that mass media takes up the matter. The success of such initiatives emerging from within civil 
society remains possible, because an otherwise latent potential built in the inner structure of the 
public sphere can be endogenously mobilized and affect the mass media where the same poten-
tial is present in form of normative self-understanding (cf. ibid).  
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5.2.4  ‘Lifeworld Public Relations’ as ‘Double Politics’? 
Finally we want to take the opportunity to return to some of our above considerations regarding 
the concept of Leitch and Neilson (2001). Looking at the application of Habermas’ theory as 
demonstrated in chapter 3.4.2 we find that Habermas’ above differentiation between the different 
actors within civil society on the one hand, and the functional systems on the other, as well as 
their different potential for influence (cf. chap. 5.2.2), may be reinforced with the concepts of the 
lifeworld organization and the system organization. In the application by Leitch and Neilson, 
however, the lifeworld organizations (or actors of civil society) are not seen quite as underprivi-
leged as in the hierarchy depicted by Habermas: they do not necessarily appear in the weakest 
position compared to lobbyists or politicians and are said to “have the potential to equal system 
organizations in terms of access to resources including public relations” (Leitch, Neilson, 2001: 
137). Despite his concept of an apparently strict hierarchy, Habermas also seems to acknowledge 
that to some degree some civil society actors successfully employ professional public relations 
practices: 
Die Organisationen, Gruppen und Advokaten, die angeblich allgemeine Interessen vertreten, können 
in manchen Fällen auch Mittel des corporate communication management einsetzen (Habermas, 2008: 176; 
italics in original).xxxv 
The decisive aspect of this comment is Habermas’ particular diction, not his general acknow-
ledgement of the employment of such practices by civil society actors. The restrictive formulation 
of “angeblich allgemeine Interessen” and “in manchen Fällen” appears to be directed at the 
problematic that if interests are not public but specific, and if an actor does not promote overall 
forms of spontaneous public communication but instead permanently employs public relations 
practices to enforce specific interests, the conception of this actor as being anchored in civil soci-
ety or as a lifeworld organization, becomes inconsistent. In Habermas’ framework, a certain de-
gree of professionalization and funds available for public relations practices appear to be a crucial 
feature for the assessment of the underlying rationality of the organization in question. It is a 
specific feature of system organizations, not lifeworld organizations, that they “draw on market 
studies and opinion surveys and conduct their own professional public relations campaigns” 
(Habermas, 1996: 375). In our discussion subsequent to the demonstration of Leitch and 
Neilson’s (2001) application, we already assessed this problematic (cf. chap. 3.4.3.2). Here we 
have, inter alia, formulated the question whether and under what premise an alleged lifeworld 
organization that equals system organizations in terms of access to resources, such as profes-
sional public relations expertise, can still coherently be referred to as coupled with the lifeworld? 
In the following we suggest an answer to this question based on Habermas’ theory that helps to 
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distinguish lifeworld organizations from system organizations not by professionalism but by the 
specific structure of their public relations efforts. 
Habermas discusses a number of indicators to distinguish the (lifeworld-bound) loose type 
of organization on the one hand, from the (system-bound) collective actor on the other (cf. 
Habermas, 1992a: 454; 1996: 375f). Amongst these indicators are organizational complexity, pro-
fessionalization, resources, represented interests and identifying features. From the perspective of 
public relations, however, the most interesting indicator may be seen in Habermas’ assessment of 
the distinctive characteristics in the communication practices of lifeworld organizations, namely 
the “self-referential character of the practice of communication in civil society” (Habermas, 1996: 
369): 
[...] mit ihrer Programmatik nehmen sie geradewegs Einfluß auf das politische System, zugleich geht es 
ihnen aber reflexiv auch um die Stabilisierung und Erweiterung von Zivilgesellschaft und Öffentlich-
keit und um die Vergewisserung der eignen Identität und Handlungsfähigkeit (Habermas, 1992a: 
447).xxxvi 
This means that the communication of these organizations is practiced in terms of ‘double poli-
tics’ that always reveal a specific subtext concerned with the critical function of the public sphere 
as such. It is distinctive for these organizations that, even though their communication may be 
part of an aggressive contestation of opinions or a struggle for access to media and influence on 
publics, they—at the same time—communicate so as to preserve the communicative infrastruc-
ture of the lifeworld and thus the critical function of the public sphere. Following it is possible to 
differentiate actors who try to gain access to and influence on the media by their public relations 
practices but at the same time reproduce the public sphere from those actors who apply profes-
sional public relations to forums that already exist (cf. ibid). 
Ultimately these considerations suggest that it may be possible to decide whether an alleged 
lifeworld organization that equals system organizations in terms of public relations expertise can 
coherently be referred to as coupled with the lifeworld, by assessing whether or not its public 
relations practices show the aforementioned ‘double politics’. Furthermore these considerations 
may also serve as a basis on which to respond to prima facie objections to applications of 
Habermas’ theory to public relations (e.g. as demonstrated in chapter 3.2.2) that claim that the 
“way in which public relations is actually practiced is a far cry from the Habermasian ideals” 
(Ihlen, Ruler, 2009: 9). Whilst Habermas’ framework surely suggests that for system organizations 
symmetrical communication is merely one more strategic option (cf. chap. 4.3.1.3), it also suggests 
that for associations of civil society, symmetrical forms of communication may not only be more 
applicable, but may in fact be more or less constitutive to the form of organization as such. Accord-
ing to social movements Habermas notes: 
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Für soziale Bewegungen ist es [...] eine Existenzfrage, ob sie Organisationsformen finden, die Solidaritä-
ten und Öffentlichkeiten hervorbringen und die es gestatten, in der Verfolgung spezieller Ziele zu-
gleich bestehende Kommunikationsrechte und -strukturen auszuschöpfen und zu radikalisieren 
(Habermas, 1992a: 454; italics added).xxxvii 
On the basis of the suggested concept of lifeworld public relations as ‘double politics’, it may be 
possible to initiate inquiry in the field of public relations research in which the applications of 
Habermas’ communicative ideals may be less naïve than in the domain of ‘highly systematic’ cor-
porate communications.  
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6 Closing Remarks 
6.1 Summary 
We initiated and based our investigations on the current necessity to further analyze potentials 
and challenges of different theoretical applications in the field of public relations research and on 
the particular need for a comprehensive demonstration and discussion of possible applications of 
Habermas’ theory. Having provided an overview of the field of research as well as an introduc-
tion of central concepts of Habermas’ theory (chap. 2), we illustrated potential applications of the 
theory and explored challenges emerging from these applications from four different ‘perspec-
tives’ (chap. 3); some of these investigation’s key results shall be summarized in the following. 
In the evaluative perspective we presented two possible applications of Habermas’ idea of the 
raising of validity claims as well as his concept of discourse ethics for analyses of practical aspects 
of public relations (chap. 3.1). First this entailed an analysis of annual reports and their adherence 
to ideal standards of communicative action—an application that allows for the evaluation of the 
degree to which particular reports adhere to the ideal claims of comprehensibility, truth, legiti-
macy and sincerity. Second we outlined a possible application that allows for an analysis of dif-
ferent standards of corporate social responsibility reporting. This application ultimately facilitates 
a judgment of the degree to which conditions of communicative understanding are addressed in 
different reporting frameworks, and enables a normative critique of the latter. In addition to 
some terminological misconceptions, our discussion of these applications revealed particular 
challenges regarding the design in which to operationalize the validity claims of legitimacy and 
sincerity. We also identified possible incoherencies with the theoretical framework in the re-
searchers’ extended idea of the ideal speech situation (including ‘all those interested’ and ‘natural 
environment’). Furthermore, we stressed the challenge of analyzing asymmetrical or non-
discursive forms of communication when drawing on Habermas’ concept based on face-to-face 
interactions. 
In the practical perspective we presented three quite dissimilar applications of Habermas’ the-
ory for the modeling of public relations practice (chap. 3.2). First we demonstrated a possible 
application of Habermas’ concept of the public sphere in a model of ‘relational’ public relations, 
especially designed to help institutions better cope with and improve their responses to critical 
publics. Along with other challenges we stressed that the application not only refers to a some-
what ‘antiquated’ concept of the public sphere, but yields a simplistic effort, lacking substantive 
theoretical grounding. Furthermore, we identified this application as a typical example for models 
developed by public relations practitioners. The pivotal question raised in the course of the sub-
sequent discussion thus concerned possible theoretical incoherencies emerging from rather naïve 
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and positive ideas of ‘good’ public relations. Furthermore we suggested that the application raises 
questions regarding the conceptualization of the multiplicity and ‘rational potential’ of the public 
sphere. Second we outlined a possible application that draws on Habermas’ concept of under-
standing and thereby establishes a model for the planning, analysis, and evaluation of different 
‘stages’ in practical public relations with the overall aim of enabling undisturbed communication 
processes. We demonstrated some common objections to the model as well as responses and 
their consequences regarding the theoretical framework. The challenges set forth in the discus-
sion led to the general questioning of the applied idea of communicative understanding in the 
strategic context of public relations as well as the presumption of some theoretical aporia. Third 
we presented a fairly recent application of Habermas’ concept of world relations in a three-
dimensional model of reputation that allows for the conception of public relations as a ‘balancing 
act’ between practices of conformation and delimitation in reputation management. In discussing 
this application we primarily adhered to the question of theoretical coherency and, by elaborating 
some conceptual differences between Habermas’ and Weber’s concepts, demonstrated that the 
application in question draws on a concept of rationality that is quintessentially incompatible with 
Habermas’ theory. 
In the moral perspective we presented three applications of Habermas’ universalization princi-
ple as well as his concepts of discourse and ideal speech that contribute to the grounding and 
enactment of public relations ethics (chap. 3.3). First we demonstrated an application that devel-
ops the study of business ethics as the study of public relations practice by paralleling the latter 
with aspects of ethical communication as found in Habermas’ concept of discourse ethics—an 
application that eventually conceives of public relations as managing the moral dimension of or-
ganizational conduct. Ultimately we questioned the application’s conceptualization of public rela-
tions in intersubjective and discursive terms as well as its ‘emphatic’ idea of practically realizing 
public relations as the ‘moral conscience’. Second we depicted an effort that attempts to apply 
discourse ethics to codes of ethics in public relations. Following, we stressed that this effort fo-
cuses on codes of ethics in general rather than on particular aspects of codes of ethics in public 
relations. Furthermore we raised the pivotal question of whether Habermas’ concept can at all be 
coherently applied to the grounding of substantial norms in public relations. Third we presented 
an application that derives five concrete steps from Habermas’ principle of universalization, al-
lowing organizations to enact discourse ethics. Furthermore we discussed a number of practical 
challenges that emerge from this effort, like the difficulty of determining where to cut off circles 
of involvement or the fundamental contradiction between forms of ideal speech and an organiza-
tion’s system rationality. After that we raised further questions regarding the realization of the 
application within different organizational forms as well as by means of different forms of com-
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munication and alluded to possible theoretical incoherencies. Generally, all the applications dealt 
with in this ‘perspective’ led us to assume some unjustified overextensions of Habermas’ concept 
of discourse ethics and ultimately appeared to advocate a restrictive concept of ethics that 
Habermas himself has long since rejected. 
In the societal perspective we presented two possible applications of Habermas’ theory that al-
low for a conceptualization of public relations in a macro societal context (chap. 3.4). First we 
demonstrated an application that can show how concepts of a company’s economic, legal and 
social responsibilities developed historically, and how the currently predominant concept can be 
associated with the emergence of a new function of the public sphere that is suited for connec-
tion with Habermas’ theory: the public sphere processes of organizational legitimacy and identity. 
These processes are than established as the central challenge of current public relations. In the 
discussion of the application we emphasized the restricted consideration of economic organiza-
tions and formulated further questions regarding the possibilities of including non-economic 
forms of organization in the established framework. Second we outlined an application that ap-
proaches core concepts of public relations by drawing on Habermas’ concept of the public 
sphere as well as his distinction between lifeworld and system. The application’s emphasis on 
power allows for the distinction of different types of publics, different types of organizations, 
and different types of relations between them. In discussing this effort we alluded to some eli-
sions, especially focused on the challenge of a consistent distinction between the suggested types 
of organizations, and ultimately raised further questions regarding theoretical coherency and con-
ceptualization of multiple and diversified public spheres. 
Succeeding these investigations within the different ‘perspectives’ we conducted some gen-
eral and comprehensive reflections regarding the discussed applications (chap. 4). After empha-
sizing the different theoretical foci and the varying complexity of the applications, we ‘con-
densed’ the various questions raised in the course of our previous discussions to three (intersect-
ing) groups that summarize key aspects of the established ‘perspectives’, forms and processes of 
communication as well as conceptual coherency. We then assumed a more abstract perspective 
from which we collected some comprehensive and categorical insights on the scope of the appli-
cations presented. In so doing we emphasized that, though drawing on the same theoretical 
framework, these applications partially produce strikingly contradicting (dialogical/strategic) con-
cepts of public relations. We were consequently led to further emphasize a suspicion already put 
forth within some of the discussion in chapter 3: the possibility of manifest theoretical aporia in 
some of the applications. After we presented in detail how public relations is conceived in terms 
of Habermas’ theory by drawing on the author’s early considerations on the press and its chang-
ing functions as well as later revisions and theoretical recontextualizations, we further elucidated 
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whether and how some of the applications hold theoretical aporia regarding Habermas’ concepts. 
With reference to the concepts of discourse ethics, communicative action, the public sphere and 
deliberative democracy, as well as lifeworld and system, we demonstrated that a number of appli-
cations of Habermas’ theory fundamentally differ with their theoretical framework and may in 
fact be ‘accused’ of contributing to the false ideology Habermas aims to unmask. 
In our final chapter we then further explored some aspects associated with the moral and 
the societal ‘perspective’ (chap. 5). In embarking on considerations of discourse ethics and public 
relations we first assessed the question of whether Habermas’ theory can be applied to the 
grounding of substantial norms in public relations. Here we succeeded in demonstrating how 
such endeavors produce inevitable contradictions. Second we initiated further considerations on 
public relations as the ‘moral conscience’ of an organization in light of questions concerning 
moral responsibility for the natural environment. Having discussed discourse ethics’ difficulties 
regarding the natural environment we concluded that claims to include the natural environment 
as a stakeholder (as put forth e.g. in the application presented in chapter 3.1.2) lack sufficient 
theoretical grounding. We also argued that Habermas’ concept can indeed be viewed as promot-
ing ignorance of the natural environment and thus constitutes a dubious theoretical resource for 
grounding and enacting public relations ethics that aims to be ‘environmentally conscious’. Ulti-
mately we briefly assessed the general constraints of discourse ethics to emphasize seemingly 
naïve assumptions in applications that entirely disregard this fundamental critique. In moreover 
embarking on further considerations regarding macro societal aspects we elucidated how to con-
ceive of public relations’ influence on the public sphere, especially focusing on the role of medi-
ated mass communication, by drawing on Habermas’ recent considerations on political commu-
nication. After we established Habermas’ concept of unequal influence of different actors on 
public sphere processes, we elaborated on ‘reflexivity’ and ‘crises consciousness’ as two parame-
ters that resist a far too negative understanding of systematic public relations practices encroach-
ing on the public sphere and dissolving rational forms of opinion-formation. Ultimately we 
picked up some considerations on the difficulty of distinguishing types of organizations practic-
ing public relations on the basis of Habermas’ concepts. Here we suggested turning to the con-
cept of ‘double politics’ for a clarification on the basis of actual forms of communication.  
6.2 Conclusion 
When returning to our preliminary overview of current public relations research, we can place 
our investigations in some perspective. Entering into our efforts, we have already stressed that, 
within the coarsely mashed ‘grid’ of research fields constituting the ‘discipline’ of public relations 
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research, our emphasis consisted of terminological and theoretical reflections.96 Regarding the 
scientific disciplines most relevant for research in public relations the above considerations were 
concerned with social theory, a field that is currently becoming increasingly important in public 
relations research (Ihlen, Ruler, 2009; Ihlen, Verhoeven, 2009; see also chap. 2.1.4). With regard 
to the general debate on public relations theory we conclude that the applications discussed in the 
different ‘perspectives’ offer insights primarily regarding the micro-level of individual interactions 
(e.g. chap. 3.2), as well as the macro level of societal structures (e.g. chap. 3.4). Furthermore we 
have seen that Habermas’ theory is applied for conceptualizing symmetrical as well as asymmetri-
cal public relations. 
In interpreting our investigations in light of the current debates in public relations research 
we can also see how some of the general challenges and deficiencies of the field are reflected in 
the applications demonstrated and discussed here. Examining the previously mentioned challenge 
regarding characteristic shortcomings of theoretical approaches to public relations conducted 
within different disciplines, for instance, we find that the better half of applications of Habermas’ 
theory—as is typical for social theory-based approaches—lack attention to questions assessed in 
organizational theory and business. Minor exceptions in this regard are, for example, 
Meisenbach’s (2006) reference to the possibility of further considerations on the organizational 
level, or the basic deliberations on general forms of organizations conducted by Leitch and 
Neilson (2001). Furthermore, if organizations as such are part of the considerations, we see that 
the applications tend to focus primarily on economic organizations, like in Eisenegger and Imhof 
(2008) or Jensen (2001).97 As we clarified initially, such a focus on business is a further, character-
istic shortcoming found in current public relations research. Another common research defi-
ciency is reflected by the discussed applications: some of the applications dealt with here contrib-
ute to the common ignoring of the perspective of the recipient. As we have demonstrated, sev-
eral of the applications simply presume certain needs (e.g. demand for dialog; cf. chap. 3.2.1) or 
interests (e.g. relevant information; cf. chap. 3.1) of stakeholders, instead of empirically analyzing 
them. Another common deficiency is reflected not in the applications but in Habermas’ own 
concept of public relations, namely the preeminent focus on journalism. Habermas, much like 
public relations research based on classical communication studies, primarily considers public 
                                                
96 Regarding the ‘knowledge production’ on the level of student theses in the field of public relations research, this 
may be seen as a distinguishing feature of our effort, since only a minimal fraction of these works are dedicated to 
review and reflection of public relations theory (c.f. Signitzer, 1992; Röttger et al., 2003). 
97 Unlike Jensen (2001), who solely refers to companies, Eisenegger and Imhof (2008) generally design their model as 
applicable for various forms of organizations (cf. chap. 3.2.3). Nevertheless, when methodically illustrating the 
model the researchers are exclusively concerned with large corporations (cf. Eisenegger, Imhof, 2008: 136–142). 
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relations in terms of a ‘dangerous influence’ on journalism (cf. chap. 4.3.1 and 5.2)—this tends to 
lead to a reduction of public relations to mere ‘press work’. 
When we now assume a more abstract position and, instead of looking at the objects of in-
vestigation, concentrate on the general effort and focus of our approach, we can conclude that 
this thesis particularly responds to presently prevailing desiderata in public relations research. In 
fact, this thesis provides investigations into all basic categories, which Röttger characterizes as 
present deficiencies in the field (cf. Röttger, 2009b; or chap. 2.1.4): we (a) enfold basic and the-
ory-led discussions, (b) provide considerations on the level of societal public relations theory, (c) 
include considerations on the public sphere, and (d) provide—especially in focusing on Haber-
mas’ theory and applications drawing on it—investigations which extend beyond the common 
framework of systems theory. The latter, that is the field’s domination by systems theory, is pres-
ently criticized due to the ‘paradigm’s’ resistance of the meso- and micro-level that are becoming 
more and more important in public relations research (cf. Jarren, Röttger, 2008: 33; Röttger, 
2009b: 13). Generally speaking, this thesis responds to this problem by offering insights into the 
potentials and challenges of an action-theoretical approach that centers on those intersubjective 
processes that are excluded from concepts based on systems theory. Furthermore, our general 
effort responds to what is currently stressed as necessary and fruitful for the ‘discipline’, namely 
the review of theoretical efforts in public relations, the comparison of different approaches and 
the analysis of commonalities and incommensurabilities (cf. Bentele, Wehmeier, 2009: 241)—
indeed, this is the general endeavor to which this thesis aspires to make a modest contribution. 
6.3 Constraints and Future Prospects 
Having made some concluding remarks with reference to the overall field of research, we must 
not conceal the constraints or limitations of our efforts. First of all, the comprehensiveness of 
our approach entails some evident constraints on the ‘depth’ in which specific potentials and 
challenges could be further considered. In chapter 5 we could only selectively conduct further 
considerations on a restricted number of the many aspects that were raised in the previous inves-
tigations. In so doing, we introduced some arguments from the philosophical debate on dis-
course ethics, for instance, and applied them to questions that had risen in our earlier considera-
tions on public relations. But as Ansgar Zerfaß (2010) correctly remarks, there exists a great 
number of further arguments on basic philosophical and sociological questions within the wide 
debate on Habermas’ program that have yet to be introduced to public relations research (cf. 
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62).98 Furthermore, what remained widely unconsidered in our discussions is the fact that the 
theoretical frame of reference drawn upon by the discussed applications was and still is a ‘work in 
progress’ rather than a fixed theoretical structure (cf. White, 1988: 4f).99 In this sense the different 
applications, which in total cover a timespan of approximately twenty years, each reflect ‘stages’ 
in the overall negotiation process and development of Habermas’ theoretical framework. Subse-
quently some of the applications have been developed under slightly different yet nevertheless 
theoretically significant conditions. We see this reflected for instance when comparing Pearson’s 
(1989a) rather ‘euphoric’ application of discourse ethics with Leeper’s (1996) considerations (cf. 
chap. 3.3).100 Moreover, the general focus of our thesis entails evident limitations: by conducting 
our efforts primarily on a terminological and theoretical level, we intentionally excluded from 
consideration research regarding the field of public relations history as but one example.  
In terms of suggestions for future research, we can begin, of course, by embarking on the 
aforementioned constraints of our investigations. Thus a general request for future efforts could 
be to further introduce core arguments from the well-established debate on Habermas’ program 
into public relations discourse. Future texts on Habermas’ concepts or applications of the latter, 
conducted in the field of public relations, should make an effort to consider up-to-date argu-
ments form the debate on the theoretical framework as such. Due to the significantly less elabo-
rate debate in other languages (cf. Albert, 2003: VIII), this is especially true for those authors 
from the German-speaking discourse who have ‘barrier-free’ access to the full controversy on 
Habermas’ concepts. Another constraint of our investigations that can be reformulated in terms 
of possible future research is the limited focus on the theoretical and terminological level. Further 
prospects may lie in the exploration of reflections on public relations history; for this, Habermas’ 
                                                
98 For instance, we find a disregard of principally well-established basic criticisms from the debate on Habermas’ 
theory in the applications discussed in chapter 3.3. These largely ignore important arguments from the fundamental 
critique regarding the concept of discourse ethics (see also chap. 5.1.3). 
99 Around the late 1980s, for instance, the author fundamentally rejected some of his earlier normative assumptions 
(cf. e.g.Habermas, 1992a), and later performed a significant ‘shift’ toward pragmatism (cf. e.g.Habermas, 1999). In 
connection to the general disregard of fundamental arguments on Habermas’ theory within the field of public rela-
tions research (cf. Zerfaß, 2010: 62), we might add that significant theoretical developments of the program are 
also partially disregarded. As demonstrated above, Maier (2005) refers solely to an ‘antiquated’ version of the public 
sphere (cf. chap. 3.2.4.1), or Meisenbach (2006), who wonders about Habermas’ resistance to apply his own con-
cept (cf. chap. 3.3.4.3) when the latter has in fact long since acknowledged fundamental constraints and, hence, re-
signed from his restrictive considerations on moral theory (cf. chap. 5.1.3). A rather impressive example of such 
disregard in public relations research is the fact that Kunczik (2010), in the latest edition of his standard work Public 
Relations: Konzepte und Theorien, reproduces a version of Habermas’ concept of the ideal speech situation that in fact 
became obsolete in the 1970s (cf. 329). On the basis of this version the author then goes on to reveal Habermas’ 
apparent ignorance of the utopian character of his concept, interpreting it as representative of the conditions of an 
ideal life form (cf. ibid.). Habermas, however, has argued against this understanding of the ideal speech situation 
since the late 1970s, and he now labels it a fallacy of misplaced concreteness (cf. Habermas, 1995: 152)—since his 
work Faktizität und Geltung (1992a) he has stopped using the term altogether. See also Koller (2004: 81f). 
100 In this respect, see also footnote 67 drawn out in the course of the discussion on Leeper’s application (chap. 
3.3.4.2, page 59). 
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theory also holds great potential (cf. Bentele, Wehmeier, 2009: 247). One possible starting point 
for such an endeavor is provided in Habermas’ socio-historical considerations on the public 
sphere. Marvin Olasky (1987), for instance, draws on Habermas’ Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit 
(1962) to historically distinguish public relations from ‘private relations’. His approach to the 
history of public relations in a corporate setting, however, has so far not received much attention 
or animated further research (cf. Ruler, Vercic, 2008: 314). Moreover, as Zerfaß (2010) points 
out, Habermas’ considerations from his seminal work Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (1981a, 
1981b) can further contribute to public relations research by helping to elucidate differences be-
tween persuasive and argumentative as well as between personal and mass-medial forms of 
communication. In public relations research, these aspects have yet to be elaborated on the basis 
of Habermas’ theory (cf. Zerfaß, 2010: 60). Compared to the applications in the practical and 
moral ‘perspective’ that conceive of public relations more or less as communicative action, and 
thus entail some fundamental theoretical aporia, we may find that those efforts demonstrated 
within the ‘societal perspective’ offer more prospects for future research. These include an ac-
count of power that is generally coherent with Habermas’ concepts and make no efforts to en-
gage in an ethical and intellectual project that, from the perspective of current public relations 
research, can be labeled as obsolete (cf. Benson, 2008: 18). Furthermore, a prospect regarding the 
‘evaluative perspective’ may be found in recent efforts to operationalize Habermas’ concept of 
deliberative democracy for empirical research. A number of articles collected in an Acta Politica 
special issue on empirical approaches to deliberative democracy may provide some initial sugges-
tions in this regard. Even though none of the authors deal specifically with public relations, some 
of the effort may, nonetheless, inspire research in the field; we want to provide some basic exam-
ples: with reference to Katharina Holzinger (2005), for instance, who investigates correlations 
between types of conflicts and modes of communication, one could further elucidate the correla-
tion between symmetrical (or asymmetrical) public relations practices and different contexts of 
conflict; or with reference to Simone Chambers’ (2005) article on Measuring Publicity’s Effect one 
could further elucidate public relation’s effect on the public’s capacity to reason and produce 
considerate public opinions; or with reference to Patrizia Nanz and Jens Steffek (2005), one 
could assess the effectiveness of civil society organizations’ public relations practice regarding the 
‘stimulation’ of the ‘political center’. Of course, these are merely some of many initial opportuni-
ties from which to commence further research in the field.  
Ultimately, every effort to further apply Habermas’ theory to public relations or—as done 
here—provide reflections on the same, contributes to the overall endeavor of further testing the 
fruitfulness of Habermas’ program as such. This fulfills the very process Habermas desires when 
he emphasizes the “fully open character and the flexibility” of his approach (Habermas, 1987: 
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383). Indeed this process of repeated testing is far from over: as Jan Philipp Reemtsma (2001) 
comments: “Habermas zu historisieren heißt, die von ihm selbst betonte Offenheit seines Werkes 
als Anschlusschance zu nutzen mit ihm über das 21. Jahrhundert nachzudenken” (57).xxxviii  
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Endnotes 
 
i Trans.: “For the communicative model of action, language is relevant only from the pragmatic 
viewpoint that speakers, in employing sentences with an orientation to reaching under-
standing, take up relations to the world, not only directly as in teleological, normatively 
regulated, or dramaturgical action, but in a reflective way. [...] They no longer relate 
straightaway to something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds; instead they relativ-
ize their utterances against the possibility that their validity will be contested by other ac-
tors” (Habermas, 1984a: 98f, italics in original). 
ii Trans.: “[...] a speaker can rationally motivate a hearer to accept his speech act offer because—on 
the basis of an internal connection between validity, validity claim, and redemption of a 
validity claim—he can assume the warranty [Gewähr] for providing, if necessary, convinc-
ing reasons that would stand up to a hearer’s criticism of the validity claim” (Habermas, 
1984a: 302, italics in original). 
iii Trans.: “[...] communicative reason does not simply encounter ready-made subjects or systems; 
rather, it takes part in structuring what is to be preserved. The utopian perspective of rec-
onciliation and freedom is [...] built into the linguistic mechanism of the reproduction of 
the species” (Habermas, 1984a: 398). 
iv Trans.: “In fact, however, [...] goal-directed actions are coordinated not only through processes 
of reaching understanding, but also through functional interactions that are not intended 
[...] and are usually not even perceived within the horizon of everyday practice” 
(Habermas, 1987: 150). 
v Trans.: “[...] all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general 
observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the in-
terests of each individual” (Habermas, 1990a: 93, italics in original). 
vi Trans.: “The truth of propositions seems to signify the existence of states of affairs in much the 
same way as the rightness of actions signifies the observance of norms” (Habermas, 1990a: 
59f, italics in original). 
vii Trans.: “(3.1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. (3.2) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever [...], is allowed to 
introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse, [... and] allowed to express his atti-
tudes, desires, and needs. (3.3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external co-
ercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (3.1) and (3.2)” (Habermas, 1990a: 89). 
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viii Trans.: “The bourgeois public sphere may be considered above all as the sphere of private 
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from 
above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the gen-
eral rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labor” (Habermas, 1989: 27). 
ix Trans.: “The ‘domination’ of the public, according to its own idea, was an order in which 
domination itself was dissolved” (Habermas, 1989: 84). 
x Trans.: “Public opinion remains the object of domination even when it forces the letter to make 
concessions or to reorient itself. It is not bound to rules of public discussion or forms of 
verbalization in general, nor need it be concerned with political problems or even be ad-
dressed to political authorities” (Habermas, 1989: 343). 
xi Trans.: “[...] my diagnosis of a unilinear development from a politically active public to one 
withdrawn into a bad privacy, from a ‘culture-debating to a culture-consuming public’, is 
too simplistic. At the time, I was too pessimistic about the resisting power and above all 
the critical potential of a pluralistic, internally much differentiated mass public whose cul-
tural usages have begun to shake off the constraints of class” (Habermas, 1992b: 438). 
xii Trans.: “In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary structure between 
the political system, on the one hand, and the private sectors of the lifeworld and func-
tional systems, on the other. It represents a highly complex network that branches out 
into a multitude of overlapping international, national, regional, local, and subcultural 
arenas. Functional specifications, thematic foci, policy fields, and so forth, provide the 
points of reference for a substantive differentiation of public spheres that are, however, 
still accessible to laypersons (for example, popular science and literary publics, religious 
and artistic publics, feminist and ‘alternative’ publics, publics concerned with health-care 
issues, social welfare, or environmental policy). Moreover, the public sphere is differenti-
ated into levels according to the density of communication, organizational complexity, 
and range—from the episodic publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; 
through the occasional or ‘arranged’ publics of particular presentations and events, such as 
theater performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or church congresses; up to abstract 
public spheres of isolated readers, listeners, and viewers scattered across large geographic 
areas, or even around the globe, and brought together only through mass media” 
(Habermas, 1996: 373f; italics in original). 
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xiii Trans.: “Comprehensibility is a claim that is already redeemed when general communication 
proceeds undisturbed. Thus I want to refer to ‘comprehensibility’ as a precondition of 
communication in general, not as a (discursive or non-discursive) validity claim that is 
raised within communication” [our own translation]. 
xiv Trans.: “The discourse-centered theoretical approach has the advantage of being able to spec-
ify the preconditions of communication that have to be fulfilled in the various forms of 
rational debate and in negotiations if the results of such discourses are to be presumed to 
be rational. Therewith this approach opens up the possibility of linking normative consid-
erations to empirical sociological ones” (Habermas, 1992b: 448). 
xv Trans.: “We have distinguished genuine imperatives, with which the speaker connects a claim 
to power, from speech acts with which the speaker raises a criticizable validity claim. 
Whereas validity claims are internally connected with grounds and give the illocutionary 
act a rationally motivating force, power claims have to be covered by a potential for sanc-
tion if they are to be successful” (Habermas, 1984a: 304). 
xvi Trans.: “Weber was not able to make his unofficial typology of action fruitful for the problem-
atic of social rationalization. The official version, however, is so narrowly conceived that 
in its framework social action can be assessed only under the aspect of purposive-
rationality” (Habermas, 1984a: 284). 
xvii Trans.: “effective in the mode of a transmitter and amplifier, no longer a mere vehicle for the 
transportation of information but not yet a medium for culture as an object of consump-
tion” (Habermas, 1989: 183). 
xviii Trans.: “Ever since the marketing of the editorial section became independent with that of the 
advertising section, the press (until then an institution of private people insofar as they 
constituted a public) became an institution of certain participants in the public sphere in 
their capacity as private individuals; that is, it became the gate through which privileged 
private interests invaded the public sphere” (Habermas, 1989: 185). 
xix Trans.: “Private advertisements are always directed to other private people insofar as they are 
consumers; the addressee of public relations is ‘public opinion’, or the private citizens as 
the public and not directly as consumers” (Habermas, 1989: 193). 
xx Trans.: “The influencing of customers borrows its connotations from the classic idea of a pub-
lic of private people putting their reason to use and exploits its legitimations for its own 
ends. The accepted functions of the public sphere are integrated into the competition or 
organized private interests” (Habermas, 1989: 193). 
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xxi Trans.: “For the criteria of rationality are completely lacking in a consensus created by sophis-
ticated opinion-molding services under the aegis of a sham public interest” (Habermas, 
1989: 195). 
xxii Trans.: “In the measure that it is shaped by public relations, the public sphere of civil society 
again takes on feudal features. The ‘suppliers’ display a show pomp before customers 
ready to follow. Publicity imitates the kind of aura proper to the personal prestige and su-
pernatural authority once bestowed by the kind of publicity involved in representation” 
(Habermas, 1989: 195). 
xxiii Trans.: “The anthropocentric profile of theories of the Kantian type seems to render them 
blind to questions of the moral responsibility of human beings for their non-human envi-
ronment” (Habermas, 1993: 105). 
xxiv Trans.: “Let us assume that it is only by virtue of the suffering and sacrifice of past genera-
tions that subsequent generations can enjoy an instrumentalised freedom, can enjoy, if 
not exactly a just order, then procedures that minimise injustice—could they call a world 
that has such a basis a ‘just’ world? (Habermas, 1982: 246) 
xxv Trans.: “In this respect ‘compassion’, compassion for the violation of moral or bodily integrity 
[of past generations], is a limit concept of the discourse ethic, just as nature-in-itself is a 
limit concept of the transcendental-pragmatic theory of knowledge” (Habermas, 1982: 
247). 
xxvi Trans.: “[...] we have a sense of being under categorical obligations toward animals. The hor-
ror inspired by the torment of animals is, at any rate, more closely related to outrage at 
the violation of moral demands than to the pitying or condescending attitude toward 
people who, as we are wont to say, have made nothing of their lives [...]. We ‘ought’ not 
to neglect animals callously, much less cruelly torment them” (Habermas, 1993: 107). 
xxvii Trans.: “Compassion for tormented animals and the pain caused by the destruction of 
biotopes are surely manifestations of moral intuitions that cannot be fully satisfied by the 
collective narcissism of what in the final analysis is an anthropocentric way of looking at 
things” (Habermas, 1990a: 211). 
xxviii Trans.: “[...] my modest opinion about what philosophy can and cannot accomplish may 
come as a disappointment. Be that as it may, philosophy cannot absolve anyone of moral 
responsibility. And that includes philosophers, for like everyone else, they face moral-
practical issues of great complexity, and the first thing they might profitably do is to get a 
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clearer view of the situation they find themselves in. The historical and social sciences can 
be of greater help in this endeavor than philosophy” (Habermas, 1993: 211).  
xxix Trans.: “’Influence’ feeds on the resource of mutual understanding, but it is based on advanc-
ing trust in beliefs that are not currently tested. In this sense, public opinion represents 
political potentials [...]” (Habermas, 1996: 439). 
xxx Trans.: “Detached from simple interactions, the semantic contents begin floating beyond the 
imperative force inherent to mutually raised validity claims” [our own translation]. 
xxxi Trans.: “These actors do not debate with one another, but aim at the opinion-formation of an 
anonymous public without having to be responsive to it” [our own translation]. 
xxxii Trans.: “Thanks to a higher degree of organization and larger material resources, lobbies and 
special interest groups are in the position to employ professional techniques in public re-
lations and political marketing so as to transform social power into political influence” 
[our own translation]. 
xxxiii Trans.: “[...] associations certainly do not represent the most conspicuous element of a public 
sphere dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market and opinion re-
search, and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and advertising of politi-
cal parties and groups” (Habermas, 1996: 367). 
xxxiv Trans.: “[...] in general, one can say that even in more or less power-ridden public spheres, 
the power relations shift as soon as the perception of relevant social problems evokes a 
crisis consciousness at the periphery” (Habermas, 1996: 382; italics in original). 
xxxv Trans.: “Organizations, groups, and advocates that allegedly defend public interests may at 
times apply means of corporate communication management” [our own translation]. 
xxxvi Trans.: “[...] with their programs, they directly influence the political system, but at the same 
time they are also reflexively concerned with revitalizing and enlarging civil society and 
the public sphere as well as with confirming their own identities and capacities to act” 
(Habermas, 1996: 370). 
xxxvii Trans.: “The very existence of social movements [...] depends on whether they find organiza-
tional forms that produce solidarities and publics, forms that allow them to fully utilize 
and radicalize existing communication rights and structures as they pursue special goals” 
(Habermas, 1996: 376; italics added). 
xxxviii Trans.: “To historicize Habermas means to make use of the very openness he emphasizes in 
his works as a chance to reflect with him on the 21st century” [our own translation]. 
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